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Abstract: In contemporary discussions it is often assumed that God cannot be timeless 
if presentism is true, but that God can be timeless if four-dimensional eternalism is 
true. I argue that the Christian God cannot be timeless on either ontology of time. 
Contemporary atemporalists have not fully grasped the details of eternalism, nor 
fleshed out the implications of eternalism for understanding the Christian doctrines of 
creation, conservation, and incarnation. Once the details are developed, it can be 
shown that eternalism is not compatible with divine timelessness. Instead, the 
Christian God would be temporal as understood on eternalism. In order to 
demonstrate this, I shall do the following in this thesis. In chapter 1 I shall lay out the 
relevant desiderata and methods for assessing the doctrine of divine timelessness. 
Chapter 2 will give an up-to-date discussion of the philosophy of time, and lay out the 
theories that are needed to understand the doctrine of divine timelessness. Chapter 3 
will articulate the traditional doctrine of divine timelessness and develop its 
systematic connections to the doctrines of divine immutability and simplicity. Chapter 
4 shall argue that the classical Christian theologians were committed to presentism. It 
shall also argue that their commitment to presentism conflicts with their commitment 
to divine timelessness and omniscience. In chapter 5 I shall argue that classical 
Christian theology cannot reconcile divine timelessness with their doctrines of 
creation and conservation. In chapter 6, it will be shown how four-dimensional 
eternalism can help Christian theology solve some of these problems for divine 
timelessness. However, it will also be argued that four-dimensional eternalism 
conflicts with Christian theology, and that four-dimensional eternalism is not 
compatible with divine timelessness. Chapter 7 offers a thorough examination of the 
doctrine of the incarnation. It is argued that divine timelessness is not compatible with 
the incarnation.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 This is a work on God’s relationship to time. I have entitled it In Search of a 
Timeless God because that is precisely what I intend to do. Is there a way for the 
Christian God to be timeless? In order to answer this question several issues will need 
to be considered. Who is the Christian God? What are Christians committed to with 
regard to God’s relationship with creation? What is time? What is eternity? How do 
the two relate to one another? All of these questions will be taken up throughout this 
thesis. What concerns us at this point is how one goes about assessing the answers to 
these questions. I propose that we can take the doctrine of divine timelessness as a 
research program and judge it accordingly. First, we will need to know what a 
research program is, and then we can start to discuss what will be involved in a 
Christian research program that promotes divine timelessness.  
 
Research Programs 
 Within philosophy of science the concept of a research program has been of 
great importance in the past few decades. One element of research programs is that 
they are “maximal sets of methodological dispositions.”1 The basic idea is that a 
research program contains a set of theories about a particular facet of reality, a 
corresponding set of relevant data, and a set of methodological dispositions for 
assessing the data.
2
 Each program will have a hardcore theory or set of theories that 
                                                 
1
 Michael C. Rea, World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3.  
2
 Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, 
Religion, and Ethics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 52. 
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are not open to revision.
3
 It will also contain a set of auxiliary theories that are subject 
to revision and confirmation. The auxiliary theories can serve to confirm the hardcore 
theory. If a particular auxiliary theory continually lacks confirmation it can be 
discarded without necessitating that the whole research program be discarded.
4
  As 
such, it is possible to revise various aspects of one’s program as new evidence comes 
along. 
 In order to begin rational inquiry into any subject one must already be working 
from a particular research program. This is because one cannot consider evidence 
prior to having methodological dispositions.
5
 It is not possible to weigh evidence 
unless one has some idea of what would count as evidence for or against a particular 
theory. In other words, evidence is useless apart from a research program.  
The claim of contemporary philosophy of science is that all theories are 
underdetermined by the evidence.
6
 As such there can never be enough definitive 
evidence (100% proof) so that one could answer as to whether or not a particular 
research program is true or false. That is, of course, assuming the particular research 
program is logically coherent. Something that is logically incoherent cannot possibly 
be true.  
Since logically coherent research programs are underdetermined by the 
evidence it can be difficult to know which research program one ought to adopt. 
Research programs can be either progressive or degenerating. In order to tell the 
difference between a progressive or degenerate research program one will need to be 
aware of several criteria. First, it will need to have internal coherence—the research 
program is not fraught with internal difficulties. Second, there is explanatory power—
                                                 
3
 Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 52. 
4
 Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 52. 
5
 Rea, World Without Design, 2. 
6
 Del Ratzsch, Science and Its Limits: The Natural Sciences in Christian Perspective 
(Downer’s Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 18-9. 
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the ability of a theory to explain the phenomena under consideration. Third, there is 
predictive power—the ability of a theory to continually and accurately make 
predictions as well as make testable claims. Fourth, epistemic fit—the plausibility of 
the theory with other beliefs we take to be true. Fifth, simplicity—a theory that has 
the least unnecessarily complex claims is more likely to be true.
7
 
A progressive research program will be one that has greater internal coherence 
than any rival. It can explain all of the phenomena better than any other. Perhaps it 
can explain more things than its rival, or even be able to incorporate all of the claims 
of its rival. It will also have a greater predictive power than its rival. It will make the 
observed phenomena more likely to be true. Next, it will also have a better epistemic 
fit than any rival.  
In some scenarios there are several competing progressive research programs 
that can account for a body of phenomena. In such cases each research program has 
great internal coherence, explanatory power, predictive power, and epistemic fit. 
When this occurs the criteria of simplicity comes into play. The hypothesis that has 
the least unnecessary complex claims is held to be more likely true than its rivals.  
 
A Christian Research Program 
 Anyone wishing to examine God’s relationship to time will need to have some 
basic Christian commitments in mind. The hardcore of any Christian research 
program will contain several hypotheses that are not revisable. The hardcore 
hypotheses cannot be given up if one wishes to continue working on a Christian 
research program. The following hypotheses are included in any Christian research 
                                                 
7
 Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God 2
nd
 Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), chapters 2-4.  
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program. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the hardcore commitments of 
Christian belief. Instead, this is a list of the relevant hardcore commitments.  
 (1) The triune God created the universe ex nihilo and continually sustains it in 
existence moment by moment. The entire universe depends for its existence on the 
will of God. At minimum, God providentially guides history towards its ultimate goal 
in some general mediated way. The ultimate goal of creation is the reconciliation of 
all things with God. (Col. 1:15-20) How God goes about providentially guiding 
history is going to be a part of one’s auxiliary hypotheses, but the hardcore will 
contain the hypothesis that the triune God does act in some providential way.  
 (2) The hardcore will also include the claim that God is directly involved in 
history through personal revelatory acts. As Bruce Ware explains, “Distinctive of the 
biblical witness of God as over and against both Near Eastern and Greek conceptions 
is this fundamental conviction that the one and only true God has involved himself 
personally at every level of his created order.”8 Bruce C. Birch, Walter Brueggemann, 
Terence E. Fretheim, and David L. Petersen concur.  
[T]he God of the opening chapters of Genesis is portrayed as a relational God. 
Most basically, God is present and active in the world, enters into a 
relationship of integrity with the world, and does so in such a way that both 
world and God are affected by that interaction. God has chosen not to remain 
aloof from the creation but to get caught up with the creatures in moving 
towards the divine purposes for the world.
9
 
 
How one understands God’s involvement in history and divine action will be a 
part of one’s auxiliary hypotheses. These acts could be understood as interventions or 
violations of the laws of nature. Or they could be understood in a non-interventionist 
                                                 
8
 Bruce Ware, “A Modified Calvinist Doctrine of God,” in ed. Bruce Ware, Perspectives on 
the Doctrine of God: 4 Views (Nashville: B&H Publishing, 2008), 81. 
9
 Bruce C. Birch, Walter Brueggemann, Terence E. Fretheim, and David L. Petersen, A 
Theological Introduction to the Old Testament (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1999), 42. 
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way.
10
 Either way, the Christian is committed to the claim that God acts in special 
ways in history. For instance, God brought about the exodus of the Israelites. This 
story involves God acting in special ways at specific times, and any Christian research 
program will need to be able to account for this epoch of history and many others like 
it.  
 (3) The hardcore of any Christian research program will also include an 
account of covenants. The God of the Bible is a God who freely establishes covenants 
with human persons. God was under no obligation to enter into a covenant with 
Abram, but freely established a covenant with Abram. In so doing God took on a set 
of obligations. He made promises to Abram and his descendants. God promised to 
bless the entire world through Abram’s descendants. There are various ways to 
understand the covenants, and there are debates about whether or not certain 
covenants are conditional, unconditional, everlasting, or temporally limited. These 
will be a part of the auxiliary hypotheses, but a commitment to a covenantal God is a 
hardcore hypothesis.  
 (4) Another hardcore hypothesis is the doctrine of the Incarnation.  The second 
Person of the Trinity, God the Son, became incarnate at a particular point in history. I 
admit that the phrase “became incarnate” is question begging. It sounds as if there is 
an earlier state of affairs where God is not incarnate, and then a temporally later state 
of affairs where God is incarnate.
11
 As such, God cannot possibly be timeless since 
He has temporal moments in His life. It would be better to state the doctrine of the 
                                                 
10
 Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, chapter 5. Murphy, “Divine Action in the Natural 
Order: Buridan’s Ass and Schrodinger’s Cat,” in eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur 
Peacocke, Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Notre Dame: Vatican 
Press, 1995). Also, Robert John Russell, “Quantum Physics and the Theology of Non-Interventionist 
Objective Divine Action,” in eds. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, The Oxford Handbook of 
Religion and Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
11
 In fact this is often how the Patristic Fathers explain the incarnation and the Son’s pre-
existence. One example is found in Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate 9.6. “There is a distinction between 
the three states: God, before his human life; then God-and-man; and thereafter wholly God and wholly 
man.”   
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incarnation in a way that doesn’t automatically favor divine temporality. Whether or 
not this is possible will be taken up in chapter 7. For now it is sufficient to point out 
that any Christian research program will include the doctrine of the incarnation. There 
are various models of the incarnation that will make up part of the auxiliary 
hypotheses. For instance, one might hold to a three-part composite Christology. This 
is where the incarnation involves the second divine Person assuming a human soul 
and body. Perhaps one might add that Christ had a divine will and a human will. 
Someone else might deny that Christ had two wills, or even that Christ had two minds 
and argue that such a view looks like Nestorianism.
12
 Instead they will posit that God 
the Son took on a human body and limited the exercise of His powers such that He 
constitutes a human person. Either way, the hardcore will include a doctrine of the 
incarnation. 
 The incarnation will have several entailments for the hardcore. First, the 
incarnation reaffirms what God declared at the beginning of creation: it is very good. 
The material world is not inherently evil or deficient. Second, creation can and does 
reveal the divine nature. It is not as if the world is inherently diametrically opposed to 
the very being of God. Third, God can and does reveal Himself in history, in time. 
Time is not diametrically opposed to the very being of God either.  
 (5) A doctrine of the Holy Spirit will also be included. Like everything else 
there are many ways to spell out the economic role of the Holy Spirit. A minimal 
claim will include something about the Holy Spirit being poured out on all flesh (Acts 
2), or that “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit.” (Rom 
5:5) The Holy Spirit is actively working in the lives of every person in order to bring 
about the reconciliation of all things to God. The Holy Spirit cannot act in someone’s 
                                                 
12
 Colin Gunton, Being and Act: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes (London: SCM 
Press, 2002), 29. 
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life until she exists. Once she exists the Holy Spirit will work in particular ways in her 
life to bring her to salvation and everlasting joy. Any Christian research program must 
be able to account for this. 
 (6) The Christian hardcore must include an adequate account of religious 
language. The God of the Bible is a God who reveals Himself to us. He is a God who 
wants us to know Him intimately. He calls us to pray to Him, worship Him, and 
interact with Him. This entails being able to stand in real relations with God and being 
able to accurately refer to God. It does not mean that we will fully comprehend God, 
but it does mean that we can have some knowledge of God. The divine act of 
revelation through prophets and ultimately through Christ entails that we can have 
knowledge of God. If we could not have any knowledge of God, it would be useless 
for God to try to reveal Himself to us. It would leave us saying, “Jesus, I know you 
are supposed to be the exact representation of God, the fullness of deity and all that, 
but…”  The ‘but’ here is intolerable to the gospel.  
 This entails that the doctrine of ineffability is false. Some might see this as a 
departure from the Christian tradition, but I see it as a happy departure, something 
worth celebrating. In my opinion no theologian actually believes in the doctrine of 
ineffability. It is something that Christian theologians may pay lip service to, but it is 
not something one can actually believe. There are two reasons for thinking this to be 
true. The first is due in part to the fact that the doctrine is self-referentially incoherent. 
It cannot even be stated in a meaningful way.
13
 It is an ill judged metaphysical 
compliment given to God. It is a misplaced piety that attempts to express the 
transcendence of God by noting the limits of human language and reason, but 
                                                 
13
 John Hick, “Ineffability,” Religious Studies 36, 2000. Keith Yandell, “The Ineffability 
Theme,” in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1975). Also, Yandell, The 
Epistemology of Religious Experience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 3. 
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ultimately lands in nonsense.
14
 One can easily maintain the limits of human reason 
and language to capture God without holding to something that is self-contradictory 
like ineffability.  Augustine’s attempt is as good as any other to state the doctrine, and 
he is forced to admit that it entails a contradiction. 
[I]f I have said anything [about God], it is not what I desired to say. How do I 
know this, except from the fact that God is unspeakable? But what I have said, 
if it had been unspeakable, could not have been spoken. And so God is not 
even to be called "unspeakable," because to say even this is to speak of Him. 
Thus there arises a curious contradiction of words, because if the unspeakable 
is what cannot be spoken of, it is not unspeakable if it can be called 
unspeakable. And this opposition of words is rather to be avoided by silence 
than to be explained away by speech. And yet God, although nothing worthy 
of His greatness can be said of Him, has condescended to accept the worship 
of men's mouths, and has desired us through the medium of our own words to 
rejoice in His praise.
15
 
 
If one notes that a position entails a contradiction, she cannot rationally hold it. I do 
not have in mind apparent contradictions like light sometimes acting like a particle 
and other times acting like a wave. What I have in mind is strict contradiction like 
speakable or unspeakable. No one can actually believe this.  
 The second reason to think that no one actually believes in the doctrine of 
ineffability is derived from the simple fact that every major Christian theologian has 
completely ignored it in practice. Augustine, John of Damascus, and Pseudo-
Dionysius are three great examples of people who pay lip service to ineffability, and 
then go on to write large treatises on the divine nature. If they really thought that God 
was ineffable, they would not continue to speak about what God is like at such great 
lengths. Nor would they so staunchly defend the doctrine of the Trinity if God were 
truly ineffable.  
An adequate account of religious language will include being able to make 
determinate claims about God. This does not exclude making indeterminate claims 
                                                 
14
 As Colin Gunton puts it, “what might appear to be a proper human modesty before the 
divine can turn into the supreme blasphemy of denying revelation.” Being and Act, 36. 
15
 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Book I.6.  
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about God, nor does it exclude using metaphor, analogy, simile, hyperbole, and all of 
the great riches of human language to talk about God.
16
  
Everything that exists has at least one property that is essential to it. Some 
properties are determinate properties while others are indeterminate.
17
 Determinate 
properties are very precise descriptions of what the subject is. For instance weighing 8 
pounds is a determinate property of a particular bowling ball. Indeterminate properties 
are more vague descriptions of a subject that are dependent upon determinate 
properties. A bowling ball that weighs 8 pounds will have several indeterminate 
properties such as having weight, having mass, and being spatially located. According 
to Keith Yandell, “[o]ne cannot have an indeterminate concept without also having 
some more determinate concept that falls under it.”18 One could not know that a 
bowling ball has weight without knowing that it has spatial extension. 
 No concept or property is an island. Properties get their meaning from a 
community or group of related concepts and properties.
19
 Some sets of properties 
simply go hand in hand. For instance, being spatially located typically goes hand in 
hand with being a physical object. Also, being a husband typically goes along with 
being married. Every subject has a property scope, or a range of applicable 
properties.
20
 Certain items cannot properly be predicated with particular properties. A 
husband cannot have the property wife because of the type of thing a husband is. A 
car cannot possess the property a prime number because a car just is not that sort of 
thing. The number 12 cannot look like you because you—assuming you are a human 
person—have a different property scope than the number 12. However, 
                                                 
16
 David K. Clark, To Know and Love God: Method for Theology (Wheaton: Crossway 
Books, 2003), chapter 12. 
17
 Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience, 86. 
18
 Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience, 87. 
19
 Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience, 67. 
20
 Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious Experience, 78-85. 
10 
 
metaphysicians will disagree on some of these points. Some deny the existence of 
negative properties like not a number. Others see negative, or sometimes called 
artificial properties, as perfectly legitimate. It is hard to tell because certain properties 
seem perfectly appropriate. It seems appropriate to predicate of the number 12 non-
personal and non-conscious because numbers are neither of those things. The reason 
this seems appropriate is because of the determinate properties of numbers seem to 
entail these more indeterminate properties.  
 With regard to religious language a proper Christian account will include all of 
this. For instance, the Christian must be able to say that God is triune. To say that God 
is triune is a determinate description of God. A Christian will also need to be able to 
say that God is the Creator, Redeemer, and Lord. If a research program cannot 
accommodate such things, it cannot be considered Christian.  
 How one goes about articulating religious language will vary, but the end goal 
is to have a determinate description of the God who created us, sustains us, and 
redeems us. One might hold to the via triplex. This is the method used by Pseudo-
Dionysius in the Divine Names and it involves a three step process in order to make 
determinate claims about God.
21
 The first step in the via triplex is the via positive. At 
this step one looks for a perfection or communicable attribute that God and creatures 
have in common like goodness. We thus positively predicate it of God by saying that 
“God is good.” Yet, say Dionysian thinkers, God is not good in the same way that we 
are good for we participate in goodness, and surely God does not participate in 
goodness (i.e. His goodness does not depend on something external to Himself). Thus, 
in the second step we remove a particular understanding of goodness from God—i.e. 
participated goodness. I say “remove” and not “negate” because Pseudo-Dionysius 
                                                 
21
 Pseudo-Dionysius’ method is often abused and misused in certain circles within 
contemporary theology. See Timothy Knepper, “Three Misuses of Dionysius for Comparative 
Theology,” Religious Studies 45 (2009). 
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typically uses aphaeresis which means “removal” instead of apophasis which means 
“negation.”22 So the second step, the via negativa, contrasts the way God and 
creatures have various properties without denying the predicates simpliciter of God. 
Which brings us to the third step: the via causalitatis. At this step a Dionysian will 
affirm that God has goodness in some superabundant way because He is the cause or 
source of all goodness. This brings us to a determinate claim about God, but it is not 
the only way to develop an account of religious language. 
Many thinkers prior and posterior to the late Middle Ages held to a doctrine of 
univocity. This is where predicates like good and being are said of God and creatures 
in the same sense. Others will follow Thomas Aquinas and hold that good is being 
used in an analogical sense. This is where good when predicated of God and creatures 
has a similar and relevant sense, but the predicate is not used univocally.
23
 Which 
theory one holds will be part of her auxiliary hypotheses, but an account of religious 
language that gives determinate descriptions of God will be a part of the hardcore of 
any Christian research program. 
 (7) Finally, any Christian research program will hold that God cannot create a 
world that is fundamentally at odds with who He is. God cannot actualize a state of 
affairs that are not compossible. For instance, when one is working on a theodicy she 
will argue that God cannot create a world where evil has the ultimate say. God is 
necessarily perfectly good. He cannot create a world that is on the whole evil because 
this would be at odds with who God is. Scripture seems quite clear on this point. The 
                                                 
22
 Knepper, “Three Misuses of Dionysius for Comparative Theology,” 209. 
23
 See E. Jennifer Ashwort, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analogy-medieval/#6. Also, Katherin Rogers, Perfect 
Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 17. William E. Mann, “Duns Scotus 
on Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God,” in ed. Thomas Williams, The Cambridge Companion 
to Duns Scotus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Clark, To Know and Love God, 
chapter 12. 
12 
 
Bible portrays a God who is radically confronting evil and promises to rid the world 
of evil.
24
 
 With regard to the topic of this thesis, what must be understood is that the 
Christian God has created the temporal universe with the intent of having an intimate 
loving relationship with His temporal creatures. He has created a universe that He can 
interact with. If a particular research program cannot account for God’s actions in 
creation, it cannot be considered a Christian research program.  
 
The Divine Timeless Research Program  
 Now that we have the generic hardcore Christian research program on the 
table it is time to look at the particular research program under consideration. The 
defender of divine timelessness will have to include all of the above in her hardcore, 
but she will also include the following three hypotheses in her hardcore: divine 
timelessness, simplicity, and strong immutability. These doctrines will be examined at 
length in later chapters. For now I will offer a brief definition of each. To say that 
God is timeless is to say that He exists without beginning, without end, without 
succession or moments in His life, and without temporal extension or location. Divine 
simplicity is the thesis that God lacks all physical and metaphysical composition. God 
has no parts or diversity in His essence. A strong doctrine of immutability will need to 
be able to prevent God from undergoing any kind of change. Otherwise, God would 
not be timeless. Typically this is taken to be that God cannot change with regard to 
intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Of course, strictly speaking, a simple God has no 
properties.  
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 These are the hardcore hypotheses of this research program. These hypotheses 
are not open to revision. If one were to revise any of these hypotheses she would be 
adopting a new research program. This is the research program that I shall examine in 
this thesis. However, this research program can have several different sets of auxiliary 
hypotheses. As such, I shall need to examine these variations as well. What are the 
auxiliary hypotheses that need to be examined? There are three that I shall primarily 
focus on in this thesis.  
 To start, one will need a theory of time. What is time? This question will be 
taken up in the next chapter. For now a few preliminary remarks are in order. There 
are several theories of time that the defender of divine timelessness can adopt. As we 
shall see later, several Christian thinkers argue that certain theories of time are 
incompatible with divine timelessness. A successful research program will hold to a 
theory of time that is compatible with the hardcore of divine timelessness. A sure and 
quick way to have an unsuccessful research program is to fail to articulate a theory of 
time. Throughout this thesis I shall be interacting with a diverse group of Christian 
thinkers. My dialogue partners do not exhaust the number of people who have 
weighed in on this topic. I do, however, think that the dialogue partners I have chosen 
are the best representatives of divine timelessness. I have intentionally excluded from 
dialogue various thinkers who have weighed in on this topic because they have failed, 
and in some instances refused, to articulate a theory of time. One of my working 
assumptions is this: no research program that seeks to explain God’s relation to time 
can even hope to be successful without articulating a coherent theory of time.
25
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 The second relevant auxiliary hypothesis is divine action. This has been a 
difficult issue for defenders of divine timelessness in the past. Part of the hardcore is 
that God acts in time in various ways. It seems that if God acts in time, He must be 
temporal. What is needed is a model of divine action where a timeless God can 
interact with a temporal creation. This is a tall order.  
 The third relevant auxiliary hypothesis that I shall examine in this thesis is the 
incarnation. There are various models of the incarnation, so perhaps there is a model 
where a timeless God can be incarnate. This would involve the humanity of the Son 
having temporality, whilst the divinity of the Son remains atemporal.  
 
Testing the Research Program 
 There are two basic ways to test the divine timeless research program. The 
first is the test of internal coherence. This involves examining how the hardcore and 
auxiliary hypotheses fit together. If they do not fit together, it is not a successful 
research program. For instance, if a version of divine timelessness entails that God 
cannot be the creator of the world, become incarnate, or that human persons cannot 
refer to God at all, it is unsuccessful. A successful research program must be 
internally coherent to even be considered a viable contender.  
If a research program can pass the first test it can move on to the second test. 
The second test involves examining arguments and evidence for and against it. This 
will involve looking at arguments for divine timelessness—are there any good reasons 
to think that God is timeless? The second test will also involve examining the 
evidence for the auxiliary hypotheses. It is the contention of many today that divine 
timelessness is only compatible with a theory of time called four-dimensional 
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eternalism. A common strategy amongst divine temporalists is to argue that four-
dimensional eternalism is false. Since divine timelessness needs four-dimensionalism, 
it falls with four-dimensionalism. A successful Christian research program committed 
to divine timelessness will need to offer reasons for thinking that God is timeless, as 
well as defend the truth of her particular theory of time.  
My strategy throughout this thesis is to see if the divine timeless research 
program can pass the first test. I shall examine the internal coherence of various 
models and argue that divine timelessness is not compatible with a presentist ontology 
of time. Unlike other temporalists, I shall also argue that four-dimensionalism is not 
compatible with divine timelessness. The main thrust of this thesis is that there are no 
successful Christian research programs that promote divine timelessness because 
divine timelessness is not compatible with any existent theory of time. Perhaps others 
will be forthcoming as discussions within the philosophy of time progress, but as of 
now the prospects for divine timelessness look bleak with regard to internal 
coherence.  
 
  
  
CHAPTER 2 
WHAT IS TIME? 
 
Among these we have just cause to account TIME; since if we keep to the 
popular and familiar use of the word, nothing can be more easily understood: 
but if we range abroad to those vast Wildernesses, the Dialectical Paraphrases 
of Philosophers thereupon, and hunt after an adequate Definition, beating its 
peculiar Genus, and essential Difference; nothing can be more obscure and 
controversial. 
—Pierre Gassendi26 
 
In this chapter the focus of the discussion shall be on the metaphysics of time. 
There are multiple issues and theories that must be put on the table and sorted out in 
order to properly deal with the question of God’s relation to time. However, I must 
first defend my approach. Some contemporary theologians and philosophers will 
question whether or not it is appropriate to start a discussion on God’s relation to time 
with an examination on the nature of time. Thinkers like Katherin Rogers and T.J. 
Mawson will argue that one should start with the doctrine of God and allow that to 
determine one’s metaphysic on time. Others like Eleonore Stump, Norman 
Kretzmann, and Brian Leftow have tried to remain agnostic on many issues regarding 
the metaphysics of time whilst articulating their doctrines of divine eternality. So why 
start with the metaphysics of time instead of delving straight into eternality?  
 The reason is quite simple. It makes no sense to ask what God’s relationship to 
x is if one does not have a clue what x in fact is. The answer will be different 
depending upon the content of x. The answer to “What is God’s relationship to 
mathematical entities?” will be different from “What is God’s relationship to 
watermelon?” The question “What is God’s relationship to sinners?” would receive a 
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different answer than “What is God’s relationship to the redeemed?” Knowing what x 
is has a significant impact upon the work that must be done. It is ill advised to ignore 
the relevant issues involved in any given project. Just imagine a theologian working 
on the doctrine of atonement trying to remain agnostic on what the human 
predicament is. The theologian will make no progress at all. In such cases agnosticism 
is a hindrance if not an absurdity.  
The situation is the same with God and time. If the project is trying to discern 
God’s relationship to time one can make no progress unless the doctrine of God and 
the metaphysics of time are both discussed. Which topic one wishes to discuss first 
may appear to be a matter of taste, but this is misguided. It is necessary to deal with 
time before asking whether or not God is temporal or atemporal. If one does not know 
what time is, she cannot meaningfully say that God is timeless. To say that God is 
timeless or atemporal is to deny of God any and all aspects of time. If one does not 
know what time is, one cannot deny it of God. It is intellectually irresponsible—if not 
outright impossible—to say that God is timeless without first having some idea of 
what time is. The concept of timelessness is dependent upon the concept of time, so 
time must be discussed first.  
Another reason that it is necessary to get clear on time is due to theological 
obscurities and confusions. Sometimes philosophers and theologians will make 
bizarre claims about time and eternity, many of which stem from a fundamental lack 
of understanding on the basic issues within the philosophy of time. For instance, one 
can find theologians saying that God is trying to save us from time, or help us 
overcome time.
27
 Once one gets a better understanding on the nature of time one will 
see that this claim is false. Part of time involves having a before and after. If a 
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temporal creature is pulled out of time—whatever that means—she will have a part of 
her life after her previous mode of existence.
28
 Thus, she has not truly escaped time.  
It is not hard to see where this confusion comes from. With regard to 
eschatology, we often speak about the forthcoming “end of time.” This phrase is 
unfortunate and derives from older translations of Revelation 10:6. For instance, the 
King James Version translates the passage as saying “time shall be no more.” Modern 
translations have corrected this error and render the passage as saying something like 
“no more delay,” (NIV and ESV) “there should be delay no longer,” (NKJV) or, “You 
won’t have to wait any longer,” (CEV). The eschatology of the Bible is best 
understood as “the end of an era” and not the end of time simpliciter. The Bible is 
concerned with the end of the age of evil, and establishing a new everlasting kingdom 
ruled by God where evil has no say anymore.
29
 The prophetic and apocalyptic authors 
in scripture are best understood as speaking of God’s everlasting kingdom—a 
kingdom that endures forever and ever amen—and not making metaphysical 
assertions to the affect that time itself will end. It would be best if one could avoid 
confusions of this sort because the anticipation of this future kingdom is meant to 
shape how we live in the here and now. Antje Jackelen makes an interesting point in 
this regard. “If detemporalization is the goal of life, questions regarding the concrete 
shaping of life in time lose their urgency.”30  
Another common confusion is to try to say that God is timeless and 
temporal.
31
 Usually there is a bit of nuance to such statements, but ultimately they 
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break down into contradiction. Closely related to this, one can find theologians saying 
that the atemporal God experiences time.
32
 Perhaps, they might say, God experiences 
time differently than we do. This is a mistake, however, because an atemporal God 
cannot experience time. To have an experience of time takes time, and this is not 
something a timeless God can do. 
A fourth confusion that is sometimes touted about is to find a third way. We 
need to get beyond the divide between timelessness or temporality, one might say.
33
 
Trying to find a third way is like hunting for snipe and haggis: it simply cannot be 
done. When it comes to whether God is temporal or atemporal, there simply is no 
third way. The two positions are logically contradictory. If they were logically 
contrary—like your pet is either a dog or a cat—we could find another option. With 
logically contradictory properties—such as either God exists or does not exist—there 
are no other options.  
A final confusion that I wish to mention is that it is sometimes claimed that a 
Trinitarian understanding of God can save divine timelessness.
34
 It is not clear, 
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however, that the doctrine of the Trinity makes a difference to the question at hand.
35
 
The doctrine of the Trinity is certainly essential for Christians, but nothing about God 
being three persons and one essence sheds light on the coherence of divine 
timelessness. This is why one can find atemporalists and temporalists both articulating 
the doctrine of the Trinity. With that being said, let us begin to examine time.  
 
The Metaphysics of Time 
 
Relational and Absolute Theories of Time 
 
What is time? One might say that time is what we use to measure change.
36
 If 
there is a change there is a time. Or one might say that if there is a change there is a 
time, but contend that time is not identical to change. Perhaps time could exist without 
change.
37
 There is disagreement over whether or not time can exist without change, 
but everyone agrees that if there is a change there is a time. (That is, unless one is an 
anti-realist about time.) 
On a relational view of time, time just is change.
38
 If there is a change there is 
a time. If no change ever occurred, then time would never occur. What must be 
understood is that any kind of change will get the job done; be it intrinsic or 
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extrinsic.
39
 From the most boring and mundane changes to the most exciting and 
dramatic changes, if there is a change there is a time. This view is fairly intuitive, and 
it is hard to find any serious objections to it. The reason one might deny it is that she 
finds it more intuitive that time can exist without change. On an absolute view of 
time, time is duration. It can exist without change or movement.  
The relational view of time dominated throughout most of Western 
Christendom. Yet as scholasticism drew to an end and the Reformation began, several 
dissenters can be found. The old Aristotelian philosophy of science started to give 
way to a new scientific revolution. Several theologians, philosophers, and scientists 
began to argue that time could exist without change, or at least without the motion of 
the celestial bodies. For instance, God could pause the movements of the heavens if 
He wanted to, and then unpause them. The argument is that time would continue 
during this period.
40
 Such speculations led some to a rejection of the relational theory 
of time. This also led several thinkers like Nicole Oresme, Pierre Gassendi, Isaac 
Newton, and Samuel Clarke to equate God’s immensity and eternity with absolute 
space and time. This move, however, led to a flight away from divine timelessness 
toward divine temporality.
41
 This flight was also due to the recognition that God not 
only causally sustains the universe in existence, but that the laws of nature are a 
manifestation of God’s continual operation in creation.42 These thinkers did not see 
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divine temporality as a problem for theology. In fact, Newton thought equating God’s 
immensity and eternity with absolute space and time was closer to the Biblical 
conception of God. He often invoked Acts 17:28, “in Him we live, and move and 
have our being.”43 
Leibniz, however, disagreed. He thought Newton’s ideas were detrimental to 
religion, and made this known in a letter which eventually sparked the famous 
correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke.
44
 Part of their debate circled around 
relational and absolute theories of time. One issue that arose from this correspondence 
was how to understand absolute time. 
For Newton, absolute time flows from God’s necessary and eternal existence. 
Absolute time always exists because God always exists.
45
 It is not that time is a 
property or attribute of God’s, but rather that it necessarily exists because of God. In 
some writings Samuel Clarke seems to hold that absolute time is an attribute of God. 
However, in several letters he attempts to make his position clear by claiming that 
absolute time, or eternity, is a mode of existence.
46
 In our own day absolute time has 
been articulated in several ways as it relates to God. For instance, J.R. Lucas argues 
that time and change are not analytically linked. “Even when nothing happens, we 
have some subjective sense of the passage of time, and that is enough to show that the 
concepts not only are distinct, but might be applied differently in some conceivable 
situation.” Just like those before him, Lucas holds that absolute time depends on the 
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personal God. Time exists because God exists. As he sees it, to “deny that God is 
temporal is to deny that he is personal in any sense in which we understand 
personality. To be a person is to be capable of being conscious, and to be conscious is 
to be aware of the passage of time.”47 Alan Padgett has offered a slightly different 
articulation of absolute time reminiscent of Isaac Barrow’s view.48 For him, “time is 
the dimension of the possibility of change. Change does not have to occur in order for 
time to occur, but the possibility of change follows from the reality of time.” With 
regard to God, Padgett holds that even before creation, “if it is possible for God to 
change, then God must in some weak sense be temporal.” The idea that it is possible 
for God to change is, in Padgett’s mind, crucial for theology. “If change was not 
possible, God could never create the world!”49 
There seems to be a possible perplexity in the notion of absolute time.  On 
some articulations of absolute time it is said that time exists regardless of the things 
contained within it. Yet theistic defenders of absolute time hold that God is 
temporal—in time. It almost seems as if absolute time could exist without God. But 
that is not the claim being made. Samuel Clarke clarifies the point as follows. 
God does not exist in space, and in time; but his existence causes space and 
time. And when, according to the analogy of vulgar speech, we say that he 
exists in all space and in all time; the words mean only that he is omnipresent 
and eternal, that is, that boundless space and time are necessary consequences 
of his existence; and not, that space and time are beings distinct from him, and 
IN which he exists.
50
 
 
Perhaps, then, the claim of theists who hold to absolute time should be 
something like the following. Time exists necessarily because an endurant God exists 
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necessarily. Time cannot exist without necessary beings, but time can exist regardless 
of what contingent beings exist within it.
51
 This distinguishes the theistic version of 
absolute time from a substantival theory of time where time is an independent being.  
A quick summary seems in order. On the one hand, there are those who say 
that time is change, while on the other there are those who hold that time can exist 
without change. But such discussions, important as they are, only get us so far at this 
juncture. Though I think that time can exist without change, my arguments in this 
thesis shall not depend upon that doctrine since defenders of divine timelessness 
overwhelmingly hold to a relational view of time.
52
 As such I shall set aside that 
issue, and assume that at the very least, if there is a change there is time. 
 
Beginning to Talk About Time 
 
A-Theory of Time 
In order to get a better handle on the nature of time the 19
th
 century 
philosopher J.M.E. McTaggart proposed two main theories of time and gave them the 
most creative names in the history of philosophy: the A- and B-theories of time.
53
 The 
A-theory goes by several names. In the literature one may come across terms like 
dynamic time, process time, and the tensed theory of time. All of these fall within the 
family of the A-theory. On this account time is held to be dynamic in the sense that it 
is constantly moving forward. There is an objective arrow of time that is rolling on. 
All events can be described in terms of past, present, or future. However, only the 
present can be spoken of as existing “now”. The “now” is treated as having some type 
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of privileged status compared with the past and the future.
54
 Every moment is relative 
to the present. 
 One reason often appealed to for holding this theory of time is that our 
language typically entails this theory of time.
55
 When we speak we often use the 
present as a reference point for all other moments of time. “Yesterday I ran into Mrs. 
Jones.” “Tomorrow I am going to the movies.” “It is raining outside right now.” This 
is because all other moments are relative to the present on this theory.
56
 Our language 
is filled with what are called A-properties and B-relations. A-properties are things that 
we predicate of moments that have pastness, presentness, and futurity.
57
 For instance, 
the sentence, “Yesterday I ran into Mrs. Jones” contains an A-property because it is 
speaking about the past. B-relations work in a similar way. These are predicated of 
things that stand in earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than relations. The 
following sentences demonstrate this idea. “The death of Socrates is earlier than the 
death of Christ.” “While Ryan was typing his paper, there was street theatre going on 
outside.” “The birth is later than the conception.”  The A-theory will use both A-
properties and B-relations in describing the temporal aspects of reality, but will 
maintain that A-properties are more fundamental than B-relations. 
 
B-Theory of Time 
 This theory can also go by several names. It may also be called static time, and 
the tenseless theory of time. On this account all instances of time are treated 
linguistically as if they have equal ontological existence. The contention of the B-
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theorist is that B-relations are more fundamental than A-properties. However, not all 
B-theorists will agree with this purely linguistic understanding of the B-theory. Many 
will argue that the B-theory entails a particular ontology of time called eternalism. 
This will be discussed below. On this understanding of the B-theory the difference 
between A- and B-theorists is not merely linguistic. Where the A-theory treated the 
present as having some objective privileged status, the B-theory holds that the past, 
present, and future are all objectively real. Technically speaking, there is no such 
thing as the past, present or future because such terms are subjective to an individual’s 
reference point and as such have no objective purchase on reality. All moments of 
time exist. None of them pass out of existence. Events are in earlier than, 
simultaneous with, and later than relations. However, the experience of change from 
one moment to the next is merely subjective human perception.
58
 The common sense 
intuition that we as humans experience a passage of time is merely an illusion.  
 B-theorists will often say that one needs to view time in spatial terms. One 
common metaphor is that time is like a map on the B-theory. Different events can be 
pointed out as if they were locations on a map because they all exist just like markers 
on a map. Or perhaps a better illustration would be that of a comic book where all of 
the panels of the comic exist and stand in sequential order.  
 
A-Theory or B-Theory? What’s the Difference? 
 It should be recalled that I mentioned earlier that the B-theory linguistically 
treats all of time as having equal ontological existence. The B-theory does not 
necessarily entail a particular ontology of time as some contend. In fact, it is not 
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obvious that the A-theory entails a particular ontology of time either. The debates 
between A- and B-theorists should now be seen to be primarily linguistic, and not 
ontological.  
For instance, one can put four A-theorists in a room. All four will be 
committed to the notion that the present has a privileged ontological status, and that 
time is essentially tensed, yet all four could disagree about the ontology of time. The 
first might say that only the present moment of time exists, while the second holds 
that the past and the present exist. The third might say that the past, present, and 
future all exist, but the now acts as a spotlight indicating which moment is present. 
The fourth person might claim that the present moment of time has the fullest degree 
of existence, but that other times have lesser degrees of existence relative to the 
present. All agree that time is tensed, and that the A-theory is true, but they do not 
agree on the ontology of time. Perhaps the A-theory is useful for getting our temporal 
language straight, but it does not seem to be useful for getting our metaphysics 
straight.  
The same seems to be true for the B-theory of time. Once upon a time a 
defender of the B-theory would reject the technical use of A-properties and seek to 
translate everything into B-relations. The old B-theorist would acknowledge that A-
properties are a part of common speech, but deny that such properties adequately 
describe reality. For many years B-theorists were engaged in the detenser project. 
This involved translating away tense from our language about time. For instance, one 
might say, “It is raining now.” This sentence contains an A-property. The old B-
theorist would try to offer an alternative tenseless sentence that contained the same 
propositional content as the tensed sentence. She might offer something like, “It rains 
at 2:00 p.m. on April 10, 2014.”  A-theorists argued that this sentence does not 
29 
 
express the same proposition as “It is raining now” and contended that tense was not 
something that could be eliminated from language about reality. In light of these 
debates a rare phenomena took place in philosophy; the kind of event that is only 
spoken of in fairy tales. A consensus arose amongst the philosophers. By the 1980’s 
philosophers realized that there is not a tenseless translation for every tensed 
statement.
59
 The B-theorists abandoned the detenser project and headed off into new 
territory. 
The new B-theory takes a different strategy. Instead of trying to eliminate 
tense from our language it seeks to offer tenseless truth conditions for tensed 
statements. Eric Olson lays out two basic rules for accomplishing this task. 1) “To 
say, at a time t, that x is present (or past, or future) is to say something that is true if 
and only if x is located at (or before, or after) t.” 2) “To say, at a time t, that x is now 
F (or was F, or will be F) is to say something that is true if and only if x is F at (or 
before, or after) t.”60  
It is at this point that we can see the B-theory need not be seen as entailing an 
ontology of time either. We can find individuals with radically different ontologies of 
time holding to the new B-theory. Individuals who hold that only the present exists, or 
that the past and present exist, or that the past, present and future all exist, can all hold 
to the B-theory of time.
61
 As with the A-theory, this may be helpful with regard to 
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getting our temporal language straight, but it is not enough to help us sort out our 
metaphysics. 
For far too long the debates over the language of time have obscured the 
discussions over the metaphysics of time. This, in turn, has obscured the discussions 
over God’s relation to time.62 As Storrs McCall points out, “Strictly speaking it is 
sentences and propositions, not time or truth or events, that are either tensed or 
tenseless.”63 The linguistic issues that are discussed in the A- and B-theories of time 
are important, but they simply do not tell us about the ontology of time. “[T]o give 
linguistic issues priority, and try to draw physical and ontological conclusions from 
them, is to put the cart before the horse.”64 In other words, if we are going to make 
any progress in our understanding of God’s relationship to time, we need to stop 
talking about how to talk about time, and begin to do metaphysics.  
Further, the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists is relatively new in the 
history of ideas. The distinction that McTaggart made was not a common distinction 
in earlier eras. The medievals, for instance, were not sensitive to such a distinction, so 
it will not be helpful to use these distinctions in assessing their thoughts.
65
 What we 
need are metaphysical ideas that have been widely held in the past and today in order 
to properly assess different accounts of God’s relation to time.  
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Getting Metaphysical 
 Knowing the basic distinction between the A-theory and B-theory of time may 
be helpful, but unfortunately not helpful enough. What will help us is looking at 
different ontologies of time and their complementary theories on persistence through 
time and change.  
 
Presentism, Four-Dimensionalism, and Persistence Through Time 
Four-dimensionalism and presentism are both theories about the ontology of 
time, or about what moments of time exist. Each is typically linked with a theory of 
change and persistence through time. Presentism is usually held alongside 
endurantism, whereas four-dimensionalism and perdurantism are taken as a package 
deal. Allow me to elaborate. 
Presentism is the thesis that only the present, the now, exists. The past no 
longer exists and the future does not yet exist.
66
 Time involves temporal becoming, or 
absolute generation, as well as real passage from one moment to the next. New things 
that did not formerly exist come into existence, and other things pass out of or cease 
to exist.
67
 For the presentist, it simply is the case that the only objects that exist are the 
ones that presently exist. As Trenton Merricks says of presentism, “an object has only 
those properties it has at the present time. The difference between past, present, and 
future is metaphysical, not perspectival.”68  
On presentism, an object endures through time by existing as a whole, or all at 
once. To say that an object endures through time is to say that an object is wholly 
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present at each moment of its existence. Numerically one and the same object exists at 
each time that it exists, and it does not have parts laying about at other times. Let us 
say that some object O begins to exist at time t1 and persists all the way through to 
time t3. On this account O exists entirely at each instant of time. Given presentism, as 
t2
 
comes into existence t1 ceases to exist and t3 does not yet exist. So O exists entirely 
at each instant only when that instant is the present. It is not as if O exists wholly at all 
of the instants of t1
 
through t3 simultaneously because all of those instances do not 
have equal ontological existence. As O endures through time it will gain and lose 
various accidental, or non-essential, properties. Let us say that O is an armchair. At t1 
the armchair is blue, and then at t2 someone paints the armchair such that at t3 the 
armchair is red. The armchair has retained all of its essential properties, but it has lost 
one accidental property—that of being blue—and gained a new accidental property—
that of being red.  
Four-Dimensionalism comes in two forms, but both have the same basic 
feature of seeing time as a four-dimensional spacetime manifold.
69
 On the eternalist 
version of four-dimensionalism all moments of time have equal ontological existence. 
To put it roughly the past, present, and the future all exist, they are all equally real. To 
put it more technically there is no real distinction between past, present, and future. 
There just is the four-dimensional spacetime manifold with no privileged moment that 
marks the present.
70
 On this account there is no real passage of time because all 
moments of time exist. Nothing ever comes into existence nor ceases to exist because 
everything simply does exist in the spacetime manifold. As such, the experience of 
temporal passage is illusory. The other version of four-dimensionalism is called the 
growing block view. Growing block theorists hold that spacetime is a four-
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dimensional manifold, but they maintain that only the past and the present are real 
whereas the future is not. Time is dynamic in the sense that new things really do come 
into existence as new time slices are added to the four-dimensional spacetime 
manifold.  
Time slices are merely instants of time that can stand in earlier than and later 
than relations. They are much like points on a map. In fact most four-dimensionalists 
see a close connection between being located in space and being located at a time, 
whereas presentists reject the similarity between being located in space and located at 
a time.
71
 For the growing block theorist new time slices are constantly being added to 
spacetime. The eternalist holds that all time slices simply exist in the spacetime 
manifold. None ever come into nor pass out of existence.  
 Presentists hold that objects endure through time; four-dimensionalists hold 
that objects perdure through time. According to Michael Rea endurantists hold that 
objects “last over time by being wholly present at every moment at which they exist,” 
whereas perdurantists hold that objects “last over time without being wholly present at 
every moment at which they exist.”72 As Sally Haslanger explains, “On the 
perdurantist’s conception of persistence, an object persists through time in a way 
analogous to how an object is extended through space.”73 The perdurantist sees an 
object as being spread out across the four-dimensional spacetime manifold, and that 
object is made up of temporal parts. Each temporal part exists at a particular point in 
spacetime and together they constitute the object. The object does not exist as a whole 
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throughout time, but instead parts of the object exist at different times. On presentism 
and endurantism there simply is no such thing as temporal parts.  
 To complicate matters a bit, perdurantism comes in two forms: worm theory 
and stage theory. Both involve an object having temporal parts at times, and both 
explain change in terms of temporal parts. On worm theory objects “stretch out 
through time just as (we all agree) earthworms stretch out through space.”74 When 
referring to an object we speak of the entire spacetime worm. On stage theory “the 
world is full of four-dimensional objects with temporal parts, but when we talk about 
ordinary objects like boats and people, we talk about brief temporal parts or ‘stages’ 
of four-dimensional objects.”75 Perhaps an illustration will help.  
 Imagine that we ask Tony Bennett to sing “I Left My Heart in San Francisco.” 
The endurantist would say that Tony Bennett is entirely present throughout the 2 
minutes and 46 seconds of his performance. There is numerically only one thing, 
Tony Bennett, which endures through the song. The perdurantist would see things 
differently. For each second of the song there is a temporal part of Tony Bennett. 
According to the worm theorist, when one puts all of the temporal parts together one 
gets Tony Bennett. Tony is not identical to any of the temporal parts, but somehow 
the temporal parts together constitute the spacetime worm that is Tony. (In calling 
Tony a worm this is not to say anything of his moral character. I’m sure he is a 
standup gentleman.) The stage theorist will say that each temporal part is Tony 
Bennett. There is the Tony Bennett that exists at t1 and the Tony Bennett that exists at 
t2. Worm theory and stage theory have the same underlying perdurantist ontology. 
The difference between the two is over where the proper name goes. The worm 
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theorist holds that the proper name applies to the spacetime worm, whereas the stage 
theorist says the proper name applies to each temporal counterpart or stage.  
It is sometimes held that endurantism could be compatible with four-
dimensionalism. Yet most think that a problem arises from intrinsic properties and 
change if endurantism is combined with four-dimensionalism.
76
 This is because the 
same object would have contradictory intrinsic properties. Say four-dimensional 
eternalism is true, and that every moment of “I Left My Heart in San Francisco” is on 
the same ontological par. If Tony were an endurant being, he would exist as a whole 
at every moment of the song. As such he would simultaneously have the properties of 
signing I left my heart at time t1
 
and on a hill it calls to me at t3. He would have the 
properties standing at t2 and sitting at the piano at t4. How can Tony be sitting and 
standing? Aren’t these contradictory intrinsic properties? Since Tony exists as a 
whole at each moment of the song, and since each moment of the song is equally real, 
all of the properties are within Tony’s domain of discourse.  
How do we remove the contradiction? There are two moves that might seem 
obvious at first, but they are widely rejected by philosophers today. First, it might 
seem as if one could say that Tony only has the property of standing at t2 and the 
property of sitting at t4. However, this move will not work since both properties are 
intrinsic to Tony, and as such this entails that Tony is sitting and standing. The 
reference to time here does not remove the contradiction. A second move might try to 
say that the intrinsic properties are really relations to times. So the property sitting is 
really a relation that Tony instantiates to time t4. This move has the unfortunate 
consequence of making all intrinsic properties relational properties. It removes the 
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problem of temporary intrinsic properties by removing intrinsic properties, hence, 
why this move is typically rejected today.
77
  
The standard move for the four-dimensionalist is to adopt temporal parts. 
Tony Bennett does not have the contradictory properties. Instead, only the temporal 
part of Tony that exists at t2 has the property standing and only the temporal part that 
exists at t4 has the property sitting at the piano. The endurantist can remove the 
contradiction by adopting presentism. On this scheme, Tony had the property 
standing but that moment no longer exists, so Tony no longer has that property. He 
only exemplifies the properties that exist at the present moment.  
Four-dimensionalism is often held to come with certain metaphysical 
commitments that a presentist and endurantist would most likely not accept. One such 
commitment is universalism. This should not be confused with the theological 
doctrine of universalism which is usually taken to mean something like all human 
persons go to heaven. The metaphysical doctrine of “[u]niversalism is the view that 
any collection of objects whatsoever has a sum, an object they compose.” This is 
sometimes called unrestricted mereology. “Any combination of temporal parts of any 
objects from any times, no matter how scattered and disparate, composes an object.”78 
It could be possible for a four-dimensionalist to reject this metaphysical doctrine, 
though that will depend on other metaphysical and theological commitments she 
holds. For instance, she might adopt universalism because she takes objects like 
bicycles and persons to be mere conventions.
79
 Or she could hold to universalism in 
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order to argue that Christ’s atonement involves fallen human persons becoming part 
of a larger four-dimensional object with Christ.
80
 
Another metaphysical commitment that four-dimensionalists typically hold, 
and that presentists typically reject, is Humean supervenience. Katherine Hawley 
describes this as the view that “facts about which intrinsic properties are instantiated 
at which points determine all the facts there are. There are no irreducibly holistic 
facts. In conjunction with perdurantism, this entails that all the facts about a given 
persisting object supervene upon intrinsic facts about its briefest temporal parts.”81 
Again, a four-dimensionalist may reject this depending on her other metaphysical and 
theological commitments.  
 At this point one might wonder which theory is correct. It seems that 
presentism and endurantism go nicely together, whereas four-dimensionalism and 
perdurantism go hand-in-hand. Which set of theories is correct? What time is it? 
Presentism or some form of four-dimensionalism? These are important questions, but 
space does not allow me to offer an answer. Further, my strategy for assessing divine 
timelessness does not depend upon such a discussion. Most contemporary discussions 
on God and time hold that presentism is incompatible with divine timelessness, 
whereas four-dimensional eternalism is compatible with timelessness. The next move 
is to argue for the truth of either presentism or four-dimensional eternalism. This is 
not my strategy. Instead, I shall be arguing that divine timelessness is incompatible 
with both accounts of time. While I am a presentist, I do not seek to make my 
rejection of divine timelessness rest solely on this ontological commitment.  
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An Excursus on Time and Divine Temporality 
In the next chapter the question ‘what does divine timelessness mean?’ will be 
given a full treatment. A related question naturally arises. ‘What does it mean to say 
that God is temporal?’ By way of a sneak preview, to say that God is timeless is to 
affirm at least three things: that God exists without beginning, without end, and 
without succession. The divine temporalist will say that God exists without beginning 
and without end, but she will believe that God does have succession in His life. The 
divine life contains distinct moments. For instance, T.F. Torrance exclaims that “the 
creation of the world out of nothing is something new even for God.”82 Torrance also 
explains that the incarnation was not just a new event for the world, but was also a 
new event for God. In order to understand this Torrance posits a distinction between 
the created time of the universe and the uncreated time of God.
83
 This is a common 
move amongst divine temporalists. The final distinction in this chapter to be 
considered is to distinguish physical time from metaphysical time. Since most, though 
not all, divine temporalists are presentists, the following should be understood in 
terms of presentism and endurantism. God is a temporal being who endures through 
time. His eternal now is not some static present that lacks a before and after. He exists 
in the ever fleeting present just like we do.
84
 God does have a before and after in His 
life.  
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Physical Time 
 Often it is claimed that the beginning of the universe was the beginning of all 
of space and time. One might also say that time cannot exist apart from the universe. 
This is far from obvious. If the absolute theory of time is true, there is no need for the 
universe to exist in order for time to exist. All that is needed is some being with 
duration, and a necessarily existent God fits the bill.
85
 If the relational theory of time 
is true, all one needs is some sort of change in order to have time, and change can 
occur without physical objects.
86
  
Someone might ask about the doctrine of creation out of nothing. Doesn’t the 
Bible clearly teach that time came into existence with creation? No, it simply teaches 
that the universe came into existence a finite amount of time ago, and that the 
universe is contingent upon God. As Alan Padgett points out, “The doctrine of 
creation out of nothing does not necessarily imply a beginning to time. Rather, it 
points to the radical dependence of all other beings on the Being of God.”87 John of 
Damascus seems to agree. Unlike Padgett, Damascus holds that God is timeless, but 
much like Padgett, he posits that there was time before creation that could not be 
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measured or divided.
88
 It is not, nor has it always been, obvious to Christian 
theologians that time came into existence with creation.  
In fact, the Bible clearly speaks of time before creation. Psalm 90:2 
says, “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and 
the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God.” The from/to formula in this 
passage is a common formula in scripture used to denote a span of time. In this 
instance, the Hebrew word olam—sometimes translated as eternity depending on 
context—is used twice here to refer to the span of God’s life.89 It quite literally means 
from perpetual duration in the indefinite past to perpetual duration in the indefinite 
future.
 
This is a deeply temporal portrayal of God. Psalm 90 not only portrays God in 
temporal terms, it also speaks of God existing alone before creation. One would be 
hard pressed to say that this is not a temporal before since the language employed is 
explicitly temporal. As Gershom Brin points out, “The earliest time mentioned [in 
scripture] is that of the reality prior to the Creation.”90 The idea that God existed 
temporally before creation is an important biblical theme which looks strikingly like 
what the temporalist wishes to say about God.
91
 
One could, if she wants, hold that physical time came into existence with 
creation. She could argue that this is perfectly compatible with the Biblical teaching 
even though it is not necessitated by Scripture. Various contemporary philosophical 
and systematic theologians today will say that Scripture implies that physical time 
came into existence with creation, but it does not necessarily entail that metaphysical 
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time came into existence. In order to understand this we will need to get clear on the 
difference between metaphysical and physical time. 
Physical time is what is typically associated with our universe and it is said to 
have the following three features. First, physical time began to exist, or it came to be. 
Second, physical time can be measured. Third, the physical time of one world cannot 
relate to a separate physical world and its time series. 
(1) Physical time began to exist. When creation began spacetime came into 
existence. This means that it has not always existed because it has a definite starting 
point. Physical time began when the universe began.
92
 
(2) Physical time can be measured. It can be measured because of a localized 
internal clock.
93
 The way physical time is measured in a particular world depends on 
the laws of nature that are intrinsic to that world.
94
 For instance, on earth we measure 
time based on our local intrinsic clock. That clock is based on the duration of the 
earth’s rotation around the sun. This constant revolution serves as a local clock for 
those of us on earth. A planet on the other side of the universe would not measure 
time by our local clock because it does not revolve around our sun. That planet would 
measure time according to its’ own local clock. Yet, these clocks can be synchronized 
because the universe has its own cosmic time as determined by the universes’ 
background space, or the frame of reference of the universe at rest with respect to the 
cosmic background radiation.
95
 The laws of nature are not localized, but are held to be 
consistent across the universe making it possible to have a cosmic time.  
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(3) The physical time of one world cannot relate well to other worlds and their 
physical time. For instance, think of C.S. Lewis’ classic The Lion, the Witch, and the 
Wardrobe. The children in this story leave London and enter into another world called 
Narnia through a magical wardrobe. They reside in Narnia for many years, but when 
they return to London only a few minutes have passed by in London. This is because 
the local clock in Narnia is not based on the same clock that we on earth use. The 
claim is that there is no way for our measurement of earth time to apply to Narnian 
time because both worlds have separate physical clocks based on the laws of nature 
that are intrinsic to each world.
96
 
I am not suggesting that there is an actual Narnia. I am using it to illustrate an 
idea that is quite popular in physics today: the multiverse.
97
 It is quite popular today to 
posit a multiverse that generates an infinite number of distinct universes, each with its 
own discrete time series. If there are multiple universes, each with its own intrinsic 
natural laws distinct from our own, it will not be possible for us to use our metrics to 
measure the time in those worlds. Or so the story typically goes.
98
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There is a further point to be made from this. This feature is also said to apply 
to worlds that lack physical objects and laws of nature as well. We cannot use our 
metrics based on our laws of nature to measure the life of angels, for instance.
99
  Nor 
would we be able to use them to measure the souls that reside in the intermediate state 
awaiting resurrection.
100
 
 
Metaphysical Time 
 Metaphysical time is often associated with God’s eternal, everlasting nature. 
In contrast to physical time, metaphysical time never came into existence. God resides 
in eternity. Eternity for the divine temporalist means that God has no beginning and 
no end. God’s eternal now is fleeting in that God has moments that slough off into the 
non-existent past, and He has not-yet existing future moments. The difference 
between our now and God’s eternal now is that God never came into existence. The 
now of physical time had a beginning, and it need not exist, whereas God necessarily 
exists.  
 Another difference that some divine temporalists draw out is that, unlike 
physical time, metaphysical time cannot be measured because it lacks an intrinsic 
metric.
101
 Typically, it is said to be amorphous: there is no constant metric by which 
one could neatly divide up the duration of moments.
102
 Prior to the creation of the 
world God exists without beginning and end in an unmetricated time. One might say 
this looks like a timeless existence since God’s life lacks a beginning, end, and 
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succession. However, this is false because in order to be timeless God must 
necessarily exist without succession and have no before or after. A temporal God 
contingently exists without succession for He can create moments in a variety of 
ways, many of which need not be creating physical objects.  
 The claim often made is that in this unmetricated state prior to the act of 
creation there is no way to measure God’s metaphysical time, or what Dean 
Zimmerman calls “dead time.” According to Zimmerman, in order to measure a 
temporal series one will need temporal intervals “consisting of a non-denumerable set 
of durationless instants.” Further, one will need to have a set of coordinates that have 
the same “betweenness relations” or same length. Without an intrinsic metric this will 
be an arbitrary convention. The problem is that any such conventional metric could be 
devised to measure God’s life, and there is no way in principle to say which one is 
wrong because every instant of dead time is intrinsically alike and is the same number 
of instants away from each other.
103
  
 Yet, this is an epistemological problem. One might counter by saying, “Just 
because we cannot know which conventional metric to apply to God’s metaphysical 
time prior to the act of creation does not mean that there is no right answer. 
Verificationist considerations like these simply will not do.” The rejoinder from 
Zimmerman is to contend that without laws of nature “nothing could ground 
counterfactuals concerning what various kinds of clocks would or would not do 
throughout a given interval of pseudo-time.”104 In other words, there simply is not any 
way to measure metaphysical time since it necessarily lacks an intrinsic metric. Yet, 
Zimmerman’s move is too quick. Just because metaphysical time lacks an intrinsic 
metric does not obviously entail that it is unmeasurable since we can come up with 
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conventional metrics. Perhaps the idea is that we cannot come up with any non-
arbitrary objective measurements.   
It should be noted that not every temporalist agrees that the metric of time is a 
convention absent uniform laws of nature. Some hold that metaphysical time does 
have an intrinsic metric, and as such it is measurable. This is a point of contention 
amongst divine temporalists that has yet to be sorted out. 
Of course, the above considerations are with regard to God’s life prior to the 
act of creation. In the act of creation God freely creates a universe with intrinsic laws 
of nature that serve as a metric for the physical time of that universe. In the act of 
creation God takes on succession in His life. Neil MacDonald refers to this as God 
getting Himself into our time. God freely takes on succession in His life so that He 
will be related to the creatures that He has made.
105
 This statement is a bit misleading 
since—as we will see below—metaphysical time contains physical time. It would be 
more accurate to say that God brings creation into His time than to say that God gets 
Himself into our time.  
Another claim amongst some divine temporalists is that any metric in the 
physical universe will fail to apply to metaphysical time.
106
 It would make no sense to 
try to use physical time to measure God’s eternal time. Physical time has a beginning, 
and metaphysical time does not. Where would one start their measurement of God’s 
time? As Sir Isaac Newton once said, metaphysical time “exists regardless of the 
sensible and external measurements we try…to make of it.”107 
 It is the case that the cosmic present marks a boundary for God because God 
cannot exist at our universe’s past or future. Further, God’s eternal now and our 
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temporal now stand in a one-to-one correspondence. However, several divine 
temporalists claim that this does not entail that our temporal metrics apply to God. As 
DeWeese says, “As it is possible that there might not be an intrinsic metric to 
metaphysical time, it is possible that no quantitative temporal relations hold for [God]. 
What this means is that, although moments of a temporal world can be placed in a 
one-to-one correspondence with moments of metaphysical time, one could give no 
sense to the statement that a certain duration of metaphysical time lasted a certain 
number of seconds (days, years, and so on).”108 
 DeWeese’s claim might strike one as rather odd. DeWeese gives us little by 
way of argument for thinking his claim to be true, nor does he fully explicate what he 
means by this statement. Other divine temporalists agree that it would certainly be the 
case that one could not use the metrics of physical time to measure the life of God 
prior to the act of creation, but argue that it is possible to do so subsequent to creation. 
Especially since God’s metaphysical time stands in a one-to-one correspondence with 
our temporal universe. It is the contention of William Lane Craig that cosmic time 
sets the boundaries for God’s time as He relates to our universe. Craig argues that 
since cosmic time is in a one-to-one correspondence with God’s metaphysical time we 
can measure the life of God subsequent to creation.
109
 If certain divine temporalists 
wish to continue making claims like DeWeese’s it must be articulated why it is the 
case that the metric of this universe does not apply to God as He continually sustains 
this universe.  
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 One possible avenue to take could come from the multiverse. If there are other 
universes with their own unique time series, God will be temporally related to those 
universes as well.
110
 As Keith Ward explains, 
God will stand at every leading edge of every process, moving with it toward 
its own open future. God will not be confined to a particular time but will 
move forward with many nontemporally related times…[He] will enter into all 
processive times and will, thus, not be reducible to one linear temporal series 
into which they are all put.
111
 
 
One could argue that this would make it impossible to use our metrics to measure the 
divine life of God since God is related to multiple universes and their time series. 
However, one might wonder if God’s eternal now would serve as a way to make each 
time series related to one another. Perhaps it is the case that the now of each universe 
is related because each now exists in the eternal now of God’s metaphysical time. The 
now of each universe is simultaneous with God’s eternal now, and thus simultaneous 
with each other. It would still be the case that each time series flows according to its’ 
own intrinsic metric, and it would still be the case that each instant of time exists in 
God’s now only when that instant in fact exists as the presentist sees things. On this 
model it would appear that God’s eternal now serves as the boundary for each 
universe’s cosmic time. This would be to reverse Craig’s claim mentioned earlier. 
This is a very difficult topic, and the very existence of the multiverse is an issue of 
great debate. It is something that temporalists will need to consider if the scientific 
evidence for a multiverse becomes possible as science moves forward.
112
 
This last point of contention brings us to the final theme that divine 
temporalists often articulate. Metaphysical time can relate to other universes and their 
times. This is because metaphysical time is the grounds of ordering relations of 
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physical time.
113
 Physical time’s existence and structure are completely dependent on 
metaphysical time. It is God’s causal act of sustaining the universe that not only keeps 
that universe in existence, but also makes time flow in that universe. As such, God 
can easily relate to other universes with various physical time structures because His 
eternal time is what keeps those time structures in order. 
Perhaps an illustration will help bring out this last point. Consider a comic 
book. The panels of a comic book could be thought of as periods of time standing in a 
successive temporal order. The order of these periods is due to the work of the author 
of the comic book. Yet, there is no flow of time in a comic book unless someone is 
reading it. In the very act of reading the reader creates a flow of time for the comic 
book. The reader’s actions are what sustain the time of the comic book, yet the 
reader’s time is not identical to the comic book. The reader can slow down or speed 
up his reading pace. He could even take a break from reading only to pick up the 
comic at a later date.  
In a similar way, God’s act of sustaining the world in existence creates the 
flow of time in our physical universe, and the same goes for any other universe that 
God may have created. Yet, one might contend that God’s time is not identical to 
ours’ because He could slow down or speed up the processes of the universe, or even 
cease to sustain the universe in existence.  
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CHAPTER 3 
WHAT IS ETERNITY? 
 
When you intend to know God…consider as you can the things about him, for 
example his eternity, immensity, infinity, his goodness, wisdom, and power 
which creates, governs, and judges creatures. For that person among others is 
a great theologian if he searches out the principles of these things, however 
much or little.  
—Maximus the Confessor114 
 
 In this chapter I shall articulate the doctrine of divine timelessness and its 
systematic connections with divine immutability and simplicity. I shall also look at 
questions about eternal duration, and how to talk about timeless eternity.  
 
Preliminary Remarks 
As noted in the previous chapter, most classical theologians have tended to 
hold to a relational theory of time where time just is change. It was also noted that 
everyone agrees that if there is a change, there is time. This understanding of time 
played an important role in the articulation of divine timelessness and immutability.  
Along the way we shall also see the role that presentism and endurantism played in 
the articulation of divine eternality.   
One final preliminary remark is in order before moving on: the use of 
temporal terms to describe timeless eternity. The concept of eternity is something 
developed over time throughout Greek philosophy and Christian theology. As the 
concept is developed theologians and philosophers were forced to use temporal words 
to describe timeless eternity. One early Christian statement of this sort on divine 
eternity can be found in Clement of Alexandria. “Eternity, for instance, presents in an 
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instant the future and the present, also the past of time.” (Stromateis, 1.13) Elsewhere 
he speaks of “the true to-day, the never-ending day of God, [which] extends over 
eternity.” (Stromateis, 9)   
The use of temporal words to describe eternity can cause confusion in 
contemporary reconstructions of divine eternality. For instance, some will argue that 
classical Christian theology did not hold to a strict account of divine atemporality 
because they used temporal terms to describe God’s eternity.115 This, however, is a 
mistake. Even though classical Christians continually use temporal properties to 
describe God, they also continually claim that these should be understood in non-
temporal ways when predicated of God.
116
 The move from these thinkers is to offer 
non-temporal readings of temporal terms like “present,” “is,” “always,” and “now.”117 
Christian theologians have long held that inconsistency and difficulties in Christian 
doctrine naturally arises when one lets her pen slip into temporal phrases without 
qualifying their non-temporal sense.  
This was an important issue in early Christian theology. Offering non-
temporal readings of temporal terms played a major role in explaining the eternal 
generation of the Son and eternal spiration of the Holy Spirit. The early Church was at 
pains to explain this in a way that avoided the Arian claim that there was a time when 
the Son did not exist. The concepts of eternal generation and spiration are causal 
notions.
118
 This naturally lends toward the idea that the cause is temporally prior to 
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the effect. In this instance that would mean that God the Father exists prior to the Son 
and Holy Spirit. Hence the question, “How can Christ be a Son, without being 
younger than the Father: for anything which derives its being must be later than its 
source?”119  
Early Christian theologians sought to avoid this by appealing to the non-
temporal reading of eternity.
120
 One example comes from Origen of Alexandria. In On 
First Principles 2.2, he claims that all three of the divine persons lack a before and 
after in their life. When it comes to speaking about God we are forced to use temporal 
expressions, but Origen explains that “the statements made regarding Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit are to be understood as transcending all time, all ages, and all eternity.” 
(On First Principles 4.28)
121
  
It will be important to keep in mind the following things when reading the rest 
of this chapter: (i) the connection between time and change, (ii) presentism and 
endurantism, and (iii) the non-temporal usage of temporal terms.  
 
What is Timeless Eternity? 
The Protestant Scholastic Benedict Pictet states the doctrine as follows. 
“Eternity, properly so called, such as belongs to God, denotes three things: to be 
without beginning, without end, without succession. In this eternity we cannot 
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conceive of anything prior or posterior, anything past, present, or future, since God is 
without beginning or end.”122 
The understanding of the atemporal God, then, means at least the following 
three propositions. 
1) God exists without beginning. 
2) God exists without end. 
3) God exists without succession, or moments, in His life. 
The divine temporalist will affirm (1) and (2). Indeed, most agree that this is 
the clear teaching of scripture. However, the temporalist will call into question (3).
123
 
Before calling into question (3) we will need to get a better picture of what Christians 
have held about God’s eternity. As we shall see, the ideas presented in Pictet carry a 
lot of theological and philosophical baggage. In particular, they are deeply connected 
with the doctrines of divine simplicity and immutability, as well as a relational view 
of time.  
(1)-(3) carry wide assent throughout Church history. In discussing the eternal 
generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, Gregory of Nyssa 
states, “Extensions in time find no admittance in the Eternal Life.” (Against Eunomius 
I.42)
124
  In his answer to Eunomius, Gregory claims that creatures are circumscribed 
by time and place. Creatures have intervals in their lives, but God transcends all 
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intervals.
125
 Augustine makes similar statements about the triune God. “In their own 
proper substance by which they are, the three are one, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, 
without any temporal movement, without any intervals of time or space, one and the 
same over all creation, one and the same all together from eternity to eternity.” (The 
Trinity IV.30) 
But (1)-(3) is not the whole story. John Philoponus explains that eternity, as 
pertains to God, “has neither temporal position, nor priority and posteriority, nor any 
extension at all.”126 The idea that God’s life does not have a before and after is a 
common theme in many Christian writers. Philoponus makes it quite clear that the 
idea of divine eternity must also include a lack of temporal position and extension. If 
something has a temporal position or extension it is in time. Anselm follows suit by 
proclaiming of God, “You exist neither yesterday nor today nor tomorrow but are 
absolutely outside all time.” (Proslogion 19) So in addition to (1)-(3), we also need 
(4) God exists without temporal position and extension.  
The idea behind (4) is that God cannot be located in, nor circumscribed by, 
time. For many Christian thinkers like Anselm, (4) is a way of expressing God’s 
aseity and sovereignty over creation.  
The notion that God lacks succession, temporal extension and location causes 
problems when it comes to articulating God’s omnipresence and conservation of 
creation. Christian theologians and philosophers in the past have been aware of this 
and have offered ways around this problem. A common strategy is to make a clear 
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distinction between God’s eternal present and our temporal present. ‘Present’ when 
used of God is given a non-temporal reading on this strategy. Boethius gives us a 
clear example of this move.  
 In The Trinity is One God Not Three Gods IV Boethius says,  
“He is everywhere” does not mean that He is in every place, for He cannot be 
in any place at all - but that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, 
although He Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot 
anywhere be in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. It is the same 
with the category of time, as, “A man came yesterday; God is ever.” Here 
again the predicate of “coming yesterday” denotes not something substantial, 
but something happening in terms of time. But the expression “God is ever” 
denotes a single Present, summing up His continual presence in all the past, in 
all the present - however that term be used - and in all the future. Philosophers 
say that “ever” may be applied to the life of the heavens and other immortal 
bodies. But as applied to God it has a different meaning. He is ever, because 
“ever” is with Him a term of present time, and there is this great difference 
between “now,” which is our present, and the divine present. Our present 
connotes changing time and sempiternity; God’s present, abiding, unmoved, 
and immoveable, connotes eternity. Add semper to eternity and you get the 
constant, incessant and thereby perpetual course of our present time, that is to 
say, sempiternity.
127
 
 
Does giving God’s present a non-temporal reading solve the problem? Does it 
assuage the tension of a timeless God sustaining a temporal world? We will have to 
wait and see. For now we must content ourselves with exploring the basic concept of 
timeless eternity.  
One of the most quoted statements on divine timelessness comes from another 
work by Boethius.  
 
Eternity is the simultaneous and complete possession of infinite life. This will 
appear more clearly if we compare it with temporal things. All that lives under 
the conditions of time moves through the present from the past to the future; 
there is nothing set in time which can at one moment grasp the whole space of 
its lifetime. It cannot yet comprehend to-morrow; yesterday it has already lost. 
And in this life of to-day your life is no more than a changing, passing 
moment…What we should rightly call eternal is that which grasps and 
possesses wholly and simultaneously the fullness of unending life, which lacks 
naught of the future, and has lost naught of the fleeting past; and such an 
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existence must be ever present in itself to control and aid itself, and also must 
keep present with itself the infinity of changing time.
128
 
 
Note that this statement also contains a clear distinction between our present and 
God’s eternal present. Brian Leftow suggests that Boethius’ use of “present” is a 
literal predication of God.
129
 Perhaps the idea is that ‘present’ denotes what exists. 
Our present is fleeting because it stands between the non-existent past and the yet to 
exist future. God’s timeless present does not have a before and after. It simply does 
exist. This is part of Gregory of Nyssa’s conception of God’s eternity. “He is always 
to be apprehended as in existence; He admits not a time when He was not, and when 
He will not be.” (Against Eunomius I.42)130  
 Anselm makes a similar statement. In Proslogion 22 he praises God by saying 
You have “neither past nor future existence but only present existence; nor can You 
be thought not to exist at any time.” In De Concordia I.5 he continues this idea. In 
“time things move from past to future” and only the present moment of time exists. 
God’s eternal present is different in that it has no movement from past to future. In 
“eternity there is only a present, nevertheless it is not a temporal present as ours is.”131 
The non-temporal reading of ‘present’ as applied to God seems to be a way of 
capturing the content of (1)-(4). It appears that, for classical theologians, certain 
predicates like ‘present’ can be applied literally to God because they can be given a 
non-temporal meaning that overlaps with the temporal meaning of ‘present.’ Other 
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predicates, however, cannot be applied to God because He is timeless, immutable, and 
simple. At this point it will be helpful to see the systematic connections between 
divine timelessness, immutability, and simplicity.  
 
Divine Immutability 
Before delving into immutability it should be noted that there is an 
Aristotelian assumption with regard to modality that plays a major role in the 
development of divine timelessness. The presupposition is that immutability and 
necessity are equivalent. Also, mutability and contingency are equivalent.
132
 Any 
being that undergoes change cannot be a necessary being. Since God is a necessary 
being, He must be immutable. The two concepts are equivalent. It is also the case that 
necessity and eternity are taken to be equivalent.
133
 A necessary being cannot begin or 
cease to exist. This is important for understanding several of the moves that Christians 
make in their articulation of eternity. For instance, John Duns Scotus argues that 
“Thou art a necessary being; and therefore Thou art eternal, because Thou hast at 
once an interminability of duration without a potency to succession. For there can be 
no succession except in that which is continuously caused, or at least in that which has 
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its being dependent upon another; and this dependence is far from that which is 
necessary of itself in being.”134  
This assumption plays a major role in the 6
th
 Century debate between Proclus 
and John Philoponus. Part of Proclus’ argument is that the Christian doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo conflicts with divine timelessness, immutability, and simplicity. If 
God were to create the universe out of nothing, He would undergo a change. As such, 
the Christian God would not immutable. If the Christian God is mutable, He must be 
contingent. As such, the Christian God would be the creature of a genuinely perfect 
God.
135
 This will be given a full treatment in a later chapter. For now it is important to 
note the strong connection between necessity, timelessness, and immutability.  
Pseudo-Dionysius clearly links the notion of immutability with divine eternity. 
This is a common theme throughout Christian history. The assumption is that time 
involves change or motion, so God must be changeless in order to be timeless.
136
 The 
way Pseudo-Dionysius expresses divine timelessness picks up on the themes 
discussed above as well as the connection with immutability. He writes,  
“Ancient of Days” is a title given to God because He is the Eternity of all 
things and their Time, and is anterior to Days and anterior to Eternity and 
Time. And the titles “Time,” “Day,” “Season,” and “Eternity” must be applied 
to Him in a Divine sense, to mean One Who is utterly incapable of all change 
and movement and, in His eternal motion, remains at rest; He transcends both 
Rest and Motion; and Who is the Cause whence Eternity, Time, and Days are 
derived. (The Divine Names, 10.2)  
 
In speaking of God’s beauty, he explains that God is beautiful in and of Himself. He 
was not beautiful at one time, and then not at another because God is eternally 
beautiful. (The Divine Names, 4.7) Pseudo-Dionysius speaks in a similar way with 
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regard to God’s actions. God cannot act at one time and not at another. If God did, He 
would suffer change, and thus not be eternal. (The Divine Names, 4.21) 
Augustine makes the same connection between timelessness and immutability. 
Like Pseudo-Dionysius, he also connects time with change. “Since the flight of time 
involves change, it cannot be co-eternal with changeless eternity.”(City of God XII)137 
In The Trinity IV he says, “For God’s essence, by which he is, has absolutely nothing 
changeable about its eternity or its truth or its will.” Later on he says God should be 
understood as “wholly everywhere without place, everlasting without time, without 
any change in himself making changeable things, and undergoing nothing.” (The 
Trinity V.2)  
Thomas Aquinas also makes the connections between time and change, as 
well as necessity, timelessness, and immutability. In Summa Contra Gentiles I.99 
Aquinas argues as follows. “God is utterly unchangeable…that which begins or 
ceases to live, or is subject in living, is changeable…Therefore God neither began to 
be, or will cease to be, nor is subject to succession in living. Therefore His life is 
eternal.” 
 In later chapters there will be a lengthy discussion of how a timeless and 
immutable God relates to an ever changing world. For now it will be helpful to begin 
to see the connections between relational and accidental properties, and divine 
timelessness and immutability.  
In The Trinity V Boethius turns his attention to the topic of relations. 
Relational predicates denote a substance’s relation to other objects. “It cannot 
therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases, decreases, or alters in any 
way the substance of the thing to which it is applied.” He offers an illustration. Say a 
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man is standing in front of you. You walk up to him and stand to his left. Then you 
stand to his right. The man has different relational properties depending upon your 
position in relation to him, but his essence has undergone no intrinsic change. Such 
“predicates which do not denote the essential property of a thing cannot alter, change, 
or disturb its nature in any way.” I take it that such predicates might be appropriately 
used of God since this would not change His essential nature. However, that does not 
seem to be the view of Boethius and other classical theologians.  
 In Sentences I, Distinction XXXVII.7, Peter Lombard explains how things 
change according to time.  
But to change through time is to become different according to their 
interior or exterior qualities which are in the very thing that is changed, 
as when it undergoes a vicissitude of joy, suffering, knowledge, 
forgetfulness, or a change of form or of some other exterior quality. 
For this change which happens according to time is a change of 
qualities which happens in the bodily or spiritual creature, and so it is 
called time. 
 
Any kind of change, intrinsic or extrinsic, will make an object temporal. Lombard 
holds that God is simple and immutable, and as such He cannot undergo any intrinsic 
changes. (Dist. VIII) Further, he holds that God cannot undergo any extrinsic 
change.
138
 For instance, when temporal creatures refer to God it would seem that God 
would undergo an extrinsic change and thus Himself be temporal.
139
 When a human 
worships God and says, ‘You are my Creator and Redeemer’ she is predicating an 
accidental property of God. Lombard understands this, so he follows Augustine by 
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holding that the accidental properties that creatures predicate of God do not apply to 
God. (Dist. XXII, XXX, and XXXIX)
140
 The take away from this is that to be in time 
is to undergo intrinsic and extrinsic change. To be timeless is to undergo no changes 
whatsoever.
141
 As such, we must add the following to (1)-(4): 
 (5) God undergoes no intrinsic or extrinsic changes.  
 At this point it will be helpful to sum up the discussion before moving on to 
other issues. So far we can see that divine eternity involves existing without 
beginning, without end, without succession, without intrinsic or extrinsic change, and 
without temporal location or position. Now we can turn to the topic of divine 
simplicity to see how it fits with timelessness and immutability.  
 
Divine Simplicity 
 What does it mean to say that God is simple? Peter Lombard offers the 
following definition of divine simplicity. “The same substance alone is properly and 
truly simple in which there is no diversity or change or multiplicity of parts, or 
accidents, or of any other forms.” (Sentences I, Dist. VIII.3)142A standard account of 
divine simplicity in the contemporary literature looks as follows.
143
 
6) God cannot have any spatial or temporal parts. 
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7) God cannot have any intrinsic accidental properties. 
8) There cannot be any real distinction between one essential property and 
another in God’s nature. 
9) There cannot be a real distinction between essence and existence in God. 
Before delving into these theses it would be good to have an understanding of 
real distinction. Within the Middle Ages it was common to hold that things can be 
really distinct or conceptually distinct. To say that there is a real distinction between 
some thing A and some thing B is to say that there is an extramental feature in reality 
that makes them distinct. For instance, there is a real distinction between a glass and 
the water it contains. A real distinction is contrasted with a conceptual distinction. To 
say that two things are conceptually distinct is to say that there is no extramental 
feature in reality that makes them distinct. The distinction exists in our minds only. 
For instance, one might say that Clark Kent and Superman are distinct, but in reality 
this distinction exists in our minds only since Clark Kent is the same person as 
Superman. In other words, Clark Kent is identical to Superman. Towards the end of 
the Middle Ages John Duns Scotus introduced a formal distinction that lies between 
real and conceptual distinctions. To say that two things are formally distinct is to say 
that there is some extramental feature in reality that makes them distinct, yet they are 
coextensive and inseparable.
144
 With this in mind we can return to the set of theses 
noted above.  
The big idea behind (6) is that God does not have any physical or 
metaphysical complexity. The assumption is that in order to be spatial a thing must 
have physical parts. God is immaterial, so God does not have any physical parts. 
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What about temporal parts? The concept of temporal parts is tricky here. What we 
would call temporal parts in our day is not the same concept. During the Middle Ages 
it was common to distinguish between an endurant object and the life of the object. 
The object endures through time and can be properly said to exist as a whole, or all at 
once, in the present. The present is the only moment that exists, so an endurant object 
does not have parts lying about at other times. Yet, we can draw a conceptual 
distinction and say that the endurant object has a before and after in its life. Its life can 
be conceptually divided up into parts.
145
 Yet even conceptual distinctions are 
repugnant to divine simplicity. As Anselm explains, “what either actually or 
conceptually has parts can be divided into parts, and this is altogether foreign to God.” 
(Incarnation of the Word VII)
146
 When classical theologians deny that God has 
temporal parts this is what they have in mind. They are asserting that God has no 
before and after in His life because He has no distinct moments in His life at all. 
There is just the one timeless present. On their understanding, this makes God a truly 
permanent entity.  
If conceptual distinctions cannot even be applied to a simple God, it would 
seem that Christian theology is a non-starter. This can be seen in the way theologians 
are forced to talk when trying to be consistent with the doctrine of divine simplicity. 
Say one has a theological puzzle, any theological puzzle that comes to mind. In order 
to remove the puzzle one must offer a careful distinction in God. Perhaps one will 
need to distinguish between God’s act and thought. Or maybe one needs to distinguish 
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between God’s permissive and active will. It does not really matter. In practice divine 
simplicity forces the theologian to say something rather embarrassing. After the 
theologian has spent dozens of pages making careful distinctions in God to remove 
the paradox she must admit that her distinctions exist in her mind only. They do not 
apply to God at all.
147
 In other words, she has just committed all of her work to the 
flames. But set aside this problem for the moment.  
(7) would appear to allow God to undergo extrinsic change, but as noted above 
in (5), classical theologians have already denied this possibility of God in the doctrine 
of divine timelessness and immutability. This is important to note since several 
contemporary defenders of divine simplicity have not acknowledged this. For 
instance, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann claim that a simple God cannot be 
exempt from having extrinsic accidental properties.
148
 What they have in mind are 
properties like being referred to. This is completely contrary to the doctrine of God as 
spelled out by classical theologians. Augustine, Boethius, Lombard, and Aquinas all 
deny extrinsic accidental properties of God. Standard examples are things like 
Creator, Redeemer, and Lord. James Arminius adds Judge of all men to the list as 
well. For these theologians God cannot have these accidental predicates because that 
would entail that God came to have them, and thus He would be mutable, temporal 
and not simple. Classical theologians held that we can refer to God, but that we must 
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realize that our accidental predicates only befall us and not God.
149
 In allowing 
extrinsic accidental properties to apply to God, Stump and Kretzmann have failed to 
see how truly radical the doctrine of divine simplicity is. They have also failed to see 
the systematic connections between simplicity, immutability, and timelessness.
150
  
(9) comes from Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae I.Q3.a4, and 
similar statements can be found in Anselm and Augustine. It is taken to be part of 
what makes God unique from creatures. Of course, one might wonder what this 
means. This will become clear when one understands (8). There can be no real 
distinction in God’s attributes because the attributes are all identical to each other and 
identical to God.  
Sometimes divine simplicity is taken to be that all of the essential divine 
attributes are mutually entailing. As such, one might wonder if (8) is an accurate 
portrayal of divine simplicity. Augustine almost seems to be saying this in several 
places. In The Trinity XV.7 Augustine argues that God is genuinely immortal since 
He never started to exist, and never can cease to exist. So, genuine immortality is 
unchanging. “But that is also genuine eternity by which God is unchangeable, without 
beginning, without end, and consequently incorruptible. Therefore one and the same 
thing is being said, whether you say God is eternal or immortal or incorruptible or 
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unchangeable.” Whether you say that God is wise, powerful, living, understanding, or 
beautiful, “[t]he same thing is being said.” 
It is easy to see how one could get mutual entailment of the divine attributes 
from a statement like this, but a careful reading of Augustine shows that divine 
simplicity is a much stronger claim. “But for God it is the same thing to be as to be 
powerful or just or wise or anything else that can be said about his simple multiplicity 
or multiple simplicity to signify his substance.” (The Trinity VI.6) Elsewhere he 
makes it even clearer that divine simplicity involves (8).  
God however is indeed called in multiple ways great, good, wise, blessed, 
true, and anything else that seems not to be unworthy of him; but his greatness 
is identical with his wisdom (he is not great in mass but in might), and his 
goodness is identical with his wisdom and greatness, and his truth is identical 
with them all; and with him being blessed is not one thing, and being great or 
wise or true or good, or just simply being, another. (The Trinity VI.8) 
 
 This is the way Christians throughout history have understood divine 
simplicity.
151
 For instance, the 17
th
 Century English theologian Richard Stock notes 
that   
it appeares, that however these things are attributed to God, that he is love, 
mercy, favour, and anger, howsoever they are spoken, as though they were 
many and different, yet in God they are but one, and the same. True it is, that 
we are of a compounded understanding, they are as severall things to us; 
because we cannot conceive God as he is, yet by faith, we are brought to 
beleeve that there is no such difference between them in God: that which is the 
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love of God, is the hatred of God; and that which is his wisdome, is his power 
also; because there is but one and the same Essence. [sic]
152
 
 
Stock, like so many others throughout church history, is following Augustine’s moves 
in The Trinity.  
Augustine continually argues throughout The Trinity that all of God’s essential 
divine attributes are identical to each other. On divine simplicity, anything that one 
might predicate of God should be understood as signifying the divine substance. One 
could say that God is eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, 
powerful, beautiful, and so forth. Yet all of those terms signify the divine substance. 
They are not qualities or properties that God has because they are identical to God. 
(The Trinity XV.8)
153
 Creatures have properties by participating in goodness, wisdom, 
life, and so on. God, who is the greatest being, does not have goodness by 
participating in something else. Goodness is identical to His essence, and God is 
identical to His essence. So God is the Good. (The Trinity V.11) Other things have an 
essence and subsist, or underlie, the properties they have. Not so with the simple God. 
“[I]t is impious to say that God subsists to and underlies his goodness, and that 
goodness is not his own substance.” (The Trinity VII.10) As Katherin Rogers points 
out, the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity denies that God has any properties. 
“With God we do not hypothesize any unity underlying the diversity because there is 
no diversity.”154 Rogers claims that Plantinga style arguments against simplicity fail 
because they neglect this point by treating God as if He has properties, or is a 
                                                 
152
 Stock, A Stock of Divine Knowledge, being a lively description of the divine nature 
(London: T.H. for Philip Nevil, 1641), 88. 
153
 Maximus the confessor agrees. “In the multiple there is diversity, unlikeness, and 
difference. But in God, who is eminently one and unique, there is only identity, simplicity, and 
sameness.” Knowledge of God, 1.83.  Cf. John Duns Scotus. “There is nothing in the divine that is not 
the same thing as the divine essence and also the same as anything essential, so that considering such in 
the abstract, one can say simply ‘This is this’.” (God and Creatures Q5.34) It should be noted that 
Scotus is innovative in that he allows for the divine attributes to be formally distinct.  
154
 Katherin Rogers, ‘The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity’, 166, see also 173. Also, 
Henry Church, Miscellanea Philo-Theologica (London: I.N. for John Rothwell, 1638), 23.  
67 
 
property.
155
 These types of objections fail to see how truly radical divine simplicity 
is.
156
  
 One additional claim is needed to flesh out divine simplicity. There is one 
final aspect of simplicity that is sometimes overlooked in contemporary discussions: 
God is pure act.
157
 As Aquinas explains, composite things have potential. They move 
from potential to actual. But God is simple, so He must lack potentiality and be pure 
act. (Summa Contra Gentiles I.16-18) One example of this idea is that God just is His 
act of existence. (Summa Contra Gentiles I.22) God is not something that underlies 
His properties because He does not have any properties. God does not go from 
potential to actual for He is pure act. God’s act is identical to God, and not something 
distinct. “His action is His being…God’s action is His substance.” (Summa Contra 
Gentiles II.9) “[T]he manifold actions ascribed to God, as intelligence, volition, the 
production of things, and the like, are not so many different things, since each of these 
actions in God is His own very being, which is one and the same thing.” (Summa 
Contra Gentiles II.10) 
 How does simplicity connect with timelessness and immutability? As 
Augustine explains, “Nothing simple is changeable; everything created is 
changeable.” (The Trinity VI.8) Again, on a relational understanding of time, time just 
is change. If God is unchanging, He is timeless. A simple God has no properties. “So 
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there is no modification in God because there is nothing in him that can be changed or 
lost.” (The Trinity V.5)  
 Further, a being who is pure act does all that He does in one timeless present. 
He simply is His act of thinking, willing, creating, and so on. If God went from 
potential to act, He would have accidental properties. But as pure act, He has no 
accidental properties. Since He has no accidental properties, or any properties at all, 
there is no worry of Him changing or persisting through time. Objects that persist 
through time are constantly gaining and losing accidental properties. God has no 
accidental properties, so—the argument goes—He is timeless.  
 
Does Eternity Have Duration? 
 A point of contention in contemporary debates is over eternal duration. Brian 
Leftow, Eleonore Stump, and Norman Kretzman hold some version of atemporal 
duration.
158
 It is not difficult for them to maintain that Christians have traditionally 
believed in atemporal duration since one could easily find statements from Christians 
in the past that speak of atemporal duration.
159
 In the Middle Ages duration is 
predicated of anything that has existence, be it temporal or non-temporal.
160
 In fact, 
one of the main reasons for thinking that God is timeless is by arguing that endurance 
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in creatures is a perfection to be predicated of God.
161
 To endure is to exist as a whole 
through time. The perfection that is said to be derived is that of existing as a whole or 
all at once. Yet, when applied to God it is given a non-temporal reading.  
 For Anselm, a man can exist as a whole throughout time. A man exists as a 
whole at each time when that time is present. Since the present is the only moment 
that exists, the man exists as a whole at the present and does not have parts at other 
times. Yet, the man’s life can be conceptually divided into parts because he has a 
before and after in his life. He no longer enjoys the past and does not yet enjoy the 
future. (Monologion 21) Anselm wishes to say that God also exists as a whole, but in 
a non-temporal way. Eternity lacks a before and after. Unlike the temporal present, 
eternity does not have moments that slip into the non-existent past, nor does it have 
future moments that do not yet exist. The duration of a temporal object can be 
measured by time, whereas the duration of eternity cannot be measured by time 
because it transcends time. Anselm makes it clear that the predicate involved—
existing as a whole—can be literally said of God and creatures. Creatures exist as a 
whole at a time and place, and so does God. The difference is that creatures are bound 
by, or contained in, time and place, whereas God is not. (Monologion 22) 
 For Anselm, to say that God has duration is to say that God exists as a whole 
at all times and places. Many theologians in the past agree that God exists as a whole 
at all times and places, and that this is the proper understanding of eternal duration.
162
 
(We will see in later chapters how this causes problems for divine timelessness.) For 
instance, the 14
th
 Century philosopher Nicole Oresme notes that there are different 
kinds of duration. One kind of duration is appropriate to things that endure through 
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the successions of time. Another kind of “duration is not successive, but refers to the 
continuity of everything together and to the things which cannot be altered; it is called 
eternity.” Further, “of necessity, [this] type is without beginning or end and without 
succession, but is at once complete as a whole; and this is the duration of God.” This 
eternal duration of God’s is “without past or future, completely in the present: 
Because neither any moment of past time is lost nor any anticipation of the future. 
And this is called the moment of eternity.”163 At this point one might ask, ‘is this a 
legitimate use of duration?’  
 Samuel Clarke says no. He claims that the schoolmen see eternity not as a real 
duration, but as a point or instant, “wherein all things are really coexistent at once.” 
This, he says, is unintelligible and of no use to religion.
164
 “The true notion of divine 
eternity does not consist in making past things to be still present and things future to 
be already come, which is an express contradiction.” By Clarke’s day there was a 
particular misinterpretation of Thomas Aquinas that said all things exist 
simultaneously in eternity. This will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, what 
must be understood is that Clarke is here offering a standard rejection of this view. He 
then goes on to make a common, and much needed, clarification. Not all moments of 
time exist in God’s eternal duration. Only the present moment of time co-exists with 
eternity. Instead, God has a perfect knowledge of all things such that they are 
“represented to him in one single thought or view, and all things present and future be 
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as absolutely under his power and direction as if there were really no succession at all, 
and as if all things had been (not that they really are) actually present at once.”165 
 Clarke’s complaint is not against predicating ‘duration’ of God’s eternity. His 
complaint seems to be twofold. First, God’s eternal duration is being abused in order 
to posit an absurd notion that all of time is literally and concretely simultaneous with 
eternity. Secondly, ‘duration’ is not being used accurately. Clarke is a defender of the 
absolute theory of time. Time can exist without change. Time, for Clarke, just is 
duration. For Clarke, eternal duration just is that which makes time exist; God is the 
ground of time. His complaint is not over whether or not God has duration, but over 
how time and duration are to be properly understood. As he sees it, when people deny 
absolute time—duration—and say that God is a point, they are basically denying that 
God exists.
166
 Of course, Clarke is not a defender of divine timelessness for he 
believes that God does undergo succession and is temporally extended. Perhaps one 
might complain that Clarke cannot be called upon to help us gain clarity on the notion 
of atemporal duration. 
 Several contemporary philosophers also find the notion of atemporal duration 
otiose. Katherin Rogers maintains that the medieval philosophers held that God’s 
eternity does not involve duration. Instead, they see eternity as unextended much like 
the point in the center of a circle. Putting historical considerations aside, she argues 
that eternity simply cannot have duration. “Since ‘duration’ ordinarily means 
‘extension in time’, a ‘timeless duration’ is, prima facie, quite a puzzling notion.”167 
William Lane Craig notes that duration is “not even applicable to a timeless being in 
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any literal sense…[because a] timeless being does not literally endure at all.”168 If 
divine eternity lacks temporal extension, as stated above, it is difficult to understand 
what eternal duration could mean. “Eternity as duration can be described only so long 
as ‘duration’ is stripped of any meaning by which to distinguish duration from the 
lack of it.”169  
 One would have to strip duration of all of its meaning if she wishes to apply it 
to a timeless being. Otherwise a direct contradiction follows. Quentin Smith explains. 
This notion of atemporal duration strikes me as self-contradictory. A duration 
by definition is an extension and an extension by definition has parts. If this be 
denied, then one is using ‘duration’ to mean its opposite, and an unextended 
and simple instant. Now the parts of a duration, by definition, are sequentially 
ordered as earlier or later. If this be denied, and it is asserted instead that its 
parts are simultaneous, then one is again using ‘duration’ to mean its opposite, 
an unextended instant…Thus to affirm unblushingly of the divine being that it 
not only has an infinitely extended duration but also is such that there is no 
earlier or later within its life is to embrace a straightforward contradiction.
170
 
 
Anselm would disagree. He thinks there is a literal usage of ‘duration’ that 
applies to God and creatures—existing as a whole. Need we say that ‘existing as a 
whole’ is equivalent to duration? A classical theologian wishes to say that God exists 
as a whole because God is simple, and because God exists at every time and place by 
causally sustaining every time and place in existence. One could say that a simple 
God exists as a whole without also saying that God has atemporal duration. What 
about divine sustaining? I will argue later that a timeless God cannot causally sustain 
a presentist world. Rogers, Craig, and Smith all agree on this point. Perhaps that is 
one reason why they reject atemporal duration. When one reads thinkers like Anselm, 
Molina, or Malebranche, they use eternal duration to speak of God existing at all 
times by sustaining all times. They are quick to say we should not think of this in a 
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temporal way, but they keep the concept of duration directly connected to existing as 
a whole at all times. As such, they have not given it an adequate non-temporal reading 
which brings us back to the main reason for rejecting eternal duration. The notion of 
duration involves temporal extension, and this is the very thing classical theologians 
wish to deny of God. It seems that duration has not been stripped of all its temporal 
meaning.
171
 As such, to say that God has atemporal duration involves a contradiction.  
At this point one might try to avoid the contradiction by adopting the doctrine 
of analogy—a thesis on religious language. Perhaps one might say that ‘duration’ is 
not being used univocally when predicated of God and creatures. Instead it is being 
used analogically. The difficulty with this is that analogical predication only works 
when one has an idea of the determinate predicate that applies to God and the 
different but closely related determinate predicate that applies to creatures. For 
instance, a standard example is the predicate ‘wise.’ One can say that ‘God is wise’ 
and ‘Socrates is wise.’ Someone who believes in the doctrine of analogy will then say 
that ‘wise’ is not being used univocally of God and Socrates here because God is wise 
in a different way. Socrates has wisdom contingently by participating in it. Given 
divine simplicity, God has wisdom necessarily by being identical to wisdom and 
being the source of all wisdom.
172
 In this example we have a clear understanding of 
how ‘wise’ is being used in each instance. We can also see how each usage is related. 
If there were no similarity between the usages, we could not say they are analogical 
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because they would be equivocal. It is not clear how this similarity avoids univocity, 
but I shall set that issue aside.
173
  
The type of similarity needed for analogy does not seem to be available with 
‘duration.’ If one has to strip duration of all its meaning in order to predicate it of the 
divine, she will have no content left in the predication. She will be left with an empty 
predicate for God and a determinate predicate for creatures. That would not be 
analogical predication. Instead it would be equivocation or simply unintelligibility. As 
such there would be no reason to predicate it of God.  
There seem to be four options left for predicating ‘duration’ of God. First, 
keep duration’s temporal baggage and predicate it of God. This would make God 
temporal, so a defender of divine timelessness will not be able to make this move. 
Second, give up the notion of atemporal duration. Third, try to offer a legitimate non-
temporal account of duration. That appears to be a tall order. Fourth, continue to 
predicate ‘duration’ of God, but when asked what this means simply say that it is an 
ineffable mystery that one cannot pry into.  
The fourth option may be attractive for some, but I would not recommend it 
for it leaves us with no positive understanding of God’s eternality. As Rogers 
explains, “Knowing what God is not like is insufficient. We are supposed to love 
God, and as Augustine always says, you cannot love what you do not know. Some 
attempt to grasp the nature of divine eternity ought to be made, even if the 
understanding of the temporal creature must fall far short of the reality of God.”174 
Further, if ‘duration’ is an ineffable mystery when predicated of God, this would not 
give us analogical predication. It would be equivocation at best, but more likely mere 
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unintelligible jargon. The best option for divine timelessness is to give up any notion 
of duration.
175
 
To sum up the discussion thus far we can start to see what divine eternality 
looks like. It has no beginning and no end. It lacks succession and change, and 
contains no before and after. It lacks temporal extension, location, and duration.  
One might wonder how someone like Augustine and Rogers can believe in 
divine timelessness since they hold that we cannot love what we do not know. The 
doctrine of divine eternality appears to be a list of negations. What must be 
understood is that not all negative statements about God are created equal. Some 
negative statements about God give us a determinate predication while others do not. 
For instance, to say that ‘God is not wicked’ is indeterminate. It does not give us a 
clue what God is actually like for God could be ‘morally ambiguous’ or ‘a pretty good 
guy who has made a few mistakes in the past’ or ‘contingently good’ or ‘necessarily 
good.’ To say that ‘God is immutable’ is determinate. It narrows the field of other 
possible predicates considerably. The same seems to be the case with ‘God is 
timeless.’ The predicate involved is a negation but it gives us a determinate predicate, 
and thus has positive content.
176
  
 
Can We Talk About Eternity? 
 This might seem to be a bizarre question a first. Haven’t I been talking about 
eternity this entire time? Obviously yes. The question that I am getting at is with 
regard to our ability to predicate things of God and talk about His actions. My intent 
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at this point is not to criticize, but simply to articulate what seems to be the best 
account available to divine timelessness. Christian theologians constantly make 
claims about God’s eternal decrees, will, action, and self-determination. For instance, 
God eternally willed salvation through Christ. When did God will this? One could 
say, “before time,” but that would be a rather unfortunate and confusing statement 
since the “before” implies a before and after relation. A timeless God cannot have a 
before and after relation. Instead, one must answer that eternity itself is when God 
willed. How is this to be understood? 
 Brian Leftow offers a helpful account. The eternal present functions logically 
as a date in that one can index propositions to it.
177
 “It seems to me that a term x 
functions literally as a date-term if a sentence is true which has the form ‘proposition 
p tenselessly-is true at x, and due to this, at t, p was already true.’”178 This is meant to 
help us understand predications of God, divine actions, and so on. It is also supposed 
to help us answer a question: when does God exist? 
 A common objection to divine timelessness is to ask when God exists. It 
seems obvious to say that God exists now.
179
 Yet, if one were to respond this way she 
would be relegating God to time. If God exists now, He is temporal. If God exists at a 
time, He is in time. God would have temporal location, and such a thing is 
inconsistent with (4). Leftow’s treatment of eternity as a date is intended in part to 
circumvent objections like these. The idea is that we should treat eternity like a time 
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that is discrete from our own.
180
 This discrete time would serve as the truthmaker for 
our claims about God.
181
 One can say that God exists in eternity, or at eternity, or 
simply that God exists. One can say that from eternity God willed to save humanity 
through Jesus, or that God eternally decreed the defeat of evil.  
 Again, it would be good to sum up what we have covered so far. Necessarily, 
God’s timeless eternity means that God exists without beginning, without end, and 
without succession. It lacks any before and after. It is not temporally extended, nor 
does it have temporal location. Eternity does not have duration. A timeless God 
cannot undergo any intrinsic or extrinsic changes. Further, as simple God is pure act, 
and has no properties, nor is He subject to any distinctions be they real or conceptual. 
Finally, eternity logically functions as a date or “time” that is discrete from our own 
time-series.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 Divine timelessness, immutability, and simplicity have traditionally been 
justified on the basis of perfect being theology. Unfortunately space does not allow 
for a detailed discussion of the method of perfect being theology. For now it will 
suffice to say that the end result of perfect being theology is to predicate of God 
perfections that He has necessarily.
182
 For instance, it is better to be good necessarily 
than contingently. When it comes to understanding God’s eternality it must be noted 
that Christians who hold to the divine timeless research program see timelessness, 
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immutability and simplicity as perfections. As such, God is held to be necessarily 
timeless, immutable, and simple. Necessarily God exists without beginning, without 
end, without succession, without temporal location and extension. Necessarily God 
can suffer no change. Necessarily God is pure act and has no potential and no 
properties. These are strong statements, and their strength is not always appreciated in 
contemporary discussions. This may be why some theologians and philosophers 
continue to look for a third way between divine atemporality and temporality. The 
method of perfect being theology, however, brings us to the conclusion that either 
temporality or atemporality are perfections. As such, there is little sense in claims that 
God is timeless sans creation but temporal with creation. If God is timeless, He is 
necessarily timeless. It is not possible for Him to become temporal for that would 
involve the possibility of change in God, and this is not something that timelessness 
allows for. God must either be necessarily timeless or necessarily temporal. The 
traditional understanding is that God is necessarily timeless.   
  
  
CHAPTER 4 
PRESENTISM, OMNISCIENCE, AND THE TIMELESS GOD 
 
 In this chapter I shall attempt to do several things. First, I shall argue that the 
classical tradition is the presentist tradition. In other words, classical theists were 
presentists. This is important to know when it comes to critiquing their research 
program on God and time. Second, I will look at one particular objection to divine 
timelessness from presentism: it is incompatible with omniscience.  
 
Presentism and Classical Theology 
 Presentism and endurantism are the traditional views amongst Christian 
theologians throughout Church history.
183
 In fact, one of the main reasons given for 
thinking that God is timeless, based upon the incompleteness of temporal life, 
assumes both presentism and endurantism. Yet, there are a few issues that have come 
to the fore in contemporary debates. Does four-dimensionalism need to be true in 
order for God to be omniscient? Is four-dimensionalism needed in order to make 
sense of the claim that all times are present for God in eternity? These are interesting 
questions that one will need to address in her research program. For now I want to 
focus on a question that sometimes arises out of these two previous questions. Is four-
dimensionalism the view that classical theologians meant to articulate? The answer is 
no. Far too many contemporary theologians and philosophers either accuse or praise 
classical theologians for holding to four-dimensionalism, but this is anachronistic.
184
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Presentism “was believed by everyone, both the philosophers and the folk, until at 
least the nineteenth century; it is written into the grammar of every natural language; 
and it is still assumed in everyday life, even by philosophers who officially deny 
it.”185 
 In the previous chapter I noted the tight connection between presentism, 
edurantism and the doctrine of divine timelessness—i.e. God exists all at once in a 
timeless present that lacks a before and after. In this section I will further show that 
presentism is the classical Christian position. This will become even clearer in the 
next chapter on presentism, creation and divine timelessness, but before we can delve 
into those issues it will be helpful to see how deeply ingrained presentism is in 
Christian thought. One example comes from Gregory of Nyssa. In a rather poetic 
fashion he says, “time’s lapse sweeps away with it all existence in the past, whereas 
expected existence gains substance from our hope.” (Against Eunomius I.42) 
Statements like these only make sense on presentism. Several misreadings and 
misinterpretations of classical texts need to be dispelled before we can begin to 
critique the classical position on divine timelessness.  
From Augustine’s Confessions to Duns Scotus’ Lectura, presentism and 
endurantism have been widely held. For the medieval theologians, both God and 
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creatures are endurant beings that exist wholly and entirely at the present.
186
 It should 
be noted, however, that medieval thinkers’ claim that God’s eternal present is 
different from the creaturely present (as discussed in chapter 3).
187
 Yet they think 
God’s present is similar enough to our present to warrant the predication present. The 
assumption of presentism is at work in their descriptions of God’s timeless eternity 
and how it relates to our temporal present.  
The Catholic and Protestant scholastics also held that God was an endurant 
being whose eternity coexists with all times.
188
 Their view is not that all created times 
coexist as the four-dimensionalist sees it. As the Protestant scholastic Francis Turretin 
explains, all times coexist with eternity without being coexistent with each other. 
“Thus the past, while it was, coexisted with eternity, the present now coexists with it, 
and the future will coexist with it.”189 Turretin is clearly holding to presentism here.  
 As noted above, there are theologians who are often called upon by the four-
dimensionalist or accused of holding to four-dimensionalism. There are passages in 
Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas that appear to point in the direction of 
four-dimensionalism. I think this is mistaken, though it is a matter of contemporary 
dispute. The contemporary confusion seems to derive from the claim that all moments 
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of time are present to God in eternity.
190
 What must be understood is that the classical 
theologians in the middle ages as well as scholastics and Protestants believe that 
God’s knowledge is not dependent upon creatures. Their claim that all moments of 
time exist in eternity must be understood in light of this belief as well as their 
continual endorsement of presentism. With these two commitments in mind we can 
begin to understand the classical position. 
In Confessions XI.17, Augustine is trying to figure out how one could see the 
future in order to prophesy given that the future does not yet exist. In XI.18 he claims 
the future itself is not seen, but perhaps the signs or causes of presently existing 
objects are seen. Ultimately he leaves it as a mystery at this point. In other writings, 
however, he is clearer. In On the Trinity 6.11 he says, “created things are not known 
by God because they have been made; it is rather the case that they have been made 
because they are immutably known by him.” In On Genesis 5.6 he says that God 
knows all things before He creates them, “they were in God’s knowledge, they were 
not in their own nature.” Peter Lombard adds to this that this is the way God knows 
things even after He creates them. (Sentences Book I, Dist. XXXV 9.1-2).  In City of 
God XI.21 Augustine explains that God’s cognition is not like ours in that God does 
not “look forward to the future, see the present, and look back upon the past.” Instead, 
God’s mind does not pass from one thought to another. His vision is utterly 
unchangeable. Thus, He comprehends all that takes place in time—the not-yet-
existing future, the existing present, and the no-longer-existing past—in an 
immutable and eternal present…His knowledge of what happens in time, like 
His movement of what changes in time, is completely independent of time. 
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Boethius continues to work out these Augustinian ideas. As Boethius’ 
Consolations of Philosophy makes clear, “how absurd it is that we should say that the 
result of temporal affairs is the cause of eternal foreknowledge!” (V.147) For 
Boethius, “All that lives under the conditions of time moves through the present from 
the past to the future.” (V.161) Elsewhere he speaks of the “now that flows away” that 
makes time.
191
 Boethius continually makes the claim that all moments of time exist 
for God in His eternal now, but he does so with a careful qualification. “Since then all 
judgment apprehends the subjects of its thought according to its own nature, and God 
has a condition of ever-present eternity, His knowledge, which passes over every 
change of time, embracing infinite lengths of past and future, views in its own direct 
comprehension everything as though it were taking place in the present.” (V.163)192 
What is Boethius saying here? 
As John Marenbon explains, Boethius is making a claim about the mode of 
God’s knowledge.193 Everything has a mode of knowledge appropriate to its own 
nature. The mode of God’s knowledge is not based on created things. Instead, it is 
based on a perfect knowledge of the divine nature. To say that all times exist in the 
eternal present is to make an epistemic claim and not a claim about the ontology of 
time. It is not a claim that all times are literally present in eternity. God cannot “see” 
the future because the future does not exist. God knows the future truths by having a 
perfect knowledge of Himself. 
Anselm speaks in multiple places like a presentist. He speaks of “what has had 
a past existence but does not now exist, and a future existence but does not yet exist.” 
(Proslogion 22) Yet in Proslogion 20 through 21 Anselm says things that sound like 
                                                 
191
As quoted by Aquinas in Summa Theologica I.Q10.objection 1. 
192
 Emphasis mine.  
193
 Marenbon, “Boethius,” in eds. Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis, The History of Western 
Philosophy of Religion Volume 2: Medieval Philosophy of Religion (Durham: Acumen Publishing 
Limited, 2009), 22-30.  
84 
 
four-dimensional eternalism. It would be anachronistic, however, to read this passage 
as a commitment to four-dimensional eternalism. Anselm is working with a 
distinction in medieval philosophy between permanent and successive entities, and 
this distinction assumes presentism and endurantism. Permanent entities endure 
through time, but their lives can be conceptually divided into successive states or 
temporal parts. These temporal parts are not extramental four-dimensional objects. 
They are conceptual divisions. (One may recall this discussion from chapter 3, and the 
role it played in articulating divine timelessness.) The basic thrust of his argument is 
that existing as a whole, or all at once (endurance), is a perfection found in creatures. 
As such, God must have this perfection and be an endurant permanent being.  
Another source of confusion in Anselm comes from De Concordia I.5.
194
 Here 
Anselm uses his presentism to articulate his doctrine of eternity. Eternity has “no past 
or future but only a present.” If Anselm where a four-dimensionalist, it would make 
little sense to continually make comparisons between our temporal present and God’s 
eternal present as he does. But the passage goes on to say that 
although in eternity there is only a present, nevertheless it is not a temporal 
present as ours is, only an eternal one in which all periods of time are 
contained. Indeed, just as our present time envelops every place and whatever 
is in every place, so in the eternal present all time is encompassed along with 
whatever exists at any time.  
 
Anselm even says that all times “exist simultaneously in an eternal present” which is 
why some think that Anselm is a four-dimensional eternalist. However, I believe this 
to be a mistake because it ignores Anselm’s continual commitment to presentism. He 
is talking about God’s knowledge and foreknowledge when He makes this claim. One 
of the problems for God’s foreknowledge that Anselm is trying to address here is that 
our actions and behaviors themselves are not everlasting because they do not always 
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exist. How does God foreknow them if they do not always exist? This problem arises 
on presentism and not on four-dimensional eternalism. If Anselm were a four-
dimensionalist he would not have this problem. His solution to the problem is 
consistent with the presentism that he explicitly endorses elsewhere. Anselm’s move 
in this chapter is that all truths about the past, present, and future exist in eternity 
immutably. It does not matter that the actions themselves do not exist in eternity. All 
that matters is that the truths exist. This is not a commitment to four-dimensionalism. 
It is a throwback to an Augustinian commitment to the eternality of truth.  
Thomas Aquinas has been accused by process theists of holding to four-
dimensionalism.
195
 Again, this is a mistake. Aquinas clearly speaks of the movable 
now (Summa Theologiae I.Q10.a4). Yet, Aquinas also uses the metaphor of a man in 
a watchtower to explain God’s foreknowledge.196 The metaphor seems to indicate that 
God sees all moments of time simultaneously just as a man in a watchtower sees the 
whole of the land simultaneously. However, Aquinas does not intend this to imply 
that the past, present, and future are on an ontological par, though some have claimed 
this of Aquinas in order to condemn him or put him on the side of four-dimensional 
eternalism. Aquinas is a presentist.
197
 In Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate QII.12 
he writes of future contingents coming into existence. “Although a contingent is not 
determined as long as it is, future, yet, as soon as it is produced in the realm of nature, 
it has a determinate truth. It is in this way that the gaze of divine knowledge is 
brought upon it.” And a little later on he says, “Although a contingent does not 
exercise an act of existence as long as it is a future, as soon as it is present it has both 
existence and truth, and in this condition stands under the divine vision.” The idea in 
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both of these statements is that future things do not exist as concrete objects until they 
become present. Aquinas goes on to say of God’s omniscience in De Veritate QII.12 
although God’s knowledge does not change but always remains the same, the 
condition according to which a thing is referred to His knowledge does not 
always remain the same with respect to that knowledge. For a thing is related 
to God’s knowledge as it is in its own present existence, yet present existence 
does not always belong to it. Hence, we can consider the thing either together 
with its condition of being present or without it, and, consequently, we can 
consider it either in the manner in which it is referred to God’s knowledge or 
in some other manner. 
 
Aquinas is endorsing presentism here. Even further, in QII.7-13 he considers 
several objections to God’s omniscience and immutability. Several of the objections 
assume presentism. For instance, one objection goes like this: is it not the case that 
God’s knowledge changes from past, to present, to future? At one time, God knew 
that <Christ will be born>, but now God no longer knows this. Instead, God knows 
that <Christ was born>. Another objection looks like this. A thing exists, then no 
longer exists. Can God know when something exists now? God’s knowledge of 
Himself cannot deliver knowledge of what currently exists. 
Aquinas’ response is telling. He never rejects presentism, but instead assumes 
it as does the objection.
 
In fact, he assumes presentism throughout the rest of the 
treatise to explicate various issues. (The same is true in Summa Contra Gentiles I.63 
and following.) What Aquinas contends is that God’s knowledge does not change 
because of the divine mode of knowing. God’s knowledge is based upon a perfect 
knowledge of His own essence. It is not that God looks upon the world and sees what 
is presently occurring, and thus has something added to His knowledge. God already 
knows everything perfectly through knowledge of Himself. All truths are thus 
represented to God through His own essence. God knows the representation of things, 
and not the concrete particulars. (De Veritate QII.13, 1.) In De Veritate QII.14 he 
makes this explicit. “It cannot be said, however, that what is known by God is the 
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cause of His knowledge; for things are temporal and His knowledge is eternal, and 
what is temporal cannot be the cause of anything eternal.”  
Aquinas’ defense is that God’s knowledge is not based on the ever changing 
temporal world. He concedes that if this were the case, God’s knowledge would in 
fact change. However, God’s knowledge is based on His own immutable essence, and 
as such, cannot change.  
Another objection that Aquinas considers will further help make this issue 
come into focus. In De Veritate QII.3 he considers the following objection. 
“Whatever God knows He knows from eternity, since His knowledge does not vary. 
Now, whatever He knows is a being, for knowledge is only of being. Hence, whatever 
He knows existed from eternity. But no creature existed from eternity. Consequently, 
He knows no creature.” If Aquinas was a four-dimensional eternalist, he could 
respond by saying that all concrete objects exist eternally in the four-dimensional 
spacetime manifold. But, Aquinas is not a four-dimensionalist. His response instead is 
that the objects do not have to exist in order for God to know them. “Although 
knowledge has only being for its object, it is not necessary that what is known should 
be a real being at the time in which it is known; for, just as we know things that are 
distant in place, we also know things distant in time, as is evident from our knowledge 
of things past. Hence, it is not inconsistent to affirm a knowledge of God that is about 
things that are not eternal.” (De Veritate QII.3.12)  
A contemporary four-dimensional eternalist would most likely see this 
response from Aquinas and say that Aquinas has a grounding problem like every 
other presentist does with regard to truths about the past and the future. It is not clear 
to me that the Augustinian move that Aquinas makes here—which grounds these 
truths in the essence of God—is unable to meet the grounding objection to presentism. 
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However, arguing this is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is merely worth pointing 
out that the medieval theologians might have resources for dealing with the grounding 
objection to presentism from within their own research program.  
Back to the present argument. Earlier I noted that process theists accuse 
Aquinas of holding to four-dimensionalism. Interestingly this criticism is not new. 
Around the time of Aquinas several theologians critical of his work falsely accused 
him of holding that eternity was simultaneous with past, present and future as if all 
times were equally real. After Aquinas’ death, certain theologians would argue that 
Aquinas held this so that they could condemn his views. A few seem to have taken up 
this line of interpretation and ran with it, but it faced obvious objections early on.
198
 
For instance, John Duns Scotus felt the need to reject this Thomistic school of 
thought. The refutation was quite simple. God cannot coexist, or stand in a causal 
relation, with non-existent things. The present is the only moment of time that exists, 
so God’s eternal now cannot be simultaneously present with the non-existent past and 
the not-yet existent future.
199
  Scotus—like most prior to the 1800’s—thinks that 
presentism is obviously true and formulates his theology accordingly. Further, Scotus 
continues to affirm the Augustinian line with regard to God’s knowledge. God’s 
knowledge is not based on created things, but is based on a perfect understanding of 
His own essence.
200
 
This confusion persisted throughout the Reformation and Enlightenment. I’m 
not certain how many people actually—if any—held the view that God’s eternity 
literally contains the past, present and future. My uncertainty that anyone actually 
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held this view is due to a particular interpretation of this claim within Thomistic 
thought. Luis de Molina in Concordia IV, Disp. 48 follows one Thomistic tradition 
that holds that objects exist eternally and temporally. Everything exists in eternity, 
and in time. There is the concrete Adam that exists in eternity, and the concrete Adam 
that exists in time. Molina goes on to say that this is the view of not only Aquinas, but 
also Anselm, Boethius, and Augustine. This particular interpretation goes back to the 
16
th
 Century Thomistic commentator Cajetan.
201
 The claim wouldn’t be that four-
dimensionalism is true of time. Instead the claim would be that somehow there are 
concrete counterparts of ourselves that exist in God’s eternal present. This is a bizarre 
claim, but it does not lend support to four-dimensionalism. The theologians who held 
this view still thought that a presentist ontology of the temporal order is true.  
Again, it is not clear that anyone prior to the 19
th
 Century actually held the 
view that all times are literally present to God. At the very least, theologians and 
philosophers felt the need to mention it in order to refute the notion. For instance, in 
Henry More’s Divine Dialogues from 1668 a group of individuals are engaged in a 
dialogue about theology. Hylobares objects to the notion of divine eternity since it 
entails a contradiction. 
That it is an essential presence of all things with God, as well of things past, 
present, as to come; and that the Duration of God is all of it, as it were, in one 
steddy [sic] and permanent…Instant at once…For what can be more 
contradictious, then that all things should have been really and essentially with 
God from all Eternity at once, and yet be born in time and succession?
202
 
 
Hylobares’ dialogue partner Philotheus quickly rebukes Hylobares for being 
uncharitable. Then Philotheus responds in a similar fashion to that of Scotus.  
That the whole Evolution of Times and Ages from everlasting to everlasting is 
so collectedly and presentifickly [sic] represented to God at once, as if all 
things and Actions which ever were, are, or shall be, were at this very Instant, 
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and so always, really present and existent before him…[The divine mind 
comprehends] the Ideas of all Things and Ages at once in the Intellect of 
God.
203
 
 
The idea is that God comprehends all things in eternity because all things in time are 
“represented” to God at once. The things themselves do not exist in eternity, just a 
representation of them. It should also be noted that the representation of things in time 
maintains the proper temporal topology even though it exists eternally in the mind of 
God. In other words, from all eternity God knows the order of events that take place 
in time.
204
 After hearing all of this Hylobares concedes that his objection has been 
refuted and says, “I am half ashamed I ever propounded it.”205 
 In the quote from Philotheus, I emphasized the “as if” clause. The “as if” 
clause is an important point for clarity on this issue, and it can be found in several 
other theologians from this time period. A contemporary of Henry More, Stephen 
Charnocke, stresses the same point. Charnocke, like the dialogue partners in More, 
holds that God exists without beginning, without end, and without succession. In 
God’s eternity there is neither flux nor change.206  The things of the world are in time 
and thus undergo change and succession. This succession does not cause a change in 
God’s knowledge because God does not see things in time. God’s knowledge is not 
based on what occurs in time. Instead, God knows all that occurs in time by having a 
perfect knowledge of Himself. “He doth not know one thing now, and another anon; 
He sees all things at once.” God still knows the true temporal order of things even 
though He knows all of this at once.  
God knows time, he knows all things as they are in time; He doth not know all 
things to be at once, though he knows at once what is, has been, and will be. 
All things are past, present, and to come in regard of their Existence; but there 
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is not past, present and to come in regard to God’s Knowledge of them; 
because he sees and knows not by any other, but by himself; He is his own 
Light by which he sees, his own Glass wherein he sees; beholding himself, he 
beholds all things.
207
 
 
If one were still uncertain about this, Charnocke drives home the point again.  
If God be eternal, he knows all things as present. All things are present to him 
in his Eternity; for this is the notion of Eternity, to be without succession. If 
Eternity be one indivisible point, and is not diffused into preceding and 
succeeding parts, then that which is known in it or by it, is perceived without 
any succession; For knowledge is as the substance of the person knowing; if 
that hath various actions and distinct from itself, then it understands things in 
differences of time as time presents them to view: But, since Gods Being 
depends not upon the revolutions of time, so neither doth his Knowledge; it 
exceeds all motions of years and days, comprehends infinite spaces of past and 
future. God considers all things in his Eternity in one simple knowledge, as if 
they were now acted before him.
208
 
 
Charnocke’s claims here echo those of the medieval theologians, and yet it also 
contains the “as if” clause that is an important point of clarification in this time 
period.  
In the 18
th
 Century Samuel Clarke also felt the need to address this confusion 
about the claim that all moments of time exist in eternity, even though he denies 
divine timelessness.  
The true notion of divine eternity does not consist in making past things to be 
still present and things future to be already come, which is an express 
contradiction. But it consists in this (and in this it infinitely transcends the 
manner of existence of all created beings, even of those which shall continue 
for ever): that whereas their finite minds can by no means comprehend all that 
is past or understand perfectly the things that are present, much less know or 
have in their power the things that are to come (but their thoughts and 
knowledge and power, must of necessity have degrees and periods, and be 
successive and transient as the things themselves); the eternal, supreme cause, 
on the contrary, has such a perfect, independent, and unchangeable 
comprehension of all things that in every point or instant of his eternal 
duration all things past, present, and to come must be, not indeed themselves 
present at once (for that is a manifest contradiction), but they must be as 
entirely known and represented to him in one single thought or view, and all 
things present and future be as absolutely under his power and direction as if 
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there were really no succession at all, and as if all things had been (not that 
they really are) actually present at once.
209
 
 
Clarke’s statement here exemplifies the clarity that theologians had been striving for 
with regard to this issue.  
A quick summary is in order before moving on. When the Christian tradition 
says that all moments are present to God in eternity—at least with regard to God’s 
omniscience—it is not meant to say something about the ontology of time. Rather it is 
saying something about God’s mode of cognition. Namely, that God knows the 
abstract forms of things from all eternity.
210
 God’s mode of cognition is not based 
upon His perception of times and events, but rather based on His direct apprehension 
of His own essence. As the medievals’ would say, God has a perfect knowledge of 
Himself and thus knows all things. In this way one can say that all times are present to 
God in eternity because it is true that from all eternity God knows all abstract states of 
affairs or all eternal truths. Thus, the tradition did not have four-dimensionalism in 
view, nor would a classical theologian think four-dimensionalism necessary in order 
to make sense of God’s omniscience.  
None of this demonstrates that God’s knowledge of the future is in fact 
possible on presentism. It merely shows that the majority of Christians in the past saw 
no reason to posit the existence of the future in order to explain God’s foreknowledge. 
If one wishes to argue that classical Christians should have held to four-
dimensionalism in order to maintain divine omniscience, one is free to do so. It would 
be anachronistic to say that classical Christians did believe in four-dimensional 
eternalism. This is because the majority of Christians in the past were presentists and 
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used presentism to articulate their theological doctrines. They never made statements 
like, ‘It only appears from our perspective that the present is the only moment that 
exists, but from the divine perspective all of time exists.’ Instead they make direct 
inferences from the fact of presentism to claims about God’s eternal present.  
 
Does God’s Knowledge Change with Creation? 
 As discussed above, there is an obvious objection that arises from the 
combination of presentism, timelessness, and omniscience, and the objection remains 
today. In our day it is often argued that a timeless God cannot know what time it is 
now if presentism is true.
211
 The idea is that a timeless God cannot know when it is 
now since that would require a constant change in God. This objection only works if 
the research program in view has a particular understanding of omniscience. It seems 
that some in the classical Christian tradition would not find this argument to be a 
serious threat to their research program since it assumes that God’s knowledge is 
based upon the existence of the concrete particulars of creation. Certain classical 
theologians would see this as a mistake. God, they say, has a perfect knowledge of 
Himself. His knowledge is in no way dependent upon creatures. I will call this the 
Augustinian Option. Another strand of classical theologians takes this argument 
seriously since they hold that God does in fact have knowledge of the present. I will 
call this the Thomist Option. 
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The Augustinian Option 
As stated above, this group of theologians holds that God knows all things that 
occur in time, but His knowledge is not based upon the temporal objects.
212
 With 
human persons, we gain knowledge when new events occur in time. Not so with God. 
“God does not see in time, nor does anything new happen in his sight or his 
knowledge when some temporal and transitory action is performed.” (Augustine, The 
Trinity XII.10) Human persons can only experience things one moment at a time. The 
divine persons of the Trinity, however, see everything “all at once, not bit by bit.” 
(Augustine, The Trinity XV.23)  
Augustine distinguishes divine and human ways of knowing as follows.  He 
holds that human persons acquire beliefs in three basic ways. First, we can know 
things through self-perception or knowing ourselves. We can reflect on ourselves, our 
own consciousness, and come to know a whole host of things like <I am alive> and <I 
want to be happy>. Second, we come to know things through bodily sensations or 
bodily perceptions. We can look around and see trees and thus know that <there are 
trees near us>. Third, we come to know things by testimony. Augustine points out that 
most of our beliefs are dependent upon the testimony of others. Through testimony we 
come to know that other places and people exist, we learn history and daily news, and 
we learn about our birth and parents. (The Trinity XV.3.21)  
When it comes to God’s knowledge, Augustine says that we do not hold that 
God knows things through the testimony of others or through bodily perception. 
Instead God knows all things by having a perfect knowledge of Himself. God is 
simple so His wisdom is His knowledge which is also His substance. How does this 
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shed light on our question? It seems that a timeless God cannot know when it is now 
nor what presently exists. Augustine would not find this as a reason for rejecting 
divine timelessness because He thinks such knowledge is unnecessary for 
omniscience. God does not know created things “because they are, but that they are 
because he knows them. He was not ignorant of what he was going to create. Nor did 
he know them as created otherwise than as to be created; nothing accrued to his 
wisdom from them, but when they came into existence as required, it remained just as 
it had been.” (The Trinity XV.22) 
The Forms or Ideas exist in the mind of God. Since God is simple, His mind is 
identical to Himself. God has a perfect knowledge of Himself and all that He can 
create and will create. Augustine in The Trinity VI.11 claims that  
the almighty and wise God [is] full of all the living and unchanging ideas, 
which are all one in it, as it is one from the one with whom it is one. In this art 
God knows all things that he has made through it, and so when times come 
and go, nothing comes and goes for God’s knowledge. For all these created 
things around us are not known by God because they have been made; it is 
rather, surely, that even changeable things have been made because they are 
unchangeably known by him.  
 
Creation adds nothing to God’s knowledge for He already had, or rather 
eternally has, a perfect knowledge of everything. (Lombard, Sentences, I Dist. 
XXXV.) God does not need to know what time it is now, nor does He need to know 
what objects presently exist. Knowing such things would not add to His knowledge, 
or so say the Augustinians. (Lombard, Sentences, I, Dist. XXXIX)
213
 In fact, knowing 
such things would be considered an imperfection because such knowledge would 
entail (i) that God’s knowledge is in some way dependent upon the created temporal 
order, and (ii) God would have succession in His life. For the atemporalist, 
temporality entails imperfection.  
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As noted before, the atemporalist who holds this view will not find it a threat 
that God does not know what time it is now. This objection to divine timelessness 
only has force for those who believe that God has knowledge of things in time. The 
temporalist will need to argue that God cannot be omniscient unless He knows what 
time it is now. In other words, she will have to argue that the Augustinian option is 
not a solid auxiliary theory within the timeless research program. Interestingly, the 
Thomistic school argued that God cannot be omniscient unless He is aware of things 
in time. As such, we will see that they are subject to this objection.  
 
The Thomist Option 
Aquinas’ position is somewhat different. Just like the Augustinians, Aquinas 
agrees that God’s knowledge is not based upon temporal things. In De Veritate QII.14 
he writes, “It cannot be said, however, that what is known by God is the cause of His 
knowledge; for things are temporal and His knowledge is eternal, and what is 
temporal cannot be the cause of anything eternal.” He agrees that God’s knowledge is 
first and per se of Himself. God knows all things by having a perfect timeless 
knowledge of Himself.
214
 (Summa Contra Gentiles, 45-54) If one has a perfect 
knowledge of a cause, she will have a perfect knowledge of its effect. God is the 
cause of all things, so He has a perfect knowledge of all things by knowing the cause 
of all things—i.e. Himself. Since God’s power is His essence, given divine simplicity, 
He has a perfect knowledge of all that He can produce. Further, God is pure act, so He 
has a perfect knowledge of what He produces. All truths are thus represented to God 
through His own essence. God knows the representation of things, and not the 
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concrete particulars. (De Veritate QII.13, 1.) This is what the Thomists call natural 
knowledge.
215
  
Where Aquinas seems to disagree with the Augustinians is over God’s 
knowledge of concrete particulars. Whereas the Augustinians held that God does not 
have knowledge of what occurs in time, Aquinas argues that God in fact does. Why? 
One reason is that humans have knowledge of concrete particulars that occur in time. 
God’s cognitive power is greater than humans, so He must have this knowledge too. If 
God is perfect in knowledge, He must have knowledge of these things. Otherwise He 
would be foolish. (Summa Contra Gentiles, I.65) 
In several places Aquinas deals with an objection to God’s omniscience from 
concrete particulars, or as he would say, singulars. Earlier I noted an objection in De 
Veritate QII.7 that looks like this. A thing exists, then no longer exists. Can God 
know when something exists now? God’s knowledge of Himself cannot deliver 
knowledge of what currently exists. In Summa Contra Gentiles I.63 one of the 
objections goes as follows. “[S]ingulars are not always. Either therefore they are 
always known by God, or they are known at one time and unknown at another. The 
first is impossible, since about what is not there can be no knowledge, which is 
always about true things, and things which are not cannot be true. The second is also 
impossible, because the knowledge of the divine intellect is altogether unchangeable.” 
The problem underlying both of these objections is that concrete particulars only exist 
at the present. In the first objection, the difficulty is whether God can know what 
currently exists without undergoing change. In the second, the difficulty is against the 
very possibility of an immutable God knowing concrete particulars because they only 
exist at the present.  
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Aquinas could affirm, like most before him, that God’s knowledge consists 
only of Himself and the representations of things, not of the concrete particulars 
themselves. Thus, God’s immutable knowledge would not need to undergo any 
change by knowing the concrete particulars. But Aquinas is not content with this. He 
wishes to go further and say that “the divine knowledge extends to singulars as 
existing in themselves.” (Summa Contra Gentiles, I.66) How can he do this? The 
strategy seems to be twofold. First, appeal to natural knowledge. God has a perfect 
knowledge of everything by knowing Himself, the cause of everything. By this 
knowledge God can know all things that exist and that do not exist. Second, by 
knowledge of vision God knows what currently or presently exists. Let us take each in 
turn. 
With regard to the first move, one of the issues is about God’s knowledge of 
non-existent things. For instance, the future does not yet exist. Can God’s natural 
knowledge deliver knowledge of non-existents? Aquinas says yes. An astronomer can 
know a future eclipse before it happens. A craftsman can know what he will make 
even before he has made it because the craftsman has knowledge of what he—the 
cause—will do. The idea is that God too has this knowledge, but in a perfect way. 
God is the cause of all, so by knowing Himself He has a perfect representation of 
every effect. (Summa Contra Gentiles, I.66) Yet, it would appear that this is not 
sufficient to give God knowledge of what presently exists in such a way that God will 
remain immutable, hence the need for the second strategy, the appeal to knowledge of 
vision. 
How can God have a timeless knowledge of the concrete particulars that exist 
in time? His answer is that the present moment of time syncs up with eternity such 
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that God’s knowledge of vision provides God knowledge of what currently exists.216 
He explains as follows. “There is no succession in God's act of understanding, any 
more than there is in His existence. Hence it is all at once everlasting, which belongs 
to the essence of eternity, whereas the duration of time is drawn out by the succession 
of before and after.” Now “since the being of the eternal never fails, eternity 
synchronizes with every time or instant of time,” much like the point of the 
circumference of a circle. 
Accordingly whatever exists in any part of time, is coexistent with the eternal 
as though present thereto, although in relation to another part of time it is 
present or future. Now a thing cannot be present to, and coexistent with, the 
eternal, except with the whole eternal, since this has no successive duration. 
Therefore whatever happens throughout the whole course of time is seen as 
present by the divine intellect in its eternity. And yet that which is done in 
some part of time was not always in existence. It remains therefore that God 
has knowledge of those things which are not as yet in relation to the course of 
time. (Summa Contra Gentiles, I.66)
217
 
 
A quick comment is in order before proceeding with Aquinas’ solution. Some 
might misinterpret this passage as a commitment to four-dimensional eternalism 
because it states that God has knowledge of all moments of time. As argued above, 
Christians have not traditionally been fond of this idea. What must be understood is 
that this statement from Aquinas is made in the middle of a chapter called “That God 
Knows the Things That Are Not.” One of the main issues is how God can know non-
existent things like the past and the future. After he states the argument from which 
the above quote is taken, he concludes that God knows “not-beings” or non-existent 
things. Further, in the next chapter, 67, he states, “the vision of the divine intellect 
from eternity sees each thing that happens in time as though it were present, as we 
have shown above.”218 This being the case, it would not be wise to interpret Aquinas 
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as holding that the past and future are on the same ontological par with the present. 
With that in mind, we can proceed with Aquinas’s second strategy. 
Aquinas, and others, hold that the present is co-existent with eternity.
219
 As the 
Protestant scholastic Francis Turretin explains, all times coexist with eternity without 
being coexistent with each other. “Thus the past, while it was, coexisted in eternity, 
the present now coexists with it, and the future will coexist with it.”220 How does this 
help with God’s knowledge of the present? Aquinas continues his argument in Summa 
Contra Gentiles I.66 as follows.  
On the other hand things which to us are present, past, or future, are known to 
God as being not only in His power, but also in their respective causes, and in 
themselves. Of such things God is said to have knowledge of vision, because 
God sees the existence of things which, in relation to us, are not as yet, not 
only in their causes but also in themselves, in as much as His eternity is by its 
indivisibility present to all time. 
 
This is not clear, but the argument seems to be this. God knows things that are past, 
present and future as they are represented in His power. He also knows them by 
knowing the cause of all things which is Himself. Yet, when it comes to knowing the 
concrete particulars in themselves He knows them when they are present because He 
is the cause of their existence. (Summa Theologiae I, Q14, a11) The present co-exists 
with eternity, and God knows the present by knowledge of vision.
221
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 One may wonder how Thomists can maintain that God is immutable. Since the 
present is constantly changing new moments of time are constantly coming into being 
and co-existing with eternity, then no longer co-existing with eternity as they cease to 
exist. Further, God’s knowledge of vision will constantly be changing since He will 
constantly be aware of new concrete particulars.  
The knowledge of vision clearly involves succession. In Summa Contra 
Gentiles I.69, Aquinas argues that God knows infinite things. One difficulty is that the 
infinite cannot be counted. God, says Aquinas, lacks succession, so He can know the 
infinite without having to traverse the infinite. “God does not know infinite things by 
His knowledge of vision, to use the expression employed by others, because the 
infinite neither is, nor was, nor will be actual.” The knowledge of vision is about 
temporal succession, and one cannot reach actual infinity through succession. Instead, 
God “knows the infinite number by His knowledge of simple intelligence. For God 
knows the infinite number of things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, and 
nevertheless are in the power of a creature. He knows also the infinite things that are 
in His power, that neither are, nor have been, nor shall be.”  
How might this shed light on Aquinas’ solution? I take it that God’s perfect 
knowledge of Himself is not increased in any way by God’s knowledge of vision. But 
that seems less than obvious, for Aquinas asserts that by knowledge of vision God 
knows the concrete particulars as they are in themselves. That type of knowledge 
would certainly add to God’s natural knowledge. At the very least, God would come 
to have knowledge de re through his knowledge of vision. It seems that God’s 
knowledge of concrete particulars in themselves causes problems for divine 
timelessness because God’s knowledge of vision is in constant flux.  
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The Augustinians did not have this problem for they denied God knowledge of 
things in time. But the Thomists think that God would be lacking a particular kind of 
knowledge if this were true. The divine temporalist agrees with the Thomist on this 
point. If God is cognitively excellent, He will have knowledge of concrete particulars 
in time. Granting God this type of knowledge, however, makes God temporal for what 
presently exists is in constant flux.  
There is one possible way to remove this problem. One could deny presentism 
and adopt four-dimensional eternalism. On this theory of time there is no objective 
present for all moments of time are on an ontological par. Thus, God’s knowledge of 
temporal things would not be in constant flux. Those who are not willing to get rid of 
presentism from their research program will not be able to make this move. As it 
stands, any Christian research program that holds to divine timelessness and 
presentism has a serious conflict between omniscience and knowledge of the present. 
She will most likely have to defend some version of the Augustinian option in order 
to assuage this difficulty. In the next chapter, however, I shall argue that this will be 
of little help. The Augustinian option may appear to avoid this difficulty, but it only 
does so by setting aside the systematic connections between omniscience, 
omnipresence, and divine sustaining. As we shall see in the next chapter, once those 
systematic connections are brought into view, the problems for divine timelessness 
become more difficult to avoid.  
 
  
  
CHAPTER 5 
PRESENTISM, CREATION, AND THE TIMELESS GOD 
 
 In the previous chapter I argued that the classical tradition was committed to 
presentism. Then I looked at the difficulties that arise for timelessness, omniscience, 
and presentism. In this chapter I shall examine the problems that arise for 
atemporality from presentism and creation. As we shall see, Christian thinkers in the 
past were aware of these issues. What I shall do in this chapter is examine the ways 
that Christians in the past have dealt with the problems that arise from presentism and 
divine timelessness with regard to creation. I shall argue that their solutions to the 
problems are not successful, and that presentism is not compatible with divine 
timelessness. The main problems are as follows. First, one cannot say that the timeless 
God is the Creator, Redeemer, or Lord of creation. This is because the timeless God 
cannot be related to creation. Second, a timeless God cannot create a presentist 
temporal world out of nothing. Third, a timeless God cannot sustain a presentist world 
in existence.  
 
The Timeless Creator 
In On the Catholic Faith Boethius proclaims “this our religion which is called 
Christian and Catholic is founded chiefly on the following assertions. From all 
eternity, that is, before the world was established, and so before all that is meant by 
time began, there has existed one divine substance of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in 
such wise that we confess the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, and 
yet not three Gods but one God.” He goes onto say, “The divine nature then, abiding 
from all eternity and unto all eternity without any change, by the exercise of a will 
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known only to Himself, determined of Himself to form the world, and brought it into 
being when it was absolutely naught.” 
John Philoponus agrees. “God, since he is the creator of time, must create 
timelessly.” If God is immutable, simple, and timeless His creative action cannot 
cause a change in God. “[T]he creative activity of God is instantaneous.”222 John of 
Damascus concurs as well. “For the creation, even though it originated later, is 
nevertheless not derived from the essence of God, but brought into existence out of 
nothing by His will and power, and change does not touch God’s nature.” (Orthodox 
Faith I.7) 
As noted before, most Christians have traditionally held the relational theory 
of time. If there is a change, there is a time. Since God cannot undergo any change, 
He must be timeless. In City of God XI.6 Augustine explains as follows: 
there could have been no time had not a creature been made whose movement 
would effect some change. It is because the parts of this motion and change 
cannot be simultaneous, since one part must follow another, that, in these 
shorter or longer intervals of duration, time begins. Now, since God, in whose 
eternity there is absolutely no change, is the Creator and Ruler of time, I do 
not see how we can say that He created the world after a space of time had 
elapsed unless we admit, also, that previously some creature had existed 
whose movements would mark the course of time. 
 
Augustine is here expressing a commitment to the relational theory of time and divine 
immutability. He is also expressing his commitment to the notion that time began with 
creation.
223
  
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo raises difficulties for immutability, 
timelessness, and simplicity. This is because the presentist tradition holds that the 
universe is not co-eternal with God. According to John of Damascus “it is not natural 
that that which is brought into existence out of nothing should be co-eternal with what 
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is without beginning and everlasting.” (Orthodox Faith I.7) Aquinas in On the 
Eternity of the World 11 says “nothing can be co-eternal with God, because nothing 
can be immutable save God alone.” Augustine City of God XII concurs. “Since the 
flight of time involves change, it cannot be co-eternal with changeless eternity.” On 
this view there is a state of affairs where God does not exist with creation. There is 
also a state of affairs where God does exist with creation. The main difficulty is 
explaining how this does not create a change—a before and after—in the life of God. 
As we shall see, there are many related problems that stem from this difficulty. 
 
Can a Timeless God be Called Creator, Redeemer, and Lord? 
In The Trinity Augustine articulates an account of divine timelessness, 
simplicity, and immutability. He holds that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 
timelessly coeternal. (The Trinity I.9) The three divine persons are one in substance, 
and this divine substance does not undergo any passage of time or change. (The 
Trinity I.3 and V.2) “In their own proper substance by which they are, the three are 
one, Father and Son and Holy Spirit, without any temporal movement, without any 
intervals of time or space, one and the same over all creation, one and the same all 
together from eternity to eternity, like eternity itself which is never without verity and 
charity.” (The Trinity IV.30) Further, the Godhead is immutable. “There is no 
modification in God because there is nothing in him that can be changed or lost…he 
remains absolutely unchangeable.” (The Trinity V.5) Yet, he allows for Trinitarian 
relational predicates to be made of God that do not modify the divine substance such 
as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit for all three are eternally related to each other. (The 
Trinity V.6) Also, the Godhead is simple in substance. (The Trinity V.9) Other 
substances participate in attributes like greatness, and as such are distinct from 
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greatness. The greatness in which they participate is something greater than them. 
Yet, this cannot be the case with God since “there is nothing greater than God. So he 
is great with a greatness by which he is himself the same greatness.” In other words, 
“God is the same thing to be as to be great.” And the same is true of all the other 
attributes we typically predicate of God like goodness, eternity and omnipotence (The 
Trinity V.11)  
The doctrines of divine timelessness, immutability, and simplicity have been 
criticized in recent years as being in direct conflict with Scripture. Scripture proclaims 
that God does things in time. It predicates contingent temporal properties of God like 
Creator, Redeemer, and Lord. How might we understand this? Augustine has a 
hermeneutical principle that can be deployed to deal with troublesome passages. 
“Whatever there is in the word of God that cannot, when taken literally, be referred 
either to purity of life or soundness of doctrine, you may set down as figurative. 
Purity of life has reference to the love of God and one's neighbour; soundness of 
doctrine to the knowledge of God and one's neighbour.” (On Christian Doctrine 
III.10. Also, cf III.15) Working from this principle Augustine asserts that when 
scripture predicates of God “position, possession times, and places, they are not stated 
properly about God but by way of metaphor and simile.” (The Trinity V.9) Since 
Augustine thinks that it is proper to refer to God as timeless, any passage of scripture 
that says otherwise must be taken as speaking in some non-literal way.  
Augustine is not out of the woods yet. He does not quickly dismiss all 
passages that ascribe temporal properties to God. Instead, He considers various issues 
that arise from scripture itself. One such issue that he deals with comes from creation. 
God is lord of creation, He created the universe out of nothing. Yet, creation has not 
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always existed—it is not co-eternal with God. Can we predicate Creator and Lord of 
a timeless God? Augustine lays out the problem in detail.  
But what about “lord”? If a man is not called a lord except from the moment 
he begins to have a slave, then this relationship title too belongs to God from a 
point of time, since the creation he is lord of is not from everlasting. But then 
how will we be able to maintain that relationship terms are not modifications 
with God, since nothing happens to him in time because he is not changeable, 
as we established at the beginning of this discussion? (The Trinity V.17) 
 
To put the problem a bit differently, God “cannot be everlastingly lord, or we 
would be compelled to say that creation is everlasting, because he would only be 
everlastingly lord if creation were everlastingly serving him.” (The Trinity V.17) We 
thus have a tension with the Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing and divine 
timelessness. The universe has not always existed, but it comes to exist. God is said to 
exist timelessly and without any modification. It seems that God must undergo some 
kind of modification when creation comes into existence. “How then are we going to 
be able to maintain that nothing is said of God by way of modification?” Augustine 
answers as follows. “Well, we say that nothing happens to his nature to change it, and 
so these are not relationship modifications which happen with some change in the 
things they are predicated of…Thus when he is called something with reference to 
creation, while indeed he begins to be called it in time, we should understand that this 
does not involve anything happening to God’s own substance, but only to the created 
thing to which the relationship predicated of him refers.” In other words, God does 
not change essentially or relationally when creation comes into existence. “So it is 
clear that anything that can begin to be said about God in time which was not said 
about him before is said by way of relationship, and yet not by way of a modification 
of God, as though something has modified him.” (The Trinity V.17) It may sound as if 
Augustine is allowing for God to have relational properties, but that is not the case. 
Augustine understands that even relational properties would make God temporal. 
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Further, since God is simple He can have no accidental properties. This is why 
Augustine says that the relational property only befalls the creature and not God. This 
is a theme developed throughout the Middle Ages. 
Following Augustine, Boethius holds that the category of relation “cannot be 
predicated at all of God.” (The Trinity Is One God Not Three Gods IV) It should be 
noted that Boethius and Augustine allow for relations when one is talking about the 
eternal relation between the divine persons of the Trinity. The denial of relations is 
with regard to God and anything ad extra to God. Peter Lombard further develops 
Augustine’s idea that the relational predicate befalls the creature and not God. “For 
there are some things which are said of God in time and which are fitting for him in 
time without any change on his part. These are said relatively, according to an 
accident which does not befall God, but which befalls the creatures, such as creator, 
lord, refuge, giver or granted, and suchlike.” (Sentences Book I Dist. XXX.1) A bit 
further on Lombard summarizes Augustine’s thoughts from The Trinity V. “From 
these comments, it is plainly shown that some things are said of God in time relative 
to creatures, without change of the deity but not without change of the creature; and 
so the accident is in the creature, not in the Creator. And the name by which the 
creature is called relative to the Creator is relative, and it denotes the relation which is 
in the creature itself; the name by which the Creator is called relative to the creature is 
also relative, but it denotes no relation which is in the Creator.” (Sentences Book I 
Dist. XXX.1)   
The idea is that when we come to passages like Psalm 90:1 where God is said 
to be our dwelling place or refuge, we interpret this to mean that we have changed and 
that God remains the same. This is because God is not related to the creature, though 
the creature is related to God. Augustine and Lombard both give several examples of 
109 
 
this notion. Say that Peter is unrepentant in his sins. He stands in God’s wrath. Yet, 
God’s wrath against sin has always been the same, so Augustine and Lombard say no 
change has occurred in God’s nature. Say that Peter then becomes repentant and 
begins to enjoy the grace and love of God. Augustine and Lombard maintain that God 
has not changed; only Peter has. God is love; He always has been and always will be 
eternally without time.  
Is this satisfactory to prevent God from having accidental properties and 
remaining timeless, immutable, and simple? Surely not. Grant that God is eternally 
and necessarily love. It still seems that God undergoes a change in bestowing grace 
and love on the repentant Peter since Peter does not become repentant until a 
particular time. Augustine and Lombard will quickly appeal to the doctrine of 
predestination at this point. God has eternally decreed to love Peter, they will say, and 
as such God has undergone no change in His decree. Does this really solve anything? 
Not at all. God’s eternal decree to bestow grace upon Peter is not identical to the 
actual manifestation of that grace upon Peter for Peter does not eternally exist. God 
cannot bestow grace on Peter or express His love towards Peter until the actual 
concrete particular that is Peter comes into existence. God can express all sorts of 
loving gestures toward Peter before Peter comes to exist (e.g. eternally decree to send 
the Son and temporally send the Son), but certain expressions of love simply cannot 
occur until Peter in fact exists. This involves God activating a potential that He did 
not previously actualize: bestowing grace on Peter. It also involves God coming to 
have an accidental property: the bestower of grace on Peter.
224
 God has undergone a 
change, and Augustine and Lombard have failed to rebut this difficulty.  
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The same problem arises from creation. God cannot be the creator until He 
causally brings about the universe into existence. Thomas F. Torrance says that, “God 
was always Father, but not always Creator.”225 God has always existed as Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, but creation has not always existed. It seems, for all the world, that 
when the universe came into existence out of nothing God began to stand in a new 
causal relation that He did not previously stand in. Augustine and Lombard’s claim 
that the accidental properties befall the creature and not God is nothing more than a 
linguistic game, and does nothing to assuage the problem.  
But grant Augustine and Lombard their claim for the moment. Another 
problem arises. Say that the accidental relational properties only fall upon creatures 
and not God. When a man cries out in prayer, ‘God my Creator and Savior,’ is he 
offering up proper praise to God? Augustine and Lombard will say yes. It is perfectly 
appropriate to predicate of God the titles Creator and Savior just as long as we 
remember that the accidental property really befalls us and not God. Yet, if the 
property Creator does not really apply to God but instead expresses a property in us, 
how can it be said that it is appropriate to predicate of God? It does not actually 
express anything at all about God. When we cry out in praise we are really saying 
things about ourselves. This looks like a clear case of religious subjectivism. 
“According to the religious subjectivist, religious sentences are about the states of 
minds of religious believers.”226 In offering up various speech acts with the intent of 
praising God we are in fact doing no such thing. We are only expressing things about 
ourselves and not anything about extramental reality.  
Surely Augustine and Lombard would find religious subjectivism repugnant. 
In fact, I think it obvious that both would consider themselves to be engaged in 
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serious theological work that does in fact say true things about God. Of course they 
would be modest and say that they do not perfectly comprehend God, but there should 
be little doubt that they are realists about theological language. Both articulate 
accounts of predicates that can be said of God’s essence: properties like goodness, 
wisdom, and so on. It is hard to see how anyone who is a Christian theological realist 
could actually believe this notion that the accidental predicates like Creator and 
Redeemer are not true of the Biblical God but only true of ourselves. Further, if it is 
only true about ourselves, then why should we think that it is appropriate to say we 
are speaking about God? Either we are speaking about God, or we are not. It seems 
that this is another doctrine that someone can only pay lip service to but not actually 
believe because the Christian God is really related to the world and is truly the 
Creator and Redeemer. This puts Christian theology in direct conflict with the 
entailments of the divine timeless research program.  
 
Is God Related to Creation? 
 This may seem to be an odd question. Christians hold that God is deeply and 
intimately related to creation. One minimal claim of Christianity is that creation 
would not exist if God did not sustain it in existence.
227
 But, as we saw in the last 
section, it is difficult to hold that God is simple, immutable and timeless, and that He 
stands in relation to a temporal universe. But things are even worse than they appear.  
 Boethius in The Trinity is One God Not Three Gods IV says, “There are in all 
ten categories which can be universally predicated of things, namely, Substance, 
Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time, Condition, Situation, Activity, Passivity. 
Their meaning is determined by the contingent subject; for some of them denote real 
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substantive attributes of created things, others belong to the class of accidental 
attributes. But when these categories are applied to God they change their meaning 
entirely. Relation, for instance, cannot be predicated at all of God; for substance in 
Him is not really substantial but supersubstantial. So with quality and the other 
possible tributes, of which we must add examples for the sake of clearness.” 
 We have a bizarre claim on our hands: relation cannot be predicated of the 
simple, immutable, and timeless God. But Christians are deeply committed to the 
notion that God is related to creatures. Not just merely related, but intimately related 
such that we can say the Holy Spirit is poured out on all flesh, and that we are His 
children.   
As discussed above, Augustine and Lombard hold that God cannot undergo 
intrinsic and extrinsic changes. Relational properties, for instance, do not apply to 
God, but only befall the creature. Aquinas further develops this idea that God cannot 
have any relational predicates. The relations cannot be in God as an accident since a 
simple God has no accidental properties. Nor can the relations be thought of as 
predicated of God’s substance because “it would follow that God’s substance is 
essentially referred to another, depends in some way thereon, since it can neither exist 
nor be understood without it. Hence it would follow that God’s substance is 
dependent on something else outside it: and thus it would not be of itself necessary 
being.” (Summa Contra Gentiles II.12)  
For the classical theologian the category of relation simply cannot apply to 
God if He is simple, immutable, and timeless. This is because they held that the relata 
are dependent upon each other. Since God exists a se and is dependent upon nothing 
outside of Himself, He cannot stand in a relation to anything outside of Himself. This 
is bizarre to contemporary ears for we do not think that most instances of relationships 
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entail that the existence of the relata are dependent upon each other. For instance, I 
stand in a relationship to my mother but we can exist without each other. In fact, my 
mother existed without me for 30 years of her life. The relationship that we stand in is 
dependent upon our existence, but our existence is not dependent upon the 
relationship. What is going on here with Aquinas’ understanding of relations? What 
makes his account different from ours?  
 Aquinas is following an Aristotelian theory of relations. For most instances of 
relations this means that a relation is something that relates two or more substances. 
This relation involves the substances having accidental properties in virtue of standing 
in a relation to the other. Since a relation involves two or more substances, a 
substance cannot itself be a relation. This seems quite reasonable to contemporary 
ears, but there is more to the story.  
On this Aristotelian account there are three modes of relations. First-mode 
relations are numerical relations founded on the category of quantity. For instance, I 
can say that I have three oranges. Second-mode relations are between active and 
passive things. These are founded on an absolute category. An example would be the 
relation between a fire and an egg that it boils. The fire is actively heating the egg. 
Third-mode relations can be founded on any of the categories, and they can involve 
things like the relation between measurable and measured, or knower and known.
228
 It 
is third-mode relation that Aquinas has in mind here.  
 Aquinas, following the traditional interpretation of third-mode relations, holds 
that these relations involve a non-mutuality condition. For instance, there is a thing 
that is knowable regardless of whether or not anyone knows about it. The knower is 
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dependent upon the knowable, but the knowable is not dependent upon the knower.
229
 
The non-mutuality condition is said to deny a co-relation between the relata. As such, 
one of the relata can have an accidental property, whereas the other does not. The two 
relata are in a mind-dependent relation, and not a real extramental relation. Hence, 
only one of the relata is in the relationship whereas the other is not involved in the 
relationship. This is where Aquinas parts company with contemporary notions of 
relations. Most do not think that a relation can obtain when one of the relata is not 
standing in a relationship to the other relatum. But many philosophers in the Middle 
Ages thought otherwise and used this to answer theological puzzles.  
 What about the problem that Augustine and Lombard tried to deal with 
earlier? It seems perfectly appropriate to say that God is my Creator, Redeemer, and 
Lord. Since God has not always been these things, this must surely involve some kind 
of change. Aquinas agrees that this would involve change. “Whatever receives 
something anew, must needs be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now 
certain relations are said of God anew: for instance that He is Lord or governor of a 
thing which begins anew to exist. Wherefore if a relation were predicated of God as 
really existing in Him, it would follow that something accrues to God anew, and 
consequently that He is changed either essentially or accidentally.” (Summa Contra 
Gentiles II.12) But Aquinas thinks that God cannot undergo any essential change, and 
a simple God does not have any accidental properties.  
How are we supposed to solve this problem? The relations that we predicate of 
God are not in Him, nor are they extrinsic to Him. We refer to God all the time in 
worship, in theology—both natural and revealed—and so on. What is the solution? 
These relations, says Aquinas, “are not really in Him, and yet are predicated of Him, 
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it remains that they are ascribed to Him according only to our way of understanding.” 
Other predicates, like wisdom, are appropriately said of God because they denote His 
essence. These types of predicates are extramental. When it comes to relational 
predicates this is not the case. They exist in our mind only and do not apply to God, as 
is the case with all third-mode relations. Aquinas maintains that our understanding is 
not false since we predicate relations of God because “the divine effects terminate in 
God Himself.” (Summa Contra Gentiles II.13-14) 
This seems obviously false. If our relational predicates do not apply to God at 
all, but only exist in our minds, what are we doing in a worship service? I would 
imagine that the average person in the pew thinks that she is singing about God. When 
she sings, ‘Lord my Creator’ she is intending to actually refer to God. But on the 
picture that we have from Aquinas, this is not the case. When singing ‘Lord my 
Creator’ she is not referring to God. The phrase from the song does not apply to any 
extramental reality. Instead it is only stating something about the creature. This is the 
same problem that Augustine and Lombard face. 
In medieval philosophy relations were held to obtain between extramental 
things.
230
 For instance, the predicates slave and master are grounded in a real relation 
between two persons. Yet, medieval philosophers also held that there are non-
paradigmatic cases of relations where two accidental properties are not involved. Say 
that Peter begins to think about Socrates. The accidental property, they would say, 
belongs to Peter only. No accidental property befalls Socrates since Socrates, they 
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say, is not actually related to Peter in this instance. Another example of a non-
paradigmatic case was God. A simple God can have no accidental properties. As such 
it is hard to explain how a simple God can stand in relations with creation. This is 
why they deny that God stands in a real relation to creation.  
In the case of Peter thinking about Socrates, later medieval thinkers argued 
that there was a relation of reason. Peter clearly has the extramental property thinking 
about Socrates. What corresponds to our concept being thought about? One might be 
tempted to say that Socrates has this accidental property, but later medieval thinkers 
argued that this is a concept that has no extramental reality. It exists in our minds 
only. When applied to God, since these accidental properties are conceptual only, they 
cannot cause any real change in God.
231
  
It should strike one as implausible that a relation obtains between one relatum 
and not the other relatum in the relation. Typically we think that a relation is a two-
way street. When x stands in a relation to y, it is also the case that y stands in a 
relation to x. This move, however, says that x stands in a relation to y, but that y does 
not stand in any relation to x. This appears to be self-contradictory. This seems to be 
saying that a relation obtains when in fact no relation obtains. If one is forced to deny 
the commonsense notion of relations in order to maintain divine timelessness, 
simplicity, and immutability, one should reconsider one’s position.  
Not only does it fly in the face of commonsense metaphysics, it brings about 
severe incoherence within one’s theology. The problem is that a real relation involves 
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an extramental foundation, and Aquinas, in Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa 
Theologiae, is denying that relations in God are extramental. This claim is too strong 
and undermines what Aquinas wishes to say elsewhere in his theology.  
For instance, Aquinas’ five ways depend on God’s causal activity. If God is 
not really the cause of the world, but only in our minds, natural theology is an utter 
failure. The atheist will be happy to say that the world’s causal dependence upon God 
exists in the minds of believers only. The Christian cannot be sanguine about this. 
Another problem is that God cannot be omnipresent. For Aquinas, God is omnipresent 
through His power which sustains all of creation in existence. An incorporeal thing 
like God “stands in relation to being somewhere by its power.” (Summa Contra 
Gentiles III.68) This looks like a clear example of second-mode relations, but we are 
forbidden from saying this in light of simplicity, immutability, and timelessness. If we 
deny real relations of God, then we must say that <God is not omnipresent>. We can 
say that <God is omnipresent> as long as we admit that this is strictly false and give it 
a different interpretation because this relation exists only in our minds. Again, the 
atheist will be happy to accept this, but the Christian cannot. As such, she should 
reject Aquinas’ denial of real relations.  
Of course, if we reject this claim we allow for God to have accidental 
properties as creatures continually refer to God in worship, and as God continually 
causally sustains all things in existence.  As such, God cannot be timeless, strongly 
immutable, and simple. 
Perhaps one might invoke the Scotistic real relation at this point and ditch the 
previous account. A “real change” or “real relation” in John Duns Scotus’ thought 
means a change or relation that is essential or intrinsic to the subject. For instance, 
one might say that creatures are really related to God in that creatures are essentially 
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dependent upon God for their existence. God is not really related to creatures because 
the existence of creatures is not essential to Him. But Scotus rejects the traditional 
interpretation of third-mode relations that was discussed above, and this is an 
important feature in his account of real relations. This departure from the traditional 
interpretation is not something Augustine, Lombard, or Aquinas take. For Scotus, 
third-mode relations are mutual and co-relative. This means that a third-mode relation 
does involve, at the very least, an extrinsic property in the terminus of the relation. 
Further, Scotus, unlike Aquinas, clearly denies “the traditional view that the co-
relation of a third-mode relation is a relation of reason. God really is correctly 
described as the Creator regardless of whether there are any minds to think so.”232 
Scotus’ account of real relations may be a helpful way to think about relations, but it 
isn’t what Aquinas holds, so it will not help Aquinas.233 Also, it allows for us to call 
God the Creator, and Aquinas admits that such a predication involves change. Hence, 
God would not be timeless. 
 
Can a Timeless God Create a Temporal World? 
 There are several objections to the Christian doctrine of creation out of 
nothing based on divine timelessness. Many of the arguments try to conclude that the 
world must be eternal since God is eternal. This will be taken up at length in the 
section on John Philoponus, but for now it would be good to see how others have 
addressed the issue. Aquinas addresses this objection in several works. One argument 
can go like this.
234
 Temporal causes produce temporal effects. Eternal causes produce 
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eternal effects. God is eternal. God willed that creation exist. God’s will causes 
creation to exist. God’s will is eternal, so creation must be eternal. The problem is that 
the biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo clearly entails that the universe is not 
eternal, but is finite in the past. The Christian who holds to divine timelessness has to 
explain why God’s eternal will to create does not entail the eternality of the world.  
 Perhaps one can respond by pointing out that God is a voluntary agent. His act 
of creation is said to be free. When an agent voluntarily wills to produce something 
she can delay for various reasons. Perhaps the agent needs to wait for the right time. 
Say Molly has a bill to pay, but she does not get paid until Friday. She must wait until 
Friday to pay the bill due to a current lack of funds. She wills to pay the bill, but her 
action must wait. Or say that Molly wills to get married, but she is presently single. 
Her action must wait until she finds a man.  
 This cannot be the case with the simple, immutable, and timeless God. 
Necessarily, a timeless God cannot wait. Necessarily, a God who is strongly 
immutable cannot begin to perform a new action. Necessarily, a God who is pure act 
cannot delay His action. His eternal acts must produce eternal effects. As such, God’s 
eternal act of creation must produce an eternal world. How can the atemporalist 
respond?  
 Aquinas’ responses are, unfortunately, underwhelming. One response is 
simply to deny that eternal acts necessarily produce eternal effects. Though Aquinas 
does not explicitly say “necessarily” he must hold it. This is because he believes in the 
eternal generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit. In this 
instance Aquinas must surely hold that God’s eternal act must produce an eternal 
effect. Otherwise there would be a time when the Son and Holy Spirit were not. 
Despite the fact that eternal generation and procession are an ineffable mystery, and 
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that I find ineffable mysteries to be incoherent and repugnant to Christian theology, I 
will grant that it gives us a clear example of an eternal cause with an eternal effect.
235
 
What Aquinas needs to do is offer a clear example of an eternal cause with a temporal 
effect. This is precisely what Aquinas does not do.  
He says that God’s “act of understanding and willing must be His act of 
making. Now the effect follows from the intellect and the will according to the 
determination of the intellect and the command of the will. And just as every other 
condition of the thing made is determined by the intellect, so is time appointed to it.” 
Just as God “wills this thing to be such and such, so does [He] will it to be at such and 
such a time.” (Summa Contra Gentiles II.35) 
 The idea seems to be this. When an agent wills that such and such take place, 
she wills that it take place at a certain time. Her will need not immediately produce 
the intended effect. Perhaps an example will help. I get motion sickness very easily. 
One day I decide to go to Edinburgh. I know that I must take medicine before I get on 
the train in order to prevent illness. However, the medicine has clear directions that it 
should be taken 20 minutes before travel. About a week before my trip I will that I 
take the medicine 20 minutes before travel. My will never changes throughout the 
week, but I do not act until the right time. If I take the medicine immediately 
following my will it shall be of no use to me. As such, I must wait to act until 20 
minutes prior to travel. My will in this instance does not produce an immediate effect.  
 The problem is that this in no way helps Aquinas explain how the will of an 
eternal God does not produce an eternal effect. The reason my will did not produce an 
immediate effect is because my will and act are distinct. For Aquinas, God is simple. 
God’s will, intellect, act, and so on are all identical to God. The above scenario 
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describes something that God cannot do if He is simple, immutable, and timeless. 
Aquinas has failed to defeat the objection. What makes this failure even more serious 
is that several of Aquinas’ later rejoinders to other objections assume the success of 
this one.  
  
The Problem of Divine Sustaining 
 Another problem for the timelessness research program is related to God’s act 
of sustaining the universe in existence. This will be treated fully in the section below 
on John Philoponus, but for now I wish to lay out some of the initial difficulties. 
Throughout this thesis I have discussed the common belief that eternity and the 
present are synced. The notion that God’s eternity syncs up with the present is 
essential for Christian thought because eternity is said to contain time or sustain the 
universe in existence. God’s sustaining of the world in existence has traditionally 
been tied up in the doctrine of divine omnipresence. It will be illuminating to see the 
way previous thinkers have tried to deal with the problems that arise from a 
commitment to divine timelessness, omnipresence, divine sustaining, and presentism. 
This will help us to see where exactly the problems are, and why the proposed 
solutions fail.  
I will begin with Anselm’s discussion on these matters. Throughout 
Monologion and Proslogion Anselm claims that God exists at every place and time. 
Then he is quick to qualify this by saying that God does not exist in any place or time. 
What is Anselm trying to say?  
He says of God, “You exist neither yesterday nor today nor tomorrow but are 
absolutely outside all time.”(Proslogion 19) Yet, he also says that God has “neither 
past nor future existence but only present existence; nor can You be thought not to 
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exist at any time.”(Proslogion 22) God must exist at all times and places, but 
somehow he is absolutely outside time. This sounds rather confusing, but what must 
be understood is that Anselm is attempting to distinguish God’s eternity from time as 
well as establish the fact that God sustains each moment of time in existence.
236
 For 
Anselm, God’s eternity contains all of time such that he can say that God does not 
exists in any place or time, but that God exists wholly at all times and all places.
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Anselm wishes to deny that God is contained in time and place because that 
would limit God. “[I]t would seem that only things that are limited to the time and 
place they are in are bound by the law of time and place.”(Monologion 22) For 
creatures that are limited by time and place they can only exist wholly at the times and 
places that they are bound to. God, who transcends time and place, is not bound by 
time and place and as such can exist wholly at all times and places. “The creator of all 
substances, the supreme substance, is necessarily free from the natures and laws of 
everything it has created from nothing. It is not subject to them.”(Monologion 22) 
Anselm proclaims of God that “nothing is greater than You, no place or time confines 
You but You exist everywhere and always. And because this can be said of You 
alone, You alone are unlimited and eternal.”(Proslogion 13) God is not contained nor 
constrained by the universe, therefore “it is necessary that [He] be present as a whole 
simultaneously to all places and times, and to each individual place and 
time.”(Monologion 22)238  
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God cannot be contained in time and place, and yet He exists at every time and 
place. God “exists everywhere, in everything and through everything.”(Monologion 
20) God must exist as a whole at everywhere and everywhen because “nothing ever, 
or anywhere, exists without God.”(Monologion 21) Creatures can exist as a whole in 
time because they endure through time. God exists as a whole outside of time, and yet 
Anselm wishes to say that He exists at every time. We have a clear tension. God 
exists timelessly. Yet, in order for anything other than God to exist “it is necessary 
that [God] be present as a whole simultaneously to all places and times, and to each 
individual place and time.”(Monologion 22) 
How can this be understood? Some will try to argue that Anselm is a four-
dimensional eternalist. As such, God can be wholly present to the entire spacetime 
manifold. But “Anselm is clearly and unequivocally a presentist.”239 When comparing 
God’s eternal present to our temporal present he makes this very clear. “Nor does part 
of [God’s] eternity leak away with the past into non-existence, or fly past, like the 
scarcely existing momentary present, or, with the future, wait, pending, in not-yet 
existence.”(Monologion 22) A clearer proclamation of presentism cannot be found. 
To say that Anselm is a four-dimensionalist is to ignore the many statements like this 
that Anselm makes.
240
 He does not say that the past and future appear to be non-
existent from our perspective. Instead, he is making a direct move from the way the 
world actually is—presentism—to the way eternity actually is. Anselm’s comparison 
would be completely undermined if he were a four-dimensionalist.  
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On presentism, the present moment is the only moment of time that exists. All 
that exists exists at the present. In order to flesh out God’s sustaining of the universe 
Anselm makes a direct comparison between God’s eternal present and our temporal 
present. “Indeed, just as our present time envelops every place and whatever is in 
every place, so in the eternal present all time is encompassed along with whatever 
exists at any time.”(De Concordia I.5) God’s eternal present “sustains everything 
other than itself, preventing everything from falling into nothingness.”(Monologion 
22) 
Fair enough; God’s eternal present syncs up with our temporal present by 
sustaining it, and all that it contains, in existence. Yet, wouldn’t this mean that God is 
constantly undergoing change? He sustains one moment of time in existence, and then 
as that moment ceases to exist, He causally sustains another moment. Anselm never 
addresses this problem as far as I know.  
Aquinas and his contemporaries have a standard reply to this type of 
objection.
241
 God’s will never changes. God always wills His good: whether or not 
God wills that some thing exist, He always wills His good as the final end. (Summa 
Contra Gentiles II.31)  
This is a woefully unhelpful reply. The issue of God’s will undergoing change 
can be distinguished from God’s action.242 God could eternally will that some thing x 
come to exist at time t1, but God cannot eternally act at t1 because that time does not 
always exist. One can appeal to timeless acts with temporal effects if she so wishes. 
All she needs to do is to offer a plausible model of timeless acts that bring about 
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temporal effects in a presentist world. At the moment there are no plausible models.
243
 
In fact, every model that I know of is based on analogies involving temporal agents 
and temporal effects. For instance, two common analogies are as follows. ‘I will to go 
to the movies later, but not now.’ And, ‘I set my heater to turn on at 5:00.’ It is true 
that the agents in these analogies have a determinate will that never changes, but these 
are temporal agents who will one thing at a time and act at another time. This simply 
cannot help us understand an atemporal agent’s acts that have temporal effects. 
Further, these analogies are dependent upon agents with distinct wills and acts. This 
cannot shed any light on a simple God whose act and will are identical.
244
  
Peter Lombard struggles with similar difficulties. God who is “existing ever 
unchangeably in himself, by presence, power, and essence is in every nature or 
essence without limitation of himself, and in every place without being bounded, and 
in every time without change.” One of the issues that Lombard attempts to answer has 
to do with how God is more present in the lives of the saints than in the lives of 
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others. This is related to God’s grace, and as such, would take us off topic. Another 
issue is this: Where was God, or where did God dwell, before there was a creature? 
The saints of God are His temple. Earth is His footstool. Where did He dwell before 
these things came into existence? In Himself. The “saints are not the house of God in 
such a way that, if the house is taken away, God falls. Instead, God dwells in the 
saints in such a way that, if he should depart, they fall.” Much like Anselm, Lombard 
is saying that God’s presence sustains all created things in existence. Yet, Lombard 
thinks more is contained in this idea. What more is contained in this idea? I don’t 
know, and neither does Lombard. He leaves it as a mystery.  
A final issue that is directly relevant is whether or not God’s presence makes 
Him subject to change and time. Lombard considers the following objection. “Every 
day, creatures are made which do not exist before, and God is in them, but he was not 
in them before; it follows that he is where he was not before, and so he seems to be 
mutable.” This argument has some serious teeth. Unfortunately Lombard’s rejoinder 
does not. “But although every day he begins to be in creatures in which he was not 
before, because they did not exist, yet this happens without change on his part, just as 
he began to be in the world which he made, and yet without change. Similarly, 
without change on his part, he also ceases to be in things in which he was before; he 
does not at that time cease to be in the place, but the place ceases to be.” (Sentences I 
Dist. XXXVII)  
I might be mistaken, but this rejoinder looks like little more than ‘I know it 
looks as if God changes, but He doesn’t.’ God’s continual causal activity of sustaining 
creation in existence is a serious defeater for divine timelessness. Much more is 
needed to remove the defeater than simply saying, “nope.” Thankfully for 
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atemporalists John Philoponus has offered a thorough treatment of these related 
problems. Perhaps he can sort things out for us.  
 
John Philoponus to the Rescue?  
A Proclus’ Inspired Dilemma 
 In the 6
th
 Century John Philoponus examined an argument from Proclus that 
he took to be an objection to the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo based on 
divine perfection.
245
 Before laying out the argument, there are two assumptions that 
Proclus and Philoponus hold about time. First, they both seem to hold to a relational 
view of time where time is change or movement. This is clear from their statements 
on God’s immutability. Second, they both hold to presentism.246 With these two 
assumptions we can begin Proclus’ dilemma.  
Proclus’ argument goes a little something like this.247 Assume that God is 
simple. God lacks physical and metaphysical composition. God’s wisdom, power, 
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goodness, thoughts, will, and so forth are all identical to each other and identical to 
God. Further, God is purely actual; He contains no potentiality. Divine simplicity is 
part of a package that includes a strong doctrine of immutability and timelessness, and 
these attributes are mutually entailing. As immutable, God undergoes no intrinsic or 
extrinsic change. As simple, He has no accidental properties. As timeless, God exists 
without beginning, without end, and without succession or moments in His life. A 
timeless God lacks temporal extension and location.
248
 
 Assume further that the act of creation is brought about by the thoughts and 
will of God. God’s thoughts are what directly bring creation into existence. Since 
God’s thoughts are identical to God Himself, and since God is eternal, God’s thoughts 
are eternal (without beginning, without end, and without succession). As such, 
creation must also be eternal (not timeless, but existing without beginning and without 
end). God is always thinking the thoughts that bring creation into existence.  
 Classical Christians will not like this conclusion since they hold that God 
freely created the universe ex nihilo at some point in the finite past. As Philoponus 
explains, God always possesses the principles and Forms of creation within Himself. 
God is actual and perfect for He always has the capacity to create, “but God brings 
each thing into existence and gives it being when he so wishes…and he so wishes at 
the time when coming into existence is good for the things to come into existence.”249 
Proclus does not see this as a viable option for a perfect God. In order to make 
his conclusion stick he offers what appears to him to be the only alternative account 
for God and creation. It is an account that classical Christians will find unsatisfactory. 
One could say that God does not always create or produce the universe. Instead God 
comes to produce the universe. But, argues Proclus, God would then not be purely 
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actual for He goes from a state of not creating to creating. He has some potential that 
becomes actual. Hence, we have destroyed divine simplicity. Further, God is 
undergoing change in this act. He brings new moments into existence. As such, God 
is not immutable nor is He timeless. A God who undergoes change, and is not purely 
actual is not perfect.  
 As Philoponus examines this argument he looks at one further line of attack 
that strengthens the dilemma. It would seem that if God does not eternally will 
creation into existence, He must will that some objects exist and then not exist. Say 
that God wills Socrates to exist and then no longer wills that Socrates exist. Socrates 
comes into existence then ceases to exist. It would seem that we have three moments 
in the life of God: existing without Socrates, existing with Socrates, and then again 
existing without Socrates. God’s life is undergoing constant alteration through this 
process of willing things into existence and no longer willing them in existence. Also, 
God’s will is divided in this process for He wills one thing and then another. As such, 
God cannot be timeless, immutable, or simple, and such a being is not perfect.  
 The dilemma seems to be this. Either God is perfect (simple, immutable, and 
timeless) and creation is eternal, or creation is not eternal and God is not perfect.  
 
Philoponus Against Proclus 
 Philoponus offers several arguments against Proclus’ critique of Christian 
belief. Many of them depend on offering a proper interpretation of Plato and 
Aristotle’s philosophy and science since Proclus and Philoponus are both working 
within these philosophical traditions. For instance, Philoponus’ first line of attack is to 
argue that the world cannot be infinite in the past since, following Aristotle, it is 
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impossible to traverse the infinite. Since Proclus is an Aristotelian, Philoponus thinks 
that Proclus must accept this.
250
 
Another line of reasoning is to turn Proclus’ argument on himself. Grant 
Proclus the claim that the cosmos is without beginning or end, that it is infinite in the 
past and the future. Since the present is the only moment that exists, God is only 
sustaining the present moment in existence. God is not the actual creator of the future 
since the future does not yet exist. God is only the actual creator of the present 
moment. So even on Proclus’ account of God and creation it is the case that God is 
not purely actual and thus not perfect since He has not yet created the future.
251
 
However, Philoponus’ main argument is that this understanding of pure act and 
perfection is mistaken as we shall see in the next argument. 
A third line of reasoning is to argue that the world is a pattern of the Forms, 
but that the Forms can exist without the world. God possesses the Forms, and it is 
possible for them to “pre-exist all created things. And so, even if the Forms and 
patterns of things are certain ideas and principles of the creator, in accordance with 
which he has brought the world into existence, it is certainly not necessary that the 
world itself should coexist from everlasting with God’s knowledge about the 
world.”252 To quote Philoponus at length, he says  
But just because he brings all things into existence by thought alone and 
always possesses the concepts and principles of all things in exactly the same 
way, it is not therefore at once necessary that things should have coexisted 
with the thoughts of God from everlasting…For God does not bring his 
creations into existence willy-nilly by a necessity, for which reason it is not at 
all necessary that whatever is thought by God should [automatically] exist 
simultaneously with the thought. For it is agreed that God knows even future 
things that have not yet come to pass…even future time is already present 
through foreknowledge to the creator of time himself.
253
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One might wonder how this is possible. How could an eternal action not create 
an eternal effect? Following Proclus one might argue as follows. “If the creator is the 
creator of something, either he will always be an actual creator, or sometimes [only] a 
potential one [and] not always be creating.”254  
From here Philoponus sets out to defend God’s perfection in light of His 
temporal creation. His defense starts with a careful examination of potential and 
actual in Aristotle, and then argues that Proclus’ use of ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ are 
ambiguous. With a proper understanding of these terms he thinks Proclus’ argument 
fails to go through. Philoponus distinguishes two types of potential and two types of 
actual.
 The first sense of potential is what one might call ‘natural fitness’ like when a 
child is naturally gifted at grammar. The child has the potential to become a great 
grammarian and make her parents proud. The second sense of potential is capacity. 
This is when the child has developed all of the skills of grammar and possesses all of 
the grammatical theorems in her mind. This second potentiality is the first sense of 
actuality. The child actually possesses the attributes to be considered a grammarian. 
But say that she is not currently practicing grammar. Perhaps she is asleep and not 
dreaming about grammatical theorems. She has the capacity to practice grammar 
since she is a grammarian, but she is not actively participating in that fast-paced 
cutthroat discipline. As such she is not actual in the second sense of actual which 
involves actively using her capacities.
 255
  
For Philoponus, God is actual in the first sense of actual. As such, God is not a 
potential creator since He possesses all of the attributes for being the creator. Proclus 
                                                 
254
 Philoponus Against Proclus 1-5, 42. Bracketed words are inserted by the translator.  
255
 Philoponus Against Proclus 1-5, 44-6. 
132 
 
is assuming the second sense of actual in his argument. Philoponus thinks that this 
assumption is fallacious, so Proclus’ argument fails.256  
Does this distinction really help Philoponus? Grant that God is actual in the 
first sense: God has the capacity to create. It would seem that for God to actively use 
His capacities to create would involve Him undergoing some kind of change. He 
would go from a state of not actualizing His capacity to create, to a state of actively 
creating. Both Proclus and Philoponus think that a perfect God cannot change. 
Couldn’t Proclus just reassert the point that the Christian God cannot be perfect?  
Philoponus thinks not. To move from a capacity to an activity “is 
instantaneous. The end of not producing and the beginning of producing occur at the 
same instant…Therefore no time elapses between not producing and producing and, 
[more] generally, between [the mere possession of] any capacity and the activity [that 
flows] from the capacity.” Since change involves time, and there is no change in 
activating a capacity, there is no time involved in God creating.
257
 God can create and 
remain changeless and timeless. 
In order to avoid confusion, it should be understood that Philoponus’ argument 
here depends on time being continuous. Time is continuous if and only if it is dense: 
between any two instants of time, there is a third instant of time. This is to be 
contrasted with discrete time where there are no instants, but instead time is composed 
of temporal atoms or periods of a shortest interval that cannot be further divided.
258
 
Philoponus argues that there is no third instant between God’s not producing and 
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producing. They are the same instant.
259
 Typically thinkers who hold that time is 
continuous or dense also hold that change is dense. This commitment to the density of 
change rules out the possibility of discrete changes like the passage from existence to 
non-existence.
260
 This seems to be what Philoponus is articulating. His argument 
looks as follows.  
Producing and not producing are contradictories. If there were a third instant 
between these two contradictories one would have a time when a contradiction 
obtained. Since contradictions cannot obtain, there is no third intermediate instant 
between these two contradictory instants.
261
 Therefore no time has elapsed between 
not producing and producing. Activity out of a capacity involves no change and thus 
no time.  
Several quick comments on this argument are in order before moving on to my 
main objection. First, say that ~p obtains at time t1 and p obtains at t2. Further say that 
time is continuous so that there is an instant between t1 and t2, namely t1.5. If it is truly 
between these two contradictory instants, then it would not be the occurrence of a 
contradiction. So we do have an interval of time between ~p and p. Second, I do not 
find it obvious that discrete changes cannot take place. It seems to me that the best 
example of a discrete change is the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, but I digress. The 
crucial issue is whether or not an activity out of a capacity involves a change.  
It is not clear that an activity out of a capacity involves no change or time. 
Philoponus thinks that this principle applies to God and everything else, so perhaps he 
can provide a concrete example from everyday life to make things clear. One of his 
examples is that of a builder and a building. Say that the builder has the perfect 
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capacity to build. He is an actual builder. When the builder decides to build a house 
out of timber and stone his mind undergoes no change whatsoever, but his body and 
the building materials do. Somehow the movement and change befall the builder’s 
body and the materials, but not the builder’s mind. Philoponus takes this to be an 
actual example of the principle he has in mind: “someone who possesses a perfected 
capacity and then acts [in accordances with it] has not become different in any respect 
from his [former] self.”262 As such, Philoponus thinks he can employ this principle to 
explain God’s creative activity of objects that exist at one time and not at another. He 
explains as follows. God 
everlastingly possesses the concepts and principles of things, through which 
indeed he is a creator, in exactly the same way, and does not become different 
in any respect whether he produces or does not produce. For, speaking 
generally, it is not even proper to say that capacity and activity are different 
[things] in the case of God; the two are one and the same thing and difference 
arises in the sphere of that which shares [in them].
263
 
 
In other words, God’s activity of creation does not change Him but changes 
everything else. God’s creative activity brings things into existence that did not 
previously exist. God actively sustains certain things in existence, like Socrates, and 
then ceases to sustain them in existence. Though it appears that this would involve 
God in a continual process of change, and hence God would be temporal, somehow 
God is not changed at all.  
This is utterly baffling. It seems quite clear that the builder who decides to 
start building does in fact undergo change. It also seems that a God who is not 
creating and then creates does undergo a change. He is not standing in a causal 
relation to anything, and then He is standing in a causal relation to creation. Activity 
out of a capacity involves change and time, for it at least creates a before and after in 
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the life of the agent. As J.R. Lucas explains, “[t]ime is the passage from possibility 
through actuality to unalterable necessity. The present is the unique and essential link 
between the possible and the unalterably necessary.”264 “To be an agent is to be 
crystallizing potentiality into actuality, thereby making it unalterable thereafter. No 
unalterability, no agency.”265 To put this in Philoponus’ terminology, for an agent to 
go from first sense actual to second sense actual is a temporal change. As such, 
Philoponus has failed to rebut Proclus’ dilemma.   
If this were not enough, Philoponus’ rejoinder to Proclus fails for another 
reason. Note what he says in the last sentence from the quote above. “For, speaking 
generally, it is not even proper to say that capacity and activity are different [things] 
in the case of God; the two are one and the same thing.” Philoponus is demonstrating 
a commitment to divine simplicity: there is no composition in God. The distinction 
between first and second actuality does not apply to God since God is simple. This 
commitment to simplicity undercuts one of Philoponus’ rejoinders to Proclus. Recall 
earlier that Philoponus rejected Proclus’ argument because Proclus failed to make this 
distinction about first and second actuality. Proclus was assuming that God must be 
actual in the second sense, but Philoponus pointed out that God was actual in the first 
sense so Proclus’ argument does not go through. Yet, if God is simple, there is no 
meaningful distinction between first and second actuality in God. Philoponus has not 
defeated Proclus’ argument. The dilemma still stands.  
To make matters worse, it would seem that a commitment to divine simplicity 
prevents one from solving any theological puzzle. What we have just seen in 
Philoponus is instructive. As discussed in chapter 3, take any theological puzzle 
where the strategy involves making clear distinctions in God. A theologian can write 
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dozens of pages making careful distinctions in order to solve the puzzle. If she is 
committed to divine simplicity she is forced to say that none of her distinctions apply 
to God at all. They are only conceptual distinctions that exist in her mind, and do not 
apply at all to reality. As such, her labor is in vain. It would seem that divine 
simplicity makes Christian theology a non-starter.  
 
Conclusion 
 Throughout this chapter I have done my best to show that divine timelessness, 
simplicity, and strong immutability bring absolute havoc on Christian theology when 
combined with presentism. If one is a presentist and a Christian, she should not 
believe that God is timeless, simple, or strongly immutable. Perhaps a Christian can 
abandon presentism in favor of four-dimensionalism in order to save the classical 
account of the divine perfections. This move is gaining popularity in contemporary 
discussions, and as such will be the subject of the next chapter. There I shall argue 
that four-dimensionalism is also incompatible with divine timelessness. 
  
  
CHAPTER 6 
DIVINE TIMELESSNESS AND FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM 
 
 It is often held today that divine timelessness is not compatible with 
presentism, but that it is compatible with four-dimensional eternalism. Unfortunately 
most of the proposals are underdeveloped. There have been many suggestions that 
divine timelessness is compatible with four-dimensionalism, but few have actually 
articulated robust models that can be adequately assessed. One common problem is 
that some of the models that have been put forward do not actually have a clear cut 
account of divine timelessness. Another common problem is a failure to understand 
all of the entailments of four-dimensionalism. It is almost as if people forget that four-
dimensional eternalism is a theory on time and change. Thankfully at least one 
person, Katherin Rogers, has put forward a robust model that more fully understands 
the doctrine of divine timelessness and four-dimensionalism than the rest.
266
 In this 
chapter I will examine Rogers’ model. Along the way I will note similarities and 
differences with others in this camp as a way to fill in some gaps in Rogers’ account.  
 First, I wish to note the difficulties that four-dimensionalism is said to help 
divine timelessness overcome. In the previous two chapters I laid out various 
arguments that need to be dealt with. These can be summed up as four broad problems 
for divine timelessness. 1) As simple God cannot have accidental properties like 
Creator, Redeemer, and Lord. 2) The doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Again, this was 
traditionally understood as there being a state of affairs where God exists alone and a 
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state of affairs where God exists with creation.
267
 The dilemma from Proclus brought 
out various difficulties one of which is that if God is eternal, then creation must be 
eternal. This rules out creation ex nihilo. The horn of the dilemma is that if creation is 
not eternal, but begins to exist, then God is temporal because creation marks a new 
moment in the life of God. 3) God’s knowledge of the ever changing world should 
entail that God’s knowledge changes. In contemporary discussions this falls under the 
question “Can God know what time it is now?” 4) Divine sustaining. God is 
sustaining an ever changing world and it is hard to see how He could be immutable, 
pure act, and timeless.  
 As we shall see, abandoning presentism and adopting four-dimensional 
eternalism does help solve some of these problems. However, I will argue that it 
brings up other difficulties that make the doctrine of divine timelessness untenable for 
Christian belief. Ultimately, I will argue that four-dimensional eternalism does not 
save the divine timeless research program. Instead, if four-dimensional eternalism is 
true, God is temporal as understood on four-dimensionalism.  
 
Katherin Rogers’ Into the Fifth Dimension 
 For Katherin Rogers it is no surprise that presentism is incompatible with 
divine timelessness.  For her, atemporality entails four-dimensional eternalism.
268
 
Though she claims to be doing Anselmian perfect being theology she thinks that one 
ought to derive her metaphysics of time from the divine perfections.
269
  
T.J. Mawson agrees. He claims that one can be agnostic as to which ontology 
of time is correct. One should reflect on the idea of God as a perfect being, and then 
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from there one can decide if presentism or four-dimensionalism is true. Whichever 
account gives God the greatest possible perfection, whichever one is more power-
granting, is the one we should go with.
270
 As Mawson sees it, God would know more 
if four-dimensionalism were true, than He would if presentism were true.
271
 Mawson, 
unlike classical theism, thinks that God’s knowledge of the future depends on the 
future actually existing. Further, if all of time exists, then God can act directly upon 
it.
272
  
 This is completely contrary to the method of perfect being theology. On 
perfect being theology, one must start with the actual perfections found in creatures 
and then move to discern what the pure perfections are that God possesses.
273
 As 
Augustine put it, “What, therefore, we do not find in that which is our own best, we 
ought not to seek in Him who is far better than that best of ours; that so we may 
understand God.” (The Trinity V.1) On this method the nature of reality sets the limits 
on possible perfections. The intuition is that God cannot create a world that is 
incompatible with who He is. Mawson’s method is not helpful in this regard. For 
instance, it would be more power-granting if God could defy the law of non-
contradiction. Thus, we should affirm that God can do such a thing. It would be more 
power-granting to affirm that God can change the past, thus we should affirm that the 
past is such that it can be altered. Someone who follows the method of perfect being 
theology will find such claims implausible because of the way the world is. The world 
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is not such that the law of non-contradiction can be broken, nor is the world such that 
the past is alterable. These are not metaphysical possibilities and as such they are not 
power-granting. Mawson would agree with this, but his method does not help one get 
there. I will set this issue aside for the time being.  
On Rogers’ account God’s eternality fits together with divine simplicity, 
immutability, omniscience, and creation. The divine attributes are mutually entailing, 
though it seems to me that simplicity is the driving force in Rogers’ account.274 Allow 
me to briefly sketch each attribute as Rogers sees it in order to help illuminate her 
account of divine eternality. 
In saying that God is simple Rogers understands this claim to be that God is 
pure act. She takes the standard sovereignty-aseity move in order to get to the claim 
that God is a simple being who is not composed of parts, nor is God dependent upon 
anything for His existence or essential nature. God is identical to His nature and each 
divine attribute is identical to each other and God.
275
 In response to contemporary 
criticisms of divine simplicity a la Alvin Plantinga she says “strictly speaking God 
neither has properties nor is He a property…God is simply act.”276 There are no 
potentialities in God for God is eternally doing all that He is. God is His existence as 
well as “His act of knowing and doing and being perfectly good” because “these are 
all one act.”277 Further, one ought not to “hypothesize any unity underlying the 
diversity in God because there is no diversity. There is just the one, perfect act which 
is God.”278 
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From simplicity Rogers moves into immutability and atemporal eternality. 
Since God is pure act, and whatever He does He does in one single eternal act, God is 
unchanging. Thus God is immutable and timeless.
279
 From here she notes that some 
within early Islamic theology held God to be temporal and immutable, but this caused 
problems for immutability. It “is only by postulating divine [atemporal] eternity that 
God’s immutability can be preserved, and with it His simplicity. If God does first one 
thing and then another He cannot be simple because His essence must stay the same 
over time, and thus be something other than the part that does the changing.”280 
To further bolster atemporal eternality she considers the argument from the 
radical incompleteness of life, but she seems to notice that the argument loses its force 
when one accepts four-dimensional eternalism and perdurantism. “One might point 
out that the very reason which the medievals gave for introducing the distinction 
between eternity and time was to insist upon the radical transitoriness of creaturely 
existence in comparison to the perfection of God’s immutable mode of being, and yet 
if [four-dimensional] eternalism is correct and we are four-dimensional beings ever 
present to God, then we are not as transitory as we seem to ourselves.”281 Yet, despite 
the diminished force, she seems to think that the argument still goes through. “By 
comparison with God who ‘possesses’ His unlimited life ‘at once’, we lead a 
dreadfully ‘disconnected’ life in that at each present instant we have little access to or 
power over all the other instants of our lives.”282 
Surely she is right that perdurant beings would live an incredibly disconnected 
life. As she notes “I seem to myself to exist only at the present instant, but in fact the 
‘I’ of an instant ago really exists and perceives an instant ago as the present instant, 
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and the ‘I’ of an instant hence really exists and perceives an instant hence as the 
present instant. And these successive time-slices of ‘me’ do not have access to one 
another.”283 This is a radically disconnected life, and surely the life of a perfect God 
would not suffer from such a defect. Hence, she thinks that God must be atemporal 
and exist all at once. 
To flesh out her account of eternality it will be helpful to look at her account 
of omniscience and creation. She takes the traditional claims about all moments of 
time existing in eternity for God differently than the classical tradition. On her 
account this claim does not amount to God knowing propositions or abstract states of 
affairs through a perfect knowledge of Himself. “The things and events themselves 
exist in divine eternity.”284 This is because God’s eternity acts as a fifth dimension in 
which the four-dimensional spacetime world exists. “Time is a fourth dimension 
containing all of space, and divine eternity is a sort of fifth dimension containing all 
of time and space.”285 The notion of a fifth dimension sounds a bit odd, but what 
Rogers is trying to express is that “all of time is equally present to God’s eternity 
since it is God’s eternal activity which causes it all to be.”286 “God is the source of 
each temporal instant. He is not contained in any of the temporal instants, but is 
directly, causally, and cognitively related to each and every one of them equally.” 
God’s eternity is a fifth dimension in the sense that it contains all of space and time 
since “God knows and acts causally upon all of space-time in one, eternal, act.” 287  
She explains that this is a form of theistic idealism. “All of space is within 
God’s omnipresence in that it is all immediately cognitively and causally present to 
                                                 
283Rogers, “Anselmian Eternalism: the Presence of a Timeless God,” 7.  
284
 Rogers, “Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension,” The Saint Anselm Journal 32 
(2006), 7. 
285
 Rogers, “Anselmian Eternalism: the Presence of a Timeless God,” 6.  
286
 Rogers, “Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension,” 2.  
287
 Rogers, “Anselmian Eternalism: the Presence of a Timeless God,” 8.  
143 
 
and absolutely dependent upon God.”288 “Whatever has creaturely existence in any 
way at all is kept in being in all its aspects from moment to moment by the power of 
God. God is simple and His power is His thought. For a creature to be, then, is to be 
thought by God. There is nothing more to a creature than what God is thinking.”289 
All things depend for their existence on God. Since God is simple and 
immutable all of His actions take place at once. The divine choice to create, along 
with simplicity, immutability, and timelessness entail that “the created world is 
always present to God’s eternity. There is no point before creation at which God 
exists alone and then a later point at which He exists with creation.”290 On her account 
if “God eternally wills to create this world, then necessarily He eternally wills to 
create this world…There was never a point at which He chose to create rather than 
not. From eternity He chooses to create.”291 For a simple God ‘being’ and ‘act’ are 
identical. Thus, “[g]iven God’s nature He could not do other than He does…God does 
not have literal options, but since He exists a se this is no limitation on Him.”292 It is 
the case that there “are other imaginable worlds, but the actual world, from God’s 
perspective in eternity, and allowing for the input of free creaturely choice, is the only 
really possible world.”293 
In order to maintain omniscience and timelessness, four-dimensional 
eternalism must be true. God sustains the entire space-time manifold by His one 
eternal thought or act. The so-called “fifth dimension” that Rogers’ posits is merely a 
way of expressing that God eternally sustains all times and places in one eternal act.   
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Reaping the Benefits of Four-Dimensionalism 
A few things are worthy of note before proceeding. First, Rogers’ proposal 
avoids the common objection to divine timelessness from creation ex nihilo. If there is 
a state of affairs where God exists without creation and another where God exists with 
creation, God has a before and after in His life. Rogers’ avoids this by making the 
four-dimensional world in a sense co-eternal with God. There is no state of affairs 
where God exists without creation, so no worry of a before and after in His life. 
Second, by adopting four-dimensional eternalism she avoids the problem of divine 
sustaining as the world unfolds through time. On presentism God sustains a moment, 
then ceases to sustain it, and sustains another. God would constantly be doing 
something different and thus not be immutable, simple, and timeless.
294
 On four-
dimensionalism this is not the case. Moments of time do not slough off into the non-
existent past and there are no yet-to-exist future moments. All of time exists and is 
sustained by God in one timeless immutable act. God can exist all at once instead of 
having to lose moments of His life as He would on presentism. 
Third, she also avoids the problem of God’s knowledge growing as the world 
unfolds through time. Strictly speaking, there is no unfolding through time. From 
God’s perspective, the best perspective, the whole four-dimensional universe simply 
exists. There is no knowledge for God to gain. Can God know what time it is now? 
No, because there is no now with a unique ontological status. Granted, from the 
perspective of temporal creatures things appear as if the present is unique and that the 
past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist. This, however, is not the way 
reality is. Terms like ‘past,’ ‘present,’ and ‘future’ are relative from the perspective of 
temporal parts or person stages. From God’s perspective, the best perspective, He sees 
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the world as it actually is. From His perspective there is no ‘now,’ there is just the 
entire four-dimensional space-time world.
295
     
It seems that four-dimensionalism helps avoid these common problems for 
divine timelessness. Does it help solve Proclus’ dilemma? Also, does it avoid the 
problem from accidental predication? In other words, can Creator be predicated of the 
simple God? Are there any other problems that might arise by adopting four-
dimensionalism?   
 
Leaving the Fifth Dimension Behind 
There are several difficulties with Rogers’ account, and I will now spell them 
out. It should be noted that if four-dimensionalism is false, Rogers’ account does not 
work. The standard move in contemporary philosophical theology is to argue that 
four-dimensionalism is false so divine timelessness cannot appeal to it.
296
 Instead of 
taking this well trodden path, I shall argue that her account suffers from internal 
incoherence as well as various theological woes. I shall also argue that she offers us 
no good reason for thinking that God is timeless. The main reasons she offers for God 
being timeless are from divine simplicity and the radical incompleteness of life. She 
also thinks that four-dimensional eternalism must be true in order to preserve divine 
atemporality.
297
 If her account of divine simplicity is incoherent it will not help justify 
divine atemporality. Further, in adopting four-dimensional eternalism she cuts herself 
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off from the argument from the radical incompleteness of life. Ultimately, four-
dimensional eternalism is not compatible with divine timelessness regardless of what 
many contemporary thinkers say.  
 
Proclus’ Dilemma and Creation Out of Nothing 
It looks as if Rogers’ view falls prey to the dilemma. Creation is the result of 
God’s thoughts. God eternally has the thoughts that bring creation into existence. So 
creation is co-eternal with God. For Proclus this means that creation is infinite in the 
past and future. This is not the case on Rogers’ proposal. Her account has some subtle 
differences. 
For Rogers, it certainly is the case that “God’s thought causes things 
immediately and directly…There is no intermediary causes between God’s thought 
and the created existent.” Yet, unlike Proclus, Rogers does not hold to presentism. 
Proclus, like many others, is subject to the criticism that God’s eternal acts cannot 
produce temporal effects since many of the effects do not yet exist and others no 
longer exist. By adopting four-dimensionalism Rogers avoids this. All of time simply 
does exist, and all of the temporal parts simply do exist at their respective times. “If 
something exists at time t, then the causal efficacy of God’s thought is acting at time t. 
This most fundamental sort of cause does not precede its effect, but is 
contemporaneous with it.”298 All of the four-dimensional world is contemporaneous 
with the timeless God who exists all at once.  
This makes the world co-eternal with God for there is no state of affairs where 
God exists without the world. God is eternal, and God always exists with the four-
dimensional world. Is this a problem? Perhaps not. When looking at the four-
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dimensional space-time manifold one must consider it from two perspectives. From 
one perspective we can see that the universe is temporally bounded in that it has a 
finite past, and that moments of time are chronologically ordered in earlier than, 
simultaneous with, and later than relations. Also, objects persist through time by 
having temporal parts that exist at each moment of time. Yet, from an atemporal 
perspective there just is the space-time manifold with all of its various temporal parts. 
The temporal parts do not persist through time, but are eternally existent at the times 
at which they exist. The universe is co-eternal with God in the sense that there is 
never a state of affairs when God exists and the universe does not exist. The universe 
is still temporally bounded, and contingent upon God. In light of this it seems that 
Rogers could argue that she does not fall victim to Proclus’ dilemma in any damaging 
way.  
However, one could complain that she has destroyed the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo. God never exists without creation. It is co-eternal with God. God eternally 
exists with the four-dimensional space-time manifold. John of Damascus will not like 
this one bit. “For it is not natural that that which is brought into existence out of 
nothing should be co-eternal with what is without beginning and everlasting.”299 For 
John of Damascus, like most classical theologians, creation out of nothing entails that 
God has not always existed with the universe. They agree with Rogers that creation is 
brought about by divine thought, but they hold that there is a state of affairs in which 
God exists alone.
300
 William Lane Craig notes that adopting four-dimensional 
eternalism completely destroys the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. This “emasculated 
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doctrine of creatio ex nihilo does not do justice to the biblical data, which give us 
clearly to understand that God and the universe do not timelessly co-exist, but that the 
actual world includes a state of affairs which is God’s existing alone without the 
universe.”301  
The only move I can see for someone like Rogers is to say that the Bible does 
not clearly teach that creation out of nothing entails that there is a state of affairs 
where God exists without creation. A common stance for contemporary defenders of 
divine timelessness is to say that the doctrine only entails that creation is contingent 
upon God.
302
  Rogers doesn’t think that the doctrine tells us whether or not the 
universe has always existed. What it does tell us is that the universe is a unique act of 
God and that everything other than God is kept in existence from moment to moment 
by His will.
303
  However, this does not satisfy the Biblical data. The Bible is very 
comfortable talking about God existing before, and without, creation.
304
 Adopting 
four-dimensionalism conflicts with the Biblical teaching on creation, and this is a 
strike against this position on God and time.  
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Begotten Not Made? 
 As already noted, on four-dimensionalism creation is co-eternal with God. 
One might wonder what distinguishes the created universe from the only begotten 
Son. The Father eternally causes the Son to exist and both are co-eternal. As Gregory 
of Nyssa puts it in On Not Three Gods, “The principle of causality distinguishes, then, 
the Persons of the holy Trinity. It affirms that the one is uncaused, while the other 
depends on the cause.” The Father is uncaused, and the Son is caused. As such, the 
Son depends upon the Father. Yet both are co-eternal. On four-dimensionalism God 
eternally causes the universe to exist. As such, the universe depends upon God. Yet 
both are co-eternal. What is the difference between the two?  
Historically, theologians distinguished between “begotten” and “made.” The 
term “begotten” was intended to denote “that which has a cause or source outside 
itself.” This causal source could be a something, or in the case of the Trinity, 
someone. This need not involve the begotten thing coming into existence. The term 
“created” or “made,” however, was intended to denote “that which has come into 
being.”305 The difference between begotten and made, then, is supposed to be that the 
Son never came into existence. The Son is caused to exist, but He never began to 
exist. The universe is caused to exist, but it did begin to exist. The Son has always 
existed, but the universe has not always existed.  
As I have argued in earlier chapters, classical Christian theology was 
committed to presentism. The difference between things that are begotten and made is 
that things that are made are subject to temporal becoming. They did not exist, and 
then they come into existence. On four-dimensionalism there is no temporal 
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becoming. Nothing comes into existence because everything eternally exists at the 
times at which they exist. We now have nothing to distinguish begotten and made. 
This is not a good position to be in if one holds to the eternal generation of the Son. 
There is a possible rejoinder. One could reject the doctrine of eternal 
generation. The temporalist and presentist John Feinberg has argued that eternal 
generation is not a biblical doctrine.
306
 One does not need it in order to be a 
Trinitarian. It seems obvious that a four-dimensionalist and atemporalist could make 
the same move. So the difficulty that I have laid out is only a problem for those who 
wish to affirm the doctrine of eternal generation.  
 
Simplicity Destroys Aseity 
 As noted above, Rogers’ account seems to be driven in large part by the 
doctrine of divine simplicity. If her account of divine simplicity does not work, one of 
the moves to divine atemporality will be cut off.  
 One of the strongest motivations for the doctrine of divine simplicity is the 
sovereignty-aseity conviction. If the doctrine of divine simplicity ends up destroying 
God’s sovereignty and aseity it is safe to say that the doctrine should be abandoned. 
The driving force behind the doctrine of divine simplicity is that God’s essential 
nature is not dependent upon anything external to God. Rogers’ account of divine 
simplicity and creation fails to establish this.  
 On her account if “God eternally wills to create this world, then necessarily He 
eternally wills to create this world…There was never a point at which He chose to 
create rather than not. From eternity He chooses to create.”307 For a simple God 
‘being’ and ‘act’ are identical. Thus, “[g]iven God’s nature He could not do other than 
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He does…God does not have literal options, but since He exists a se this is no 
limitation on Him.”308 It is the case that there “are other imaginable worlds, but the 
actual world, from God’s perspective in eternity, and allowing for the input of free 
creaturely choice, is the only really possible world.”309 
 At this point several concerns might arise. For instance, how is it that God 
could be free in a libertarian sense if He has no options? If He does not have freedom 
how could He be sovereign? For Rogers, libertarian freedom does not mean the ability 
to do otherwise. It means that an agent is the author of her own choice.
310
 This is a 
point of contention amongst libertarians. For now I will focus my criticism on an 
entailment of her account of simplicity and creation. She comes to an astonishing 
conclusion.  
From God’s perspective, if His essence is His eternal and immutable act in this 
the actual and only really possible world then He could not fail to have any of 
His attributes and still be Himself. They are equally necessary. That means 
that we are forced to conclude that creatures do have some effect on God’s 
very essence. This seems shocking since a major motivation for insisting on 
simplicity is the absolute aseity of God. And now we have apparently arrived 
at the conclusion that He is dependent on creatures!
311
 
 
Why is God dependent on creatures? Rogers specifically has in mind the 
libertarian freedom of created human persons.
312
 Which possible world is actualized is 
in part dependent on human acts. Ultimately which possible world is actual is 
dependent upon God’s one act which is identical to God. Part of that act includes the 
acts of human persons, so in this sense God is dependent on creatures. This may not 
be that terrible of an entailment if God desires to create human persons with free will. 
Most temporalists would agree. If God desires to create creatures with libertarian free 
will that in no way diminishes God’s sovereignty or aseity. Of course, temporalists 
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are also willing to say that God is contingently the Creator, Redeemer, and Lord. 
These are contingent and accidental attributes that God freely takes on. Rogers cannot 
exactly say this. Given divine simplicity God cannot have any accidental properties. 
Can she say that God is contingently the Creator? It would seem the answer is no.
313
 
“If originally He was not creating, and then He became a creator, He would become 
better. And there’s a difference between intending to create and creating, so if God 
goes from being someone who intends to create to being someone who creates He’s 
changed for the better. But then He does not possess perfection as a necessity of His 
nature.”314  
  It seems that God is essentially the Creator. Since God is pure act, and all He 
does is done in one timeless act, He never becomes the Creator for He is eternally the 
Creator. If Creator is an essential—not a contingent—divine attribute, God must 
create something in order to be who He is.
315
 On the type of perfect being theology 
that Rogers is working with there are no value-neutral potentialities or changes. All 
change is for the better or worse. If it is possible for God to create, He must create. 
Otherwise He would not be pure act. So God is dependent upon creation simpliciter in 
order to be who He is.  
Someone like John Philoponus will see this as an unwelcome consequence of 
divine perfection. For Philoponus, a perfect God can exist without creation. He thinks 
it would be impious to say that God’s perfections depend upon creation in anyway. 
Philoponus takes it as a general principle that things are perfect in themselves because 
of the powers that they necessarily possess, and not by external relations things stand 
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in. Fire is “complete in its own being” even if nothing is around to participate in its 
heat. The sun would be perfect even if nothing else existed. The same is true of God 
who is “always a creator by virtue of his perfect possession of creative 
principles…For everything in existence is characterised not by the activities that 
proceed from it but by its essential powers.” On Rogers’s account God must create 
this world in order to be perfect.
316
 Otherwise God would not be pure act, immutable, 
simple, or timeless. If God did not create this world, He would be other than He in 
fact is which is contrary to simplicity.
317
 Philoponus thinks otherwise. “For if God 
cannot be perfect unless created things also exist, then his products will be perfective 
of the producer himself. Such, then is the situation if perfection has come to God not 
from his own substance but from outside.”318 
This difficulty may not be untenable for Rogers. For instance, I doubt she 
would accept Philoponus’ claim that capacity is actuality. Also, Rogers attempts to 
get out of this entailment, and admits that her account needs more work. She notes 
several options, one of which is to distinguish between necessary and contingent 
attributes in God. I take it that being the Creator would be a contingent attribute. 
However, like Philoponus, she recognizes that a commitment to divine simplicity 
means that there is no real distinction between God’s necessary and contingent 
attributes. These distinctions are only apparent from our human vantage point, and do 
not actually apply to God.
319
 As was the case with Philoponus, these distinctions are 
of no help since they fail to apply to God. 
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It seems that the entailments are reason enough to abandon her account of 
divine simplicity. God’s essential attributes are dependent upon creation. This has 
completely destroyed aseity, which is the main motivation for thinking divine 
simplicity is true. She now has no justification for thinking divine simplicity is true. 
As such, her account of divine simplicity cannot help justify divine atemporality. This 
is sufficient for showing that her move from simplicity to immutability and 
timelessness does not work. 
 
The Threat of a Modal Collapse 
 The above discussion has already noted that God must create this world in 
order to be who He is. This brings up the threat of a modal collapse. A view suffers 
from a modal collapse when everything becomes necessary and all contingency is 
eradicated. One way of putting this is that there is only one possible world. The way 
the world is is the only way things could be. An easy way to avoid this is to hold that 
there are other possible worlds. God did not have to create and could have existed 
alone. Or God could have created a universe different than this one.
320
 Rogers account 
won’t have any of this. “From the divine point of view things cannot be other than 
they in fact are. It is only the temporal and limited point of view which allows 
discussion of other possible worlds.” Since God’s perspective is the best perspective, 
it is the right perspective.
321
 Things simply could not be any other way. In fact, she 
holds this as an entailment of divine omniscience. “The only actualizable world is the 
one which God eternally chooses…from the point of view of divine creativity, taking 
into account that God responds to our free actions, the world which God does make 
                                                 
320
 Thomas F. Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981).  
321
 Rogers, The Anselmian Approach, 54.  
155 
 
must always be known to Him as the only world He ‘can’ make.”322 In other words, 
from all eternity there is God and the four-dimensional universe. We limited creatures 
could imagine different scenarios and epistemically conceive of things differently, but 
these are not real metaphysical possibilities from God’s perspective, the best 
perspective.  
 What makes a modal collapse so terrible? First, it denies of God his infinite 
creative freedom over creation. God must necessarily exist with creation on a modal 
collapse. He is not free to exist without creation. This is deeply repugnant to Christian 
thought which has long held that God is perfect in Himself and can exist without 
creation. As John Webster explains, “the triune God could be without the world; no 
perfection of God would be lost, no triune bliss compromised, were the world not to 
exist; no enhancement of God is achieved by the world’s existence.”323 Second, a 
modal collapse completely eradicates creaturely freedom. Everything is necessary and 
nothing is contingent. The ramifications of this for the problem of evil, grace, God’s 
goodness, and other areas of Christian dogmatics are disastrous.  
 
The Threat of Pantheism 
Rogers’ account of simplicity and creation looks strikingly like a form of 
pantheism when one considers her stance on theistic idealism. Rogers does not want 
to align herself with pantheism given her commitment to perfect being theology and 
Christian doctrine. Creation, she says, does not add anything to the being of God.
324
  
She makes claims that try to distinguish creatures from the Creator. In 
articulating her form of theistic idealism she says,  
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To be an idea of God’s is not to be God or ‘part of’ God. As long as we 
maintain a distinction between the act of thinking and the object thought, we 
can hold that created things just are what God thinks and wills to exist in His 
one, perfect act which is identical to His nature, and yet that the objects of 
divine thought are not identical to that thought itself and hence are not God.
325
 
 
Perhaps it is coherent to maintain the distinction between Creator and creature, but it 
is difficult to do so given her account of simplicity and idealism. If “[t]here is nothing 
more to a creature than what God is thinking” and God’s thoughts are identical to His 
nature,
 326
 how is it not the case that creatures are identical to God’s nature? Further, if 
God’s nature is identical to God Himself, how is it not the case that creatures are 
identical to God?  
It is instructive to see Don Lodzinski’s defense of divine timelessness, 
immutability, and simplicity.
 327
 He concurs with Rogers that four-dimensionalism is 
needed to maintain timelessness. Also, he agrees that creation is co-eternal with God, 
and that creation is the product of God’s one eternal thought. Yet, he thinks that all of 
this clearly entails pantheism. What is the difference between Rogers and Lodzinski? 
Why does one deny pantheism and the other willingly embrace it? There is a move 
that Rogers makes that Lodzinski does not. 
Rogers attempts to avoid pantheism by placing God on a different ontological 
level. In earlier writings she holds that there are three ontological levels, yet in later 
writings the third one seems to have disappeared. The big idea is that God is on one 
ontological level. Everything that exists apart from God are divine ideas, or reflect the 
divine ideas, and are thus on a second ontological level. As created beings our ideas 
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are copies of the divine ideas and are thus inferior. They exist on a third ontological 
level.
328
  
I must confess that I do not understand the notion of different ontological 
levels. This is because existence does not admit of degrees or levels. A thing either 
exists or does not exist. Granted, God exists necessarily and creatures exist 
contingently. The modality of each is different, but existence is basic and univocal to 
each. What would it mean for there to be different ontological levels?  
In order to make her position clear Rogers asks us to consider our own minds. 
In our own minds we can distinguish between our mind and our thoughts. In an 
analogous way we can distinguish between the divine mind and His thought (which is 
creation). “We must distinguish the ontological level of the mind where the thinking 
goes on, and the ontological level of the ideas sustained by the thinking. The process 
of thinking is not exactly the same thing as the idea which exists as the object of 
thought….The mind is not just the same thing as its ideas and vice versa.”329 
Does this really clear up the notion of different ontological levels? The 
thinking mind exists and brings certain thoughts into existence. The mind and the 
thoughts both exist. Granted, the thoughts are dependent upon the mind for their 
existence, but so what? The mind and the thoughts both exist. When one takes stock 
of her ontological inventory she will count the mind and the thoughts, and place both 
of them in the category of things that exist. She can then go on to give a metaphysical 
description of what each thing in her ontological inventory is like, but that does not 
bring in the idea of different ontological levels. There is one world—a maximally 
compossible state of affairs—that is made up of all the things that exist. The analogy 
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that Rogers has offered has not given us a way to understand the concept of different 
ontological levels.  
Perhaps she doesn’t need the notion of different ontological levels in order to 
avoid pantheism. Maybe the analogy she has offered is enough to distinguish God and 
creatures. The analogy does appear to be intuitive. Our minds are not identical to our 
thoughts. Say I am at a restaurant and have to figure out how much to tip the server. 
This puts me in the awkward position of having to do math in my head. My mind 
clearly exists before I engage in the mathematical thought process, and it continues to 
exist once I have ceased to think about the tip. My mind is not identical to my thought 
about the tip.  
Is this a good analogy for thinking about God’s mind? Not if God is simple. 
My thoughts are not identical to who I am. They are things I do, but not things I am. 
With the simple God, His thought is identical to His essence. God just is His act of 
thinking. If God were not simple, immutable, and timeless this analogy would be apt, 
but it cannot help Rogers. As it stands, it appears that Rogers’ account entails 
pantheism.  
   
What Perfections Can Be Derived From Four-Dimensionalism? 
 Earlier I noted that Rogers and Mawson wished to move from divine 
perfections to the metaphysics of time. I also noted that this is going about perfect 
being theology in the wrong order. The methods of perfect being theology start with 
the assumption that God can be known from the perfections found in creatures. If the 
world is a four-dimensional space-time manifold and creatures are perdurant objects, 
what perfections can be derived from this? It does not appear to be anything like 
divine atemporality, simplicity, or immutability.  
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 If creatures are perdurant beings it would seem that the perfection to be 
derived would be divine perdurantism. One certainly cannot derive the perfection of 
infinite endurance from perdurant creatures. The Anselmian argument from the 
radical incompleteness of life assumes that creatures are endurant beings—they exist 
as a whole or all at once. It further assumes that enduring through time is better than 
not. The next move is to predicate that endurance through time can be had to an 
infinite degree. Hence, God has infinite duration, or endures without beginning or 
end. The next step is to try to argue that it is better to be without a before and after 
than to have a before and after in one’s life. As noted in chapter 3, this is where divine 
simplicity comes into play. In particular, the claim that conceptual distinctions do not 
apply to God. This is the point where the various forms of the argument get a bit 
fuzzy and make some odd jumps, but the end result is supposed to be a God who 
exists all at once in a timeless present that lacks a before and after.  
If human persons are perdurant beings, the argument will look different. It will 
have to assume that perduring through time is better than not. The question will then 
be can perdurance through time be had to an infinite degree? Let us say that it can be. 
In that case God would have an infinite perdurance which means that He would have 
an infinite number of temporal parts or stages. If God has temporal parts, He is not 
simple, immutable, or timeless. No defender of the traditional view of God will take 
delight in this entailment. Assuming four-dimensional eternalism and perdurantism 
does not lead to divine timelessness. It leads to a perdurant God. 
There is a further problem in assuming four-dimensional eternalism. The 
argument from the radical incompleteness of life not only assumes endurantism, it 
also assumes presentism. The life of creatures is transitory precisely because creatures 
lose moments of their lives as the present moment slips into the non-existent past, and 
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they do not yet possess the non-existent future moments of their lives. The argument 
hinges on presentism and endurantism. If one rejects these metaphysical doctrines, 
she is cutting herself off from one of the main arguments for divine timelessness.  
Four-dimensional eternalism will not get the job done. On Rogers’ account 
God is eternally creating and sustaining the four-dimensional space-time manifold. 
There never was a moment when God existed and the world did not. The world 
simply is not transitory on this view. It is contingent because its’ existence depends 
upon God, but it is co-eternal with God. In adopting this view on time Rogers and 
Mawson have cut themselves off from one of the main arguments for divine 
timelessness.  
 
Four-Dimensionalism Does Not Save Divine Timelessness 
 Many defenders of divine temporality have claimed that the only way to 
maintain divine timelessness is to hold to four-dimensional eternalism.
330
 
Atemporalists like Paul Helm, Mawson, and Rogers agree. However, this is false. 
God would be temporal in the way that a four-dimensionalist understands time.  
 It seems that the reason that contemporary philosophical theologians have 
claimed that four-dimensional eternalism is compatible with divine atemporality 
stems from the notion that this view of time involves an unchanging reality. On 
presentism it is obvious that the world is constantly changing. If God is sustaining this 
constantly changing world He cannot be immutable for He can only sustain objects 
that exist at the ever changing present moment. On four-dimensionalism it might 
appear that the world is unchanging since all moments of space and time have equal 
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ontological existence, and the flow of time is said to be illusory. As such, God can 
sustain the world in one eternal and immutable act.  
The problem is that this is a false understanding of this theory of time. As 
Nathan Oaklander explains, “The rock-bottom feature of time that must be accepted 
on all sides is that there is change, and the different views concerning the nature of 
change constitute the difference between A- and B-theories of time.”331 To hold to 
four-dimensional eternalism is not to hold to a changeless world. Instead, it is to hold 
to a different understanding of change—i.e. perdurantism. The world involves change 
from one moment of time to the next. Perdurantism is the way four-dimensionalists 
explain how an object changes over time without having contradictory temporary 
intrinsic properties. As such, even on four-dimensional eternalism, God is sustaining a 
changing world.  
In this section I shall lay out several reasons for thinking that four-
dimensionalism does not save divine timelessness. 
 
The Timeless God Exists At Every Time 
 Mawson’s account of divine timelessness falls into divine temporality. God, 
on his construal, is temporal as understood on four-dimensionalism. This is not 
intentional. He does attempt to distinguish his account from divine temporality. I will 
argue that he does not succeed.  
On his model, much like Anselm’s, God’s relation to time is directly parallel 
to God’s relation to space. “God is not located at any particular point in time, in the 
sense that he exists then but not at other times. Rather, he transcends time. Despite his 
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temporal transcendence, he is not absent from any time.”332 He notes that the 
temporalist will agree with this assessment, and as such he has not clearly 
distinguished timelessness from temporality. What distinguishes the two positions? 
“The answer is that the atemporalist believes that if God had not created a universe, 
he would have existed at no time for there wouldn’t have been time, whereas the 
temporalist believes that even if God had not created the universe, he would have 
existed at times, indeed at all times, for there would still have been time.”333 
Is this enough to distinguish divine atemporality from temporality? The 
temporalist should say no. On the Anselmian view God exists at all times and 
places.
334
 This means that God is causally related to each moment of time. He exists 
at those times. If He did not, those times would not exist. This, says Mawson, is 
sufficient for God to exist at every time. “It is a sufficient condition of one’s being at 
a particular time that one knows what is going on at that time directly, without first 
needing to do something at some other time, and that one can act directly at that time, 
that is without first needing to do something at some other time.”335 At this point, the 
divine temporalist will say that to exist at a time is a sufficient condition to be in 
time.
336
 Thus, Mawson’s account does not give us divine timelessness. If God exists 
at any time, He must be temporal.  
Mawson will disagree for two reasons. First, his appeal, again, is that if God 
had not created the temporal world He would not exist at any time.
337
 This is 
irrelevant since God has in fact created a temporal world and exists at every time. 
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Further, as noted above, on Mawson’s account God has always existed with the 
temporal world. There never was a state of affairs where God did not exist at all 
times. Second, Mawson claims, like Anselm, that existing at every time is not 
sufficient for existing in time.
338
 He gives us no hint as to how this is the case. Thus, 
we have no reason to think this claim is true.  
In fact, this is a problem for many atemporalists. There is a widespread 
assumption amongst atemporalists that there is a clear distinction between existing at 
a time and existing in time, or between existing with a time and in time. As Rory Fox 
points out, this distinction was taken to be obvious throughout the Middle Ages, but 
was left vague and largely unexplored.
339
 This distinction is not obvious. I dare say it 
is empty. To exist at a time is to have temporal location. To exist in time is to have 
temporal location. Having temporal location makes one temporal. What is the 
difference between at and in? 
The atemporalist wants to draw the distinction by saying that eternity contains 
time in that “God is the source of each temporal instant. He is not contained in any of 
the temporal instants, but is directly, causally and cognitively related to each and 
every one of them equally.”340 The temporalist agrees, but she understands eternity as 
metaphysical time as outlined in chapter 2.  
How can the atemporalist distinguish herself from the temporalist? What 
metaphysic of time makes this distinction between at and in time intelligible? There 
does not appear to be one. If the absolute theory of time is true, time can exist without 
change. There is no distinction between existing at a time and existing in time. 
Nothing can be timeless if the absolute theory of time is true for it is a necessary 
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concomitant of God’s existence. Several divine temporalists will be happy with this, 
but it will not help divine timelessness. If a relational theory of time is true, time is 
just change. There is no meaningful sense in which an object exists at a change but 
not in a change. An object persists through change by either enduring or perduring. 
An object either does or does not change. The atemporalist will say that God does not 
change intrinsically or extrinsically. Below I will argue that this is not possible. For 
now I will simply note that this does not make the at-in distinction intelligible.  
What seems to be going on with the at-in distinction is a strong analogy 
between space and time, but even the most ardent four-dimensionalist will note that 
space and time have clear distinct qualities. For instance, time has a direction and 
space does not. The at-in distinction assumes that time is like a container, but time 
just is not the sort of thing that could be a container.
341
 It is not enough like a physical 
object to be described literally in this manner.
342
 Granted, temporalists do speak of 
God existing in time, but this is a loose way of saying that God is temporal.  
One common move to make the at-in distinction work is to say that time is 
created by God. God cannot be bound by created things. Does this help? No. First, say 
that time is created. Time is either relational or absolute. No progress has been made 
over the above difficulties by making time a created thing. Second, it isn’t obvious 
that time was created. For instance, John of Damascus held to a period of indivisible 
time prior to creation. There needs to be a reason for thinking that time was created. 
Augustine posits that God created time to respond to the Manichaean question, “Why 
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did God not create sooner?”343 It is an ad hoc move that one need not accept.344 One 
will need independent justification for making this claim. One could offer a kalam 
argument to the conclusion that time had a beginning. However, this would get us to 
the conclusion that there was a first change which is consistent with John of 
Damascus’ position. It cannot get us to the conclusion that time began for there could 
be a single moment of amorphous time prior to creation that contains no changes.
345
 
One will need another argument for the conclusion that time began. 
As it stands the timeless God exists at every time and thus has temporal 
location. That is sufficient for God to be temporal.  
 
The Arguments Against Timelessness Work on Four-Dimensionalism 
To bolster the conclusion above it is worthy of note that some of the 
arguments against divine timelessness work on presentism and four-dimensional 
eternalism. John Duns Scotus argued against Thomism that God cannot be co-present, 
or immense, with an event unless that event exists.
346
 In other words, God cannot be 
equally co-present with all moments of time because moments of time only exist at 
the times at which they do. Scotus was assuming presentism, so his claim is that God 
can only be co-present with the present moment. God cannot be co-present with any 
other moments because those other moments simply do not exist on presentism. 
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However, Brian Leftow briefly suggests that the same argument could work on four-
dimensional eternalism.
347
 
On eternalism objects are constituted of temporal parts or stages. Stages only 
exist at the moments at which they exist. Some object O has stages at times t1 through 
tn. It simply is the case that those stages exist at those times and no others. The whole 
notion of perdurant objects and stages arises because endurant objects cannot exist at 
multiple times as the four-dimensionalist sees it. Since all moments of time have 
equal ontological existence an endurant object would exist wholly at several times and 
would thus have contradictory intrinsic properties. Say O exists as a whole at t1 
through t2. At t1 O is blue all over and at t2 O is red all over. Since O exists as a whole 
at both times the properties of each time fall within O’s quantifier domain. O has the 
properties blue all over and red all over. O has contradictory properties.  As discussed 
in chapter 2, the adoption of perdurantism removes the contradictory properties.  
What does this have to do with God and time? One may recall that for God to 
be immense, or omnipresent, is for God to be “wholly present” to all of space and 
time by being directly, causally, and cognitively related to all of space and time.
348
 
Further, recall that a simple God is identical to His act of knowing and sustaining the 
universe. If God is immense, or wholly present, to all moments of time as the four-
dimensional eternalist sees it, God will have contradictory intrinsic properties. From 
all eternity God is incarnate and not incarnate. From all eternity God is initiating the 
Mosaic Covenant and He is not. Since God is equally and wholly present at each 
moment of time, and since each moment of time has equal ontological existence, all 
of these properties are within the quantifier domain in that all of these properties can 
be predicated of God. In order to remove the contradiction one would have to adopt 
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divine perdurance so that she could say that <at time tn God is incarnate> and <at time 
tx God is not incarnate>. Again, no defender of divine simplicity will accept that for 
God literally has temporal parts. If God has temporal parts, He is not timeless. 
Rogers may have a rejoinder. In one place she writes, “Although God is 
‘timeless’ in that His life is not stretched out four-dimensionally across time as our 
lives are, it does not follow that He is incapable of being related to the temporal 
universe…God knows and acts causally upon all of space-time in one, eternal, act.” 
Here she is clearly denying that God is spread out through the spacetime manifold. 
Yet, God is still causally related to each moment of time. He is “the source of each 
temporal instant.”349 God is the source of each instant by being cognitively and 
causally related to each instant. Does this help? No. A simple God is identical to His 
cognition and His cognition is temporally spread out. Thus, God is temporally spread 
out. His act of causing t1 to exist only exists at t1 and not at t2.  
There is one way to avoid this conclusion, but the atemporalist will not like it. 
The atemporalist could appeal to a claim that she is already committed to: all of time 
is simultaneously present to God. All of time is simultaneous with eternity. Time t1 is 
simultaneous with eternity. Time t2 is simultaneous with eternity. Thus, t1 is 
simultaneous with t2. This has the advantage of clearly making God’s causal activity 
one single act. Of course, it has the high price of collapsing the chronology of time 
and thus destroying four-dimensionalism. As I said before, this avoids the problem, 
but the atemporalist will not like it.
350
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There is another argument worth considering that comes from Dean 
Zimmerman and Roderick M. Chisholm. Their argument explicitly endorses 
presentism, but I believe that it works on four-dimensionalism as well. One of the 
starting points for the argument is that God stands in real relations to creation. As 
noted before, Rogers has no taste for the Medieval denial of God’s relation to 
creation. Zimmerman and Chisholm argue that if God stands in a relation with 
temporal entities He too must be temporal. “If anything changes, then everything 
changes. If you change from the state of sitting to the state of standing, then each of 
us becomes such that you change from the state of sitting to the state of standing. And 
so does God.”351 
What Zimmerman and Chisholm are describing are Cambridge changes. A 
Cambridge change is a relational, or extrinsic, change. It is not the same thing as an 
intrinsic change. If person P decides to perform some action a, and then performs a, P 
will have undergone an intrinsic change. If a red apple turns brown it has undergone 
an intrinsic change. A Cambridge change is different because it does not involve a 
change in something intrinsic to the subject. Let us say that there is a tree in the 
middle of a forest. At time t1 there is a squirrel standing south of the tree. At time t2 
the squirrel moves and stands north of the tree. The squirrel has undergone an 
intrinsic change, but the tree has not. The tree has only undergone a mere Cambridge 
change.  
What does this have to do with God and time? Zimmerman and Chisholm are 
arguing that a subject that has undergone a Cambridge change is in time. The tree was 
standing in a relation to the squirrel at t1 and then was standing in a new relation at t2. 
God is eternally sustaining both of those times. He stands in a real relation to this 
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Cambridge change. It would seem that God would be subject to a Cambridge change 
as well since He is really related to both times. If God undergoes a mere Cambridge 
change, He is temporal.  
One could try to get out of this by denying that Cambridge changes should 
even count as changes at all.
352
 I find this less than persuasive since Cambridge 
changes are enough to change propositions about other subjects. One will need to 
offer an argument as to why they are not legitimate changes. Ultimately, that does not 
matter since Christian theology proclaims that God stands in several types of relations 
with creation that are far more significant than mere Cambridge change.  He created 
and sustains the world. The world is causally dependent upon Him, so the world is in 
a dependency relation with God at each moment of its existence. Also, God through 
Christ and the Holy Spirit stands in an intimate loving relationship with human 
persons. These are not mere Cambridge changes.  
Anything related to a time is in time. Anything related to a change is also 
changed. Four-dimensional eternalism is a theory on time and change. Time and 
change are part of the furniture of the world. God is related to a temporal and 
changing world, as understood on four-dimensionalism, so God is temporal as 
understood on four-dimensionalism. This brings us back to a perdurant God.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 In the previous chapter I argued that the traditional view of divine 
atemporality is not possible given presentism. Here I examined a contemporary 
account of divine timelessness that assumes four-dimensional eternalism. I have 
argued that this account fails to maintain divine timelessness as well. Katherin Rogers 
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has said that unless divine timelessness “entails some logical or metaphysical 
impossibility” Christians ought to hold to this doctrine since it expresses “the most 
ontologically perfect way to exist.”353 What I am positing is that divine timelessness is 
metaphysically impossible given that God has created a temporal world. It does not 
matter which theory of time one holds. We know that God has created a temporal 
world and that He causally sustains this world and interacts in it, and as such God 
must be temporal.  
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CHAPTER 7 
THE INCARNATION OF THE TIMELESS GOD 
 
Formerly he was not man, but only God the Son, before all ages, unconnected 
with a body or anything corporeal; but at last he became man also, assuming 
manhood for our salvation; passible in the flesh, impassible in the Godhead; 
limited in the body, unconfined in the spirit; on the earth and at the same time 
in heaven; belonging to the visible world, and also to the intelligible order of 
being; comprehensible and also incomprehensible; so that man as a whole, 
since he had fallen into sin, might be fashioned afresh by one who was wholly 
man and at the same time God. 
—Gregory of Nazianzus354   
 
the assumptio carnis also means that the eternal God, without ceasing to be 
eternal, has taken temporal form, as well as creaturely existence. God has 
assumed our time into union with himself, without abrogating it. He the 
eternal has become temporal for us in the form of our own temporal and 
historical existence, not simply by embracing our time and historical existence 
and ruling it, but by permitting time and our historical existence to be the form 
of his eternal deity. Thus he is not only accessible to us in time and history, 
but we in time and history are free to approach the eternal and to live with 
him. 
—T.F. Torrance355  
 
 
 It is often said that the incarnation conflicts with divine timelessness, though 
this is seldom fleshed out in the contemporary discussions. The intent of this chapter 
is to find if there is a way for the incarnation to be compatible with divine 
timelessness. First, we need to get a clear statement of the conflict. Then we need to 
find a model that is possibly compatible with timelessness. I will argue that there are 
no existent models. Since the incarnation is part of the hardcore of every Christian 
research program, it is a non-negotiable doctrine. Divine timelessness does not have 
the same status as the doctrine of the incarnation.  As such, Christians should give up 
the divine timeless research program in order to maintain the incarnation. 
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The Initial Objection  
 It should be recalled that all one needs is a change, any kind of change, in 
order to have time. Any kind of change that a being undergoes will be sufficient for 
that being to be temporal. The incarnation seems to be a clear example of God the Son 
undergoing a change, and thus being temporal. As Colin Gunton puts it, “the eternal 
love of God locates itself in time and space, and so becomes datable.”356 Yet, 
Christians have traditionally wished to resist the claim that this entails that God is 
temporal. In speaking of the incarnate Christ, Pope Leo I says that “[w]hile continuing 
to be beyond time, he begins to exist from a point in time.”357 This appears to be 
highly paradoxical.  
It is not surprising the doctrine of the incarnation was theologically offensive 
in the ancient world. The notion that the immutable God could change was an offense 
against His perfection. The suggestion that the timeless God could enter into time—
let alone be aware of what is happening in time—is an assault on the most exalted 
being.
358
 It was an uphill battle for early Christians to establish the intellectual 
credibility of the incarnation. As Christianity became the dominant religion in the 
West, the critics did not go away. Christian theologians continued to feel compelled to 
answer objections against the compatibility of God’s perfection and the incarnation.359 
A common objection was that it is unfitting for God to become anything which He 
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was not eternally. The incarnation is a new event in history, it is not eternal. As such, 
God cannot have become incarnate at some point in history.
360
  
These objections were common because it was assumed that God is atemporal. 
The incarnation was on trial before the bar of the classical understanding of divine 
perfection. In our own day the objections usually run the other direction. The classical 
understanding of the divine perfections is placed on trial before the bar of God 
incarnate. This is as it should be if we truly believe that the incarnation is the ultimate 
revelation of God to human persons.
361
 The incarnation should force us to reconsider 
what God is like.
362
  
There are several ways of articulating the objection. Thomas Senor puts it like 
this.
363
 
 1) Jesus Christ was the bearer of temporal properties. 
 2) No bearer of temporal properties is atemporal. 
 3) Jesus Christ=God the Son (a divine person). 
 4) God the Son is not atemporal. 
 Brian Leftow states the problem as follows, displaying a clear understanding 
of the role change plays in the argument:
364
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 5) Jesus Christ existed in time. 
 6) Jesus Christ=God the Son. 
 7) God the Son existed in time. 
 8) God the Son began to be human. 
 9) Whatever begins to be human changes intrinsically. 
 10) God the Son changed intrinsically. 
 11) Whatever changes intrinsically exists in time. 
 12) God the Son exists in time.  
Senor notes that this doesn’t necessarily entail that the entire Godhead is 
temporal. “It does follow, however, that there exists a temporal divine being and, a 
fortiori, atemporality is not essential for divinity.”365 Senor’s modesty here ignores 
some important issues in Trinitarian theology. This would entail that all of the divine 
persons are temporal since all of the divine persons necessarily and essentially stand 
in a perichoretic relation to one another. If one divine person becomes temporal, the 
others do too because of the interpenetrating relation that they stand in to each other. 
The temporality of the incarnation is a serious threat to divine timelessness. 
“[I]f God is timelessly eternal, then there can be no time at which the Word of God 
can be said to do or become anything.”366 This would seem to make it impossible for 
a timeless God to become incarnate, but the incarnation is an essential part of any 
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Christian research program. The atemporalist needs to offer a model of the 
incarnation that is compatible with divine timelessness if she is going to have a 
coherent Christian research program. There might be a way to develop a model where 
this is possible. This will be examined below. 
 
Christological Models 
 There are various models of the incarnation at large today.
367
 The dominant 
strands are composite Christologies.
368
 This can involve two, three, or four parts of 
the composite Christ depending on one’s anthropology. For instance, the two-minds 
view is a three part Christology since it posits that Christ has a divine mind, a human 
mind, and a human body.
369
 Someone who is a substance dualist may find this 
attractive. However, she may also find a two part Christology equally attractive. This 
is where the divine mind constitutes a human person by being connected to a human 
body in the appropriate way, perhaps through some sort of psycho-physical laws.
370
 A 
trichotomist will most likely have a four part Christology since she holds that human 
persons are comprised of a body, soul, and spirit. (Or in the case of Apollinaris a 
body, a rational soul, and an animal soul. Although, he had a three part Christology 
since, on his view, the Son takes the place of the rational soul and thus counts as fully 
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human.
371
) In this instance, the divine mind would take on a human body, a human 
soul, and a human spirit.
372
  
 Closely related to this is the question of the divine and human will. 
Monothelites hold that the Son only has one will, whereas dyothelites hold that the 
Son has two wills—a human and a divine will.373 A monothelite will say that only 
persons have a will, whereas a dyothelite will maintain that natures have a will.
374
 
Since Christ took on a human nature, He must have taken on a human will as well. 
What might this look like? Say one has a three part Christology and is a dyothelite. 
On this view God the Son—a divine mind—assumes a human mind, a human body, 
and a human will.  
 There are other Christological models available as well. There are two broad 
kenotic positions that one might hold. These can be compatible with three and four 
part Christiologies, though one need not hold them in order to flesh out a kenotic 
account. A functional kenotic view holds that the Second divine Person limited the 
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exercise of His powers to such an extent that He constitutes a human person.
375
 The 
Son does not give up any of His essential attributes in the incarnation. He simply 
limits the exercise of His attributes. An ontological kenosis view holds that the Son 
does give up His omni-attributes in the incarnation in order to be considered 
human.
376
 This view, at least the plausible versions of it, will also try to maintain that 
the Son does not give up any of His essential attributes. A proponent of this view will 
argue that an attribute like omnipotence is not necessary for being divine, but that 
love is. The Son gives up omnipotence, but does not give up love.  
 Which type of model will help us maintain divine timelessness? The kenotic 
views will be of no help since the very idea of kenosis involves giving something up. 
A timeless God cannot give up anything for that would involve change and a new 
moment in the divine life. On an ontological kenosis the Son loses certain properties 
at a particular time, and that certainly cannot be compatible with divine timelessness. 
A functional view holds that for a particular stretch of time the Son does not exercise 
certain divine powers. Such a view has already given up the idea that God is pure act, 
and instead holds that God can act or refrain from acting at particular times. This is 
certainly not congenial with atemporality as it involves real change in God.
377
 
 What about a composite model? It is not clear how a two part monothelite 
Christology will work. The Son becomes connected to a body through psycho-
physical laws and the divine will acts at particular times. The Son becomes causally 
connected to a body at a particular time, and He was not always causally connected to 
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a body, lest we hold that the incarnation is timeless. Perhaps a three part dyothelite 
Christology is the best option. In fact, it appears to be the majority view after the 
seventh century.
378
 For instance, one of the reasons the Third Council of 
Constantinople affirmed a three part dyothelite Christology was to maintain that the 
divine nature did not change or suffer in the incarnation.
379
 This is the view that I 
shall examine throughout the rest of this chapter. Before doing so, I need to lay out a 
few preliminary issues. 
First, one might complain that I am ignoring the trichotomist position and a 
four part Christology. In fact, I am doing this for at least two reasons. (1) The 
trichotomist position has not had many major contenders in Church history. Nor am I 
aware of any contemporary trichotomists who have sufficiently fleshed out the 
incarnation in light of divine timelessness. (2) If it is possible for a three part 
Christology to maintain divine timelessness, a trichotomist can easily reap the benefits 
of this view and tack on a human spirit. It is not obvious what the human spirit would 
do that a human soul cannot do, nor how adding a human spirit would help solve the 
problem of a timeless God incarnate. Regardless, if a three part Christology can 
uphold divine timelessness, so can a four part Christology.  
Second, an overwhelming majority of Christians have been presentists and 
endurantists. Very few have been four-dimensionalists and perdurantists until recent 
times. As such, there are not many models of the incarnation cut in terms of four-
dimensionalism. I will do my best to construct a composite Christology on both 
accounts, but it will be difficult since there has not been much reflection on the impact 
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of four-dimensionalism on Christology. With that being said, let us begin to construct 
a composite Christ.  
 
The Two-Minds View: The Basics 
 The three part Christology under consideration here is widely known as the 
two-minds view. Before getting into the details it would be good to get a feel for what 
an adequate Christology is trying to capture. Typically an adequate Christology is 
attempting to fall within the bounds of the Council of Chalcedon in 451.
380
 What does 
Chalcedonian Christology look like? Oliver Crisp summarizes five relevant desiderata 
from the Chalcedonian creed.
381
 
 13) Christ is of one substance (homoousious) with the Father. 
14) Christ is eternally begotten of the Father according to his divinity and 
temporally begotten of the Virgin Mary according to his humanity. 
15) Christ is one theanthropic (divine-human) person (hypostasis) subsisting 
in two natures (phuseis), which are held together in a personal union.  
16) Christ’s two natures remain intact in the personal union, without being 
confused or mingled together to form some sort of hybrid entity or tertium 
quid.  
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17) Christ’s two natures are a fully divine nature and a fully human nature, 
respectively, his human nature consisting of a human body and a ‘rational’ 
soul.   
 This list naturally raises issues related to personal identity, anthropology, and 
the doctrine of God. What does it mean to be human? What does it mean to be divine? 
What is personal identity? I have already discussed some of the issues related to 
personal identity through time, and will do so in the next section. For now I will stick 
with answering the first two questions. 
 The two-minds view starts by distinguishing between a kind-essence and an 
individual-essence.
382
 A kind-essence is a cluster of properties that are essential for 
being a part of a particular kind of thing. For instance, there is a kind-essence called 
bovinity that signifies the necessary and essential properties a thing must have in order 
to be considered a cow. An individual-essence is a cluster of properties that are 
essential to a particular entity. Each human person has an individual-essence, a 
haecceity or thisness. Socrates has a thisness, and so do we. Our individual-essence is 
what distinguishes us from everyone else in the human race. It distinguishes one from 
every other person be they human, angelic, divine, or other. One cannot lose an 
individual-essential property and continue to exist. One can lose a kind-essential 
property and continue to exist, but one will cease to exist as that kind of thing. The 
move for the two-minds view is to posit that an individual-essence can have more 
than one kind-essence. It can only have one kind-essence essentially, but it can 
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contingently have other kind-essences as well.
383
 In this instance, God the Son can 
have a human and divine essence.  
 Next, the two-minds view tries to distinguish the properties that makeup the 
kind-essence divinity and the kind-essence humanity. How would one go about doing 
such a thing? With regard to divinity one could use the method of perfect being 
theology. Upon doing so she might come up with a list as follows: necessary 
existence, aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipresence, perfect 
freedom, and eternality. In this instance I shall assume that ‘eternality’ means 
timelessness.  
Part of the desiderata assumes that to be human is to have a human mind and a 
human body. Yet there seems to be more entailed. How might one go about 
discerning the necessary properties of humanity? One strategy is to look around at 
other human persons. A typical list might include the following: contingent existence, 
created, limited in power, limited in knowledge, limited in goodness, locally and 
spatially limited, free, and sempiternal. Clearly we have a problem. The two lists 
conflict with each other in a fundamental way. It would seem that the Son would have 
contradictory properties in the incarnation.  
 There are some possible ways around this problem. One can start to assuage 
the difficulty by pointing out that not all properties that one finds amongst humans are 
essential. There are common human properties that are not essential human 
properties. ‘Sinful’ is an example. G.K. Chesterton once said that the doctrine of 
original sin was the easiest of Christian doctrines to verify. All one needs to do is look 
out on the street.
384
 It is not hard to come to the conclusion that all human persons are 
sinful. Yet, part of the doctrine of the incarnation is that at least one human person, 
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Jesus Christ, was not sinful. One of the things we learn from the incarnation is that 
‘sinful’ is not an essential property of humanity. It certainly is a common property, 
but it is not an essential property. One can be human and not sin. In fact, Christian 
theology proclaims that one day sin will be no more and that human persons will 
enjoy everlasting life. Christian theology proclaims that humans flourish best when 
they are not sinful. If ‘sinful’ is an essential property of humanity this is not even 
possible.  
 That may be all well and good, but it does not tell us about some of the other 
incompatible properties. What about necessary existence? Necessary existence is not 
just an essential property of the divine essence, it is also a part of the Son’s 
individual-essence. Necessarily, a thing cannot change its modal status. A contingent 
thing cannot become a necessary thing, nor can a necessary thing become a contingent 
thing. The Son simply cannot become contingent. Isn’t this a problem? The defender 
of the two-minds view will say no. The humanity of the Son is contingent, even 
though the Son Himself is not. As Morris explains, “For God the Son to become 
human, he thus had to take on a human body, and a human mind, with all that entails. 
He did not have to become a created contingent being. He just had to take on a 
created, contingent body and mind of the right sort.”385 
 The defender of the two-minds view will argue that Christ is fully human 
since He has all of the essential properties that are entailed by having a human mind 
and a human body. Yet, Christ is not merely human. We who are merely human are 
contingent, limited in power, and so on, but Christ is not merely human. Yet, the two-
minds view still attempts to make room for limitations of power and knowledge by 
appealing to the human mind.  
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 God the Son has a divine mind that is omnipotent and omniscient. In assuming 
a human mind and body He becomes causally connected to this composite such that 
He constitutes one person with two natures. The divine mind is fully conscious, and 
so is the human mind. “The human mind drew its visual imagery from what the eyes 
of Jesus saw, and its concepts from the languages he learned.” The divine mind does 
not do this since it is already omniscient. The human mind is limited to the resources 
of its own consciousness and body, but the divine mind is not so limited. There is an 
asymmetrical accessing relation between the divine mind and the human mind such 
that the divine mind has access to all of the contents of the human mind, but the 
human mind does not have access to the contents of the divine mind.
386
  
 
Is the Two-Minds View Nestorian? 
 Any adequate Christological model must be able to explain how Jesus Christ 
is God the Son incarnate in human flesh such that there is one person with a fully 
divine and a fully human nature. If the two-minds view cannot explain how there is 
one person in Jesus Christ, it cannot be a part of a Christian research program. If it 
cannot be a part of a Christian research program, it cannot be employed in a Christian 
research program that also holds to divine timelessness. Later in this chapter I shall 
argue that the divine timelessness research program entails Nestorianism. For now, I 
wish to lay out the initial charge of Nestorianism to illuminate the problems that will 
face the atemporalist. Also, discussing the charge of Nestorianism will help illustrate 
another component of an adequate Christological model—the distinction between 
enhypostasia and anhypostasia. 
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The charge of Nestorianism can be put in several ways. One way to state the 
problem is as follows. Typically we think that a person just is a mind with free will. 
On a two-minds view we have two minds, so we must have two persons.
387
 Further, 
on dyothelitism Christ has two wills. Each mind has a will of its own. The situation 
seems to be this. We have two minds. Each has its own set of beliefs. The first mind 
can believe p and the second mind can believe ~p. The first mind can intend to will 
some action a, and the second mind can intend to will ~a.
388
 The first mind 
experiences nothing but uninterrupted joy (given divine impassibility). The second 
mind experiences moments of suffering. The first mind cannot be tempted. The 
second mind suffers temptations of all sorts. The first mind never experiences change 
and stands in no temporal relations of any sort (given immutability and timelessness). 
The second mind does experience change and stands in temporal relations. The first 
mind cannot be simultaneous with the second mind for simultaneity is a temporal 
relation, and the first mind cannot stand in any temporal relation at all. The first mind 
is pure act and performs all its actions in one timeless present (given simplicity and 
timelessness). The second mind has potentiality and its actions are spread out 
temporally.  
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It would seem that we are clearly referring to two different persons, but the 
doctrine of the incarnation states that there is one person with two natures. As Anselm 
explains, the Son “assumed another nature, not another person.” (Incarnation of the 
Word, XI) The defender of the two-minds view will claim that normally two minds 
means two persons, but in the instance of the God-man two minds come together to 
function as one person.
389
 This looks suspiciously like the moves of Theodore of 
Mopsuestia and various Nestorians.
390
 However, it is also the view espoused in the 
Tome of Leo leading one to ask if there is really a substantive difference between the 
orthodox and heretics.
391
  
A defender of the two-minds view might try to avoid the charge of 
Nestorianism in the following way. Oliver Crisp will say that there never was a time 
when the human nature of Christ exists apart from God the Son. When the Holy Spirit 
conceived the human nature of Jesus in Mary’s womb, the Son joined Himself to that 
human nature. So there never was a moment when the human nature existed without 
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being joined to the Son. The “human nature is never in a position to form a supposit 
distinct from God the Son.”392  
 In order to understand what Crisp is up to one must be aware of the 
anhypostasia and enhypostasia distinction within the traditional doctrine of the 
incarnation. T.F. Torrance explains the distinction as follows. Anhypostasia claims 
that “Christ’s human nature has its existence only in union with God, in God’s 
existence or personal mode of being (hypostasis). It does not possess it in and for 
itself—hence an-hypostasis (‘not person’, i.e. no separate person).” Enhypostasia 
expresses the fact that “the human nature of Christ is given existence in the existence 
of God, and co-exists in the divine essence or mode of being.”393 One way to 
understand this is that the Son’s human nature would not have existed if it were not 
for the incarnation. It did not exist prior to the incarnation. It only exists because of 
the incarnation. Further, the human nature is only personal because it is assumed by a 
divine person, God the Son. The human nature is not a person independent of the 
Son’s assumption.  
What must be understood is that the move that Crisp and others make avoids 
the charge of adoptionism, but not Nestorianism simpliciter. Adoptionism is one 
Christological heresy that often falls under the category of Nestorianism. On 
adoptionism, Jesus exists for a certain stretch of time and is later united to God the 
Son. In this scenario we clearly have two persons. But what must be understood is 
that adoptionism isn’t the only way to be a Nestorian. All one needs to do in order to 
be a Nestorian is to offer a Christological model that entails two persons in Jesus 
Christ. One could hold that Jesus “had union with the Logos straightaway from the 
beginning when he was formed in his mother’s womb,” and still be charged with 
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Nestorianism.
394
 How does affirming the en/anhypostasia distinction remove the 
charge of Nestorianism simpliciter? It does not. 
This distinction, while interesting, does not help in understanding how the 
two-minds view can explain that the God-man is one person and not two. The 
en/anhypostasia distinction does not give us a Christological model. Instead, it serves 
as a constraint for developing Christological models that avoid Nestorianism. 
Affirming a constraint on adequate Christological models does not explain how Christ 
can be one person with two natures.
395
  
I cannot see how the two-minds view can avoid Nestorianism. On this model 
we have two conscious beings—God the Son and the human nature—and it seems 
impossible for a pair of conscious beings to be one conscious being, but I will set this 
issue aside for now.
396
 As noted before, I will pick up the charge of Nestorianism later 
in the chapter.  
 
What is the Unique Relationship Between the Son and His Humanity? 
The charge of Nestorianism is a difficult challenge for the two-minds view, 
but it is not the only challenge it must face. It must also answer the following two 
issues. First, the two-minds view must explain what the unique relation is that the Son 
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has to this human nature that makes the Son a human person. Second, the two-minds 
view must also explain how the Son is uniquely related to His humanity in a way that 
is different from how He is related to our humanity. The answers to these issues are 
closely related, and will help one understand the arguments against divine 
timelessness discussed below. Also, examining these questions will help to illustrate 
three more components that make up an adequate Christological model. Those 
components are said to be perichoresis, the communicatio idiomatum, and 
embodiment.  
How can the proponent of the two-minds view explain Christ’s unique 
relationship to His humanity? She cannot appeal to the asymmetrical accessing 
relation between the divine mind and the human mind because the asymmetrical 
accessing relation is not unique to the incarnation. The Son already has an 
asymmetrical accessing relation to all human minds, and we do not consider any of us 
to be the incarnation of God. Further, it seems that the commitment to dyothelitism 
only serves to bolster this point. The divine mind has a distinct will from the human 
mind. All human minds have wills that are distinct from God. So what is the 
difference between me and Jesus?  
 The doctrine that is supposed to help us understand the unique relation 
between the Son and His humanity is the doctrine of perichoresis. Perichoresis is a 
tricky doctrine because it is used in a different way of the Trinity than it is of the 
incarnation. Quite literally perichoresis means interpenetration.
397
 In Neoplatonic 
thought, perichoresis was used to describe the relationship between a soul and 
body.
398
 In the doctrine of the Trinity the three divine persons stand in a perichoretic 
relation to one another—they interpenetrate one another such that, necessarily, they 
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cannot exist apart from each other. In the incarnation perichoresis “is the idea that the 
divine nature of Christ somehow penetrates his human nature, but not conversely, and 
without compromising the integrity of either of the natures in Christ’s theanthropic 
person.”399 The idea is that the Son stands in a perichoretic relation to His humanity, 
and does not stand in a perichoretic relation to the rest of humanity.  
Perichoresis is supposed the unique relation that we have been looking for. 
But does it distinguish the Son’s relation to His humanity from His relation to the rest 
of humanity? It is not clear that it does. The doctrine of perichoresis within the Trinity 
can be given a clear modal interpretation—necessarily the divine persons are strongly 
internally related such that they cannot exist apart from each other.
400
 The doctrine of 
perichoresis cannot be given this same interpretation within the context of the 
incarnation because the Son can exist without the human nature. Further, within the 
Trinity perichoresis gives us three persons with one nature. Within the incarnation, 
perichoresis is supposed to give us one person with two natures. So what exactly is 
being affirmed here with perichoresis in the context of the incarnation?  
It is hard to say because the doctrine of perichoresis has been used by 
theologians in the past and today to say all sorts of things about the God-world 
relation, salvation, and anthropology.
401
 None of which is easily distinguishable from 
how it is used within the doctrine of the incarnation. For instance, a panentheist can 
say that God stands in a perichoretic relation with creation. On some accounts of 
panentheism God necessarily exists with creation, so it will be hard to distinguish how 
perichoresis is being used here from how it is used within the Trinity. Others claim to 
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be eschatological panentheists. On this account God will one day bring creation to its 
completion. On that day God will be all in all. The eschatological panentheist 
interprets this to mean that God will eventually stand in a perichoretic relation with all 
of creation, but in such a way that the integrity of the natures of each is maintained.
402
 
Some eschatological panentheists will even say that the perichoretic relation entails 
that God has divine and creaturely attributes, and that creatures will also have divine 
and creatures attributes, yet again, in such a way that the integrity of each nature is 
maintained.
403
 This interpretation of perichoresis is indistinguishable from how it is 
used in the context of the incarnation. Perhaps, then, perichoresis is of little help. 
 The defender of the two-minds view will most likely argue that these 
panentheists are using perichoresis in a fast and loose way. She might try tightening 
up the doctrine by connecting it to the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. 
Because of the perichoretic relation between the Son and His humanity there is a 
communication of the attributes from the two natures onto the one person. Anselm 
explains as follows. 
And we truly predicate everything, whether regarding God or regarding the 
human being, of him. For we cannot designate or name the divine Son as 
person apart from the human son, nor the human son as person apart from the 
divine Son, since the very same one who is the human son is the divine Son, 
and the combination of proper characteristics of the Word and the assumed 
human being is the same. (Incarnation of the Word XI) 
 
The idea is that the person who is God the Son is the same person who is Jesus 
Christ. There is a strict identity relation between the Son and Jesus. They are 
numerically the same person. The communicatio idiomatum tries to capture this whilst 
maintaining the soteriological significance of the incarnation. The connection between 
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incarnation and soteriology was one of the driving motivations for rejecting 
Nestorianism. We need to know that God Himself has come to us. Why? We need to 
know if it is even possible for human persons to be reconciled to God. The incarnation 
is an act of reconciliation.
404
 In the one person Jesus Christ, humanity and divinity are 
perfectly united. Not only is it possible for humanity and divinity to be united, they 
are in fact united and the incarnation is a demonstration of that fact. If the incarnation 
is to be meaningful we must know that God Himself has become incarnate. Further, as 
John of Damascus argues, if God has not taken on the fullness of humanity, we are 
not saved. That which God has not assumed has not been healed.
405
  
This maybe all well and good, but it is still not clear that we have explained 
how the Son is uniquely related to His humanity such that He (a) counts as a human 
person, and (b) is differently related to my humanity. Just as with the an/enhypostasia 
distinction, we do not have a Christological model by appealing to perichoresis and 
the communicatio idiomatum. The reason the an/enhypostasia distinction does not 
help is because it is a constraint on Christological models. Perichoresis and the 
communicatio idiomatum do not help for different reasons. I take perichoresis to be an 
unsuccessful attempt at offering a model. It is too coarse-grained of a concept to be 
useful. The communicatio, however, is an entailment from an adequate Christological 
model. Any adequate Christological model will hold that Jesus Christ is one person 
with two natures. As such, Jesus will be one suppositum, one ultimate possessor of 
properties. This is not an explanation for how Christ is human, and how His relation 
to His humanity is different from my own. Instead, the communicatio assumes that 
there already is an explanation from an adequate Christological model for these 
issues. We do not have that yet. The answer to these issues does not lie in affirming 
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constraints on models, nor affirming the entailments of an adequate model. The 
answer lies in actually offering a model that is compatible with these constraints and 
has the desired entailments.   
What is needed to answer these questions is an account of embodiment. 
Above, I noted that the Neoplatonists used perichoresis to describe the relationship 
between the soul and body. Perhaps, the best way to interpret perichoresis within the 
doctrine of the incarnation is to understand it as embodiment. To say that the Son is 
human is to say that He is appropriately related to a human organism or body. The 
relation that the Son has to His human body will not be the same as the relation I have 
to my human body. In order to understand this, we need an account of embodiment.  
What does it mean to be embodied? There are several accounts of embodiment 
in the literature, but there appear to be two basic accounts.
406
 The first is physical 
realization. This assumes a physicalist anthropology of human persons. This view 
holds that “a person P is embodied in body B if and only if all the (intrinsic) states of 
P are wholly realized by (intrinsic) states of B.”407 One way to put this is that all of 
P’s mental states supervene upon the brain states of B.408 Someone who holds to a 
materialist Christology will argue for this account of embodiment. However, Leftow 
notes that such a thing is impossible for the Son—an immaterial thing cannot become 
wholly material.
409
 My inclination is to agree with Leftow here, but I will not press 
the point. All that matters for the discussion is that this is not a live option for divine 
timelessness. It is not a live option since an immaterial person becoming wholly 
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physical involves change, and a timeless person cannot change. Perhaps the second 
account of embodiment will be of use for divine timelessness. 
The second broad account is more congenial with immaterial minds and cuts 
things in terms of a causal connection between the mind and the body. A mind is fully 
embodied in a physical body iff the following five conditions are met. The first 
condition is that the disturbances of the physical body cause pain in the mind. Also, 
the various goings-on in the body cause pleasure in the mind. If the body stubs a toe, 
the mind will feel pain. If the body is hugged, the body will feel pleasure. Second, the 
mind can feel the inside of the body. An example would be the feeling of an empty 
stomach. Third, the mind can move the body through a basic action. A basic action is 
when an agent can perform an act without having to perform some other action in 
order to accomplish the first act. For instance, I move my arm by a basic act. I do not 
move the cup of water on my desk by a basic act. Fourth, the mind looks out from the 
world from where the body is. The body is the mind’s locus of perception of the 
world. The mind acquires perceptual knowledge as mediated through the body. Fifth, 
the thoughts and feelings of the mind are affected by the things that go on in the 
body.
410
 
With this understanding of embodiment the proponent of the two-minds view 
can finally answer the questions of this section. If the second divine person is 
embodied in a particular human organism, He will be a human person. To be a human 
person is to be a person, a thinking thing with free will, that is embodied in human 
flesh. The proponent of the two-minds view can further say that God the Son is only 
embodied in one human organism. The Son does not stand in the same relation to my 
body as He does to His own. Thus, we have a way of distinguishing the Son’s relation 
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to His humanity from His relation to the rest of humanity. Even further, the two-
minds theorist can now say that she has a Christological model that entails the 
communicatio idiomatum. The Son being embodied in a particular human organism 
entails the Son having certain properties from the body. For instance, one can say that 
the Son walked on water. This cannot be said of God the Son unless the Son is 
embodied. It is only by having a body that one can predicate this of the Son. This will 
be discussed further in the next section.  
 
The Reduplicative Strategy and Contradictory Properties  
Now that we have a model of the incarnation to work with, we can start to see 
how it might answer some problems. One problem is that an adequate Christology 
entails the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, and this doctrine entails that the 
one person with two natures has contradictory properties. The attributes of divinity 
and humanity are communicated through the interpenetration of one another onto the 
one divine person.
411
 For instance, it is because of the communicatio idiomatum that 
the person of Christ has the contradictory properties timeless and temporal. How do 
we resolve the contradiction? In this section I will outline the basic strategy that the 
compositional Christology of the two-minds view uses to remove contradictory 
properties. In subsequent sections I will discuss specific ontologies of time and argue 
that this strategy may help with certain properties, but it does not help with the divine 
timeless research program.  
 The Reduplicative strategy, or the qua-move, is the standard way to remove 
contradictory properties.
412
 The idea is that we can coherently talk about the 
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properties of Christ’s humanity and divinity as parts of the Son. When we talk about 
the properties of His divinity we do not ascribe to it the human parts. When we talk 
about the properties of His humanity we do not ascribe to it the divine part. We can, 
however, ascribe both sets of properties to the one person.  For instance, we can say 
that the Son was crucified. Yet, the divine essence was not crucified.
413
 It is only in 
virtue of the Son’s humanity that He is crucified. One might say, qua human, the Son 
was crucified. How exactly does this work? 
 In order to get a better feel for the qua move we will need to see some 
examples of how it works. One might say that <the apple is red>. Why is the apple 
red? It is red because its skin is red. The apple is red qua skin, or in virtue of its skin. 
If one were to peel the apple it would no longer be red. <Socrates is wise>. What 
makes Socrates wise? Socrates is wise in virtue of having a well trained mind. If 
Socrates lost his mind, (however you wish to understand that) he would no longer be 
wise. Imagine you have a ruler and one end is painted green while the other end is 
painted blue. Your ruler is green and blue in virtue of its painted ends.  
 Perhaps the idea is that we can say that <Christ is atemporal qua divine, but 
temporal qua human>. Have we removed the contradiction? We have only if we 
refuse to consider the communicatio idiomatum. It is not the case that we have two 
unrelated subjects of predication. We have one person who is said to be atemporal and 
temporal. Once we bring back in the communicatio idiomatum we have <Christ is 
atemporal simpliciter> and <Christ is temporal simpliciter>. This is because sentences 
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of the form <x qua G is F> entail <x is F>.
414
 We could ignore the communicatio 
idiomatum in an effort to save this position, but we would then face Nestorianism, and 
thus have abandoned an adequate Christology. Maybe we have not used the qua move 
in the right way since we still have incompatible properties.  
As Robin Le Poidevin points out, “One way in which a single thing can 
exhibit incompatible properties is by having different parts, each of which exhibits 
one of the incompatible properties. As long as the properties are not exhibited by one 
and the same part, contradiction is avoided.”415 Perhaps if we treat Christ’s humanity 
and divinity as parts we could solve the problem. Douglas Blount points out a 
possible way to understand this.
416
 Consider the following. 
 18) The Fightin’ Irish qua defensive team played well during time t. 
 19) The Fightin’ Irish qua offensive team did not play well during t. 
Blount wants to say that the following inferences are not valid. 
 20) The Fightin’ Irish simpliciter played well during t. 
 21) The Fightin’ Irish simpliciter did not play well during t. 
I take it that the inferences to (20) and (21) are not valid since it is only certain parts 
of the team that played well or poorly.  
Of course, two points can be made. First, there is a sense in which these 
inferences go through. Say Notre Dame won the game. It would seem that a fan could 
assert (20) without any shame. The team as a whole pulled it off in the end. But say 
Notre Dame lost the game. A fan would have to shamefully concede that (21) was 
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true. Any denial of (21) would be the sort of post-game bull that one expects to hear 
on a sports talk show. It is sheer bluster trying to cover up the fact that the team did 
not bring it together, did not give it their best, and did not play well as a team. We can 
only deny the inferences to (20) and (21) when we ignore the fact that there is a team 
out on the field. What this illustrates is that not all cases of the reduplicative strategy 
can be treated the same.
417
 This is because there are certain cases where one property 
trumps another.
418
 For instance, a human person has various non-thinking parts like a 
nose or an arm. She is not intelligent qua arm. She is intelligent qua mind since the 
mind is the thing that does the thinking. If Notre Dame loses the game the property 
played poorly trumps its contrary, and if Notre Dame wins the property played well 
trumps.  
Second, this seems to be a poor analogy for the incarnation. Surely the 
mereology of Jesus is nothing like the mereology of a football team. The divine nature 
and the human nature are not loosely related parts. They stand in a very close relation, 
a perichoretic relation through embodiment. As Poidevin explains, “The human and 
divine parts are parts of a single substance—that is, an object that persists through 
time, enjoys a certain independence from other objects, and is a single individual. The 
properties of the parts can carry over to the whole.”419 The contradictory properties 
come back in full force because of the unity of the person of Christ.  
Maybe there is a way to successfully maneuver through all of this. It seems 
some reduplicative strategies work. A two-minds view is committed to substance 
dualism. Human persons are a composite of an immaterial soul and a material body. 
On substance dualism a person is an immaterial soul, and has a material body—the 
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‘is’ being the is of identity. A human person has material properties because she has a 
body, but this does not entail a contradiction because the dualist is not saying that she 
is entirely physical. In regards to this set of contradictory properties one can say that 
God the Son is an immaterial being who possesses a human body. The Son has 
material properties by having a body. A proponent of the two-minds view is not 
committed to saying that the Son is entirely physical. All she is committed to is saying 
that Christ has physical and non-physical parts.  
What about necessary and contingent existence? The Son is a necessary being, 
but His humanity only exists contingently. The person of Christ exists necessarily, but 
His humanity exists contingently. The two-minds view proponent can argue that 
persons who are merely human exist contingently, whereas a person who is fully 
human but not merely human can exist necessarily. Of course, a particular problem 
arises here. It would seem that the Son is only contingently related to His humanity. If 
He were necessarily related to His humanity, His humanity would not be contingent. 
This means that the Son’s human nature is accidental to Him.420 But accidental 
properties are repugnant to divine simplicity.
421
 The Son, being simple, cannot have 
accidental properties. The communicatio idiomatum entails that the Son has accidental 
properties so divine simplicity is false.  
There might be a way to get around this. Perhaps one could say that only the 
divine nature is simple, and not the Son. Of course, that would seem to destroy the 
doctrine of divine simplicity and call into question whether or not the Son is divine. 
Another possible way to get out of this is to deny the communicatio idiomatum, but 
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then one would be left with an inadequate Christology. One might deny that the Son 
has His humanity accidentally, and insist that the Son has it necessarily. Apart from 
being prima facie implausible, this would seem to lead to immanent subordinationism 
and not economic subordinationism. Divine simplicity is incompatible with the 
Incarnation. So much the worse for the divine timeless research program.  
One might try to ditch divine simplicity in order to save the timeless research 
program. As noted in previous chapters, this move would undermine the justification 
of the timeless research program since one of the reasons often given in support of 
divine timelessness is divine simplicity. Say one bites the bullet and gives up this 
source of justification for divine timelessness in an attempt to make the timeless 
research program compatible with the incarnation. She will still need to answer 
several questions. Is it possible for the reduplicative strategy to solve the apparent 
contradiction of the Son being atemporal and temporal? Is it possible for the Son to 
have a timeless part and a temporal part? Or is this a case where one of the properties 
trumps the other? That may depend on which theory of time she adopts. 
 
The Reduplicative Strategy, Presentism, and Endurantism 
 There appears to be a very serious difficulty with presentism and the 
incarnation even if one does concede that the humanity is a part of Christ. The New 
Testament witness, the early Church creeds, and the orthodox theologians all affirm 
(a) that the Son pre-existed His incarnate state, and (b) that the human nature of Christ 
came into existence at a particular point in time.
422
  The humanity of Christ simply did 
not exist until sometime around 4 B.C. At that time it came into existence. The Son 
could not have been embodied with His humanity prior to that time because there is 
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nothing in existence for the Son to be embodied in. God may have timelessly decreed 
that the Son be embodied with His humanity at 4 B.C., but that does not alter the 
situation. Embodiment is an extremely intimate relation that the Son stands in with 
regard to His humanity, and it is impossible for Him to stand in this relation until His 
humanity comes into existence. This is a real change in the Son since the Son is 
deeply and intimately related to His humanity. There is no way to remove the 
temporal implications of this. One might say that <Christ qua divine is atemporal> 
and <Christ qua human is temporal>, but this does nothing to relieve the fact that at a 
particular time in history the Son began to be embodied in a particular human nature. 
The human nature is accidental to Him. The human nature is not itself timelessly 
eternal. It simply did not exist prior to 4 B.C. The divine nature itself undergoes a 
substantial change in the incarnation by becoming embodied in an endurant human 
nature.  
 There are two ways that I can see to avoid this. First, one can give up the 
doctrine of embodiment. Maybe she will go medieval and say that the Son is not 
really related to His humanity. If she does this she will have given up any adequate 
notion of the incarnation. Embodiment is what distinguishes the Son’s humanity from 
everyone else’s humanity. If we abandon embodiment there is no legitimate sense in 
which we can say that the Son assumes humanity, nor any way for us to distinguish 
the relationship between the Son and His humanity from the Son and our humanity 
(i.e. how are we not incarnated by the Son as well?).This first option is not a very 
good move to make. The second possible way to avoid this is to adopt four-
dimensional eternalism.  
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The Reduplicative Strategy, Four-Dimensionalism, and Perdurantism 
 Instead of treating Christ’s human nature as an endurant object that objectively 
came into existence with the flow of time, one could say that Christ’s human nature is 
a perdurant object. On four-dimensionalism Christ’s human nature is eternally located 
at a particular stretch of time. The human nature will either be a spacetime worm or a 
series of person stages (temporal counterparts). On this theory of time there is no 
worry about the human nature not existing and then coming to exist. The temporal 
parts that make up the humanity of Christ are co-eternal with God. There is never a 
state of affairs in which God exists alone without the universe. There is never a state 
of affairs at which God exists without the humanity of Christ.  
 This may look attractive at first, but an entailment must be brought out. In 
adopting perdurantism one has given up the numerical identity of God the Son with 
Jesus Christ. This is because perdurantism is not numerical identity through time. 
Poidevin explains that “the result is a view of Christ and God the Son as overlapping 
series of temporal parts.”423 Maybe this is not as bad as it sounds. One will recall that 
perdurantism is considered by its defenders as identity through time, just not 
numerical identity through time. An object persists through time by having temporal 
parts at different times. The temporal parts are supposed to be in the right sort of 
intimate spatiotemporal and causal relations to each other in order for identity to 
obtain. Surely an omnipotent being like God could ensure that the humanity of Christ 
has the appropriate relations necessary for identity through time.  
 What we have, then, is a model where God the Son is eternally related to a 
perdurant object. The perdurant object in question is a human nature. Does this save 
divine timelessness? Poidevin says no since the Son is causally joined with a 
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collection of temporal parts.
424
 The Son acts at particular times, so temporality trumps 
atemporality. Perhaps a dyothelite can get around this. She could assert that the Son 
eternally decrees that the human nature will certain actions at particular times. The 
human will acts in time, whereas the divine will acts timelessly. This sounds 
promising, but we have not yet considered embodiment or the communicatio 
idiomatum. If the Son is embodied in a perdurant humanity He will assume the 
properties of that humanity. That means that the Son will literally have temporal parts. 
Such a thing is odious to divine timelessness and divine simplicity since no timeless 
or simple being can have temporal parts. One could avoid this by saying that it is only 
the human nature that has temporal parts, but the success of this move depends on 
denying embodiment and the communicatio idiomatum.  
 
Four-Dimensionalism and Subordination 
 Another problem arises for four-dimensionalism and the incarnation. There is 
a very real sense in which the Son is eternally incarnate. Typically a Christian 
theologian will want to say that there is a distinction between the immanent and the 
economic Trinity. The immanent Trinity distinguishes the necessary and essential 
properties of the divine persons as they are in themselves. The economic Trinity 
distinguishes the contingent properties and roles of the divine persons in the economy 
of creation and salvation. The immanent Trinity is about God in Himself, and the 
economic Trinity is about God in relation to creation. In the economy of salvation the 
Son is subordinate to the Father by being obedient in the incarnation. This is said to 
be a non-essential role that the Son freely takes in the economy of salvation. (Of 
course, divine simplicity makes this impossible since God cannot have any accidental 
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properties.) In what sense can we maintain the immanent and economic distinction on 
four-dimensionalism? The Son is eternally incarnate, and thus would seem to be 
eternally subordinate. If the Son is eternally subordinate it is hard to see how He is 
equal to the Father.  
 The defender of divine timelessness cannot say that the Son is only 
subordinate to the Father from 4 B.C. on. That would make the Son temporal, and on 
four-dimensionalism that would entail that the Son has temporal parts. As such, one 
has abandoned timelessness, simplicity, and immutability.  
 A possible move is to distinguish between absolute necessity and conditional 
necessity. Absolute necessity applies to the essence of a thing, whereas conditional 
necessity applies to a particular supposition.
425
 A triangle has three sides of absolute 
necessity. The proposition <Socrates is sitting> is conditionally necessary. If it is true, 
it is impossible for <Socrates is not sitting> to be true. With this modal distinction in 
hand one might say that the Son is subordinate of conditional necessity. It could have 
been the case that God did not create a world at all. It could have been the case that 
the Father or the Holy Spirit had become incarnate instead of the Son.
426
 However, 
God has eternally decreed the subordination of the Son. There never was a time when 
the Son was not subordinate to the Father. We may have a modal collapse on our 
hands since it appears that things could not have in fact been otherwise given divine 
timelessness, immutability, and simplicity.  
 Modal collapse can be avoided if it were actually possible for God to have 
willed differently. Of course, this will be of little help. If God could have done 
otherwise, He would have been different in several respects. First, His will would 
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have been different. Instead of actualizing world A where the Son becomes incarnate, 
God would have actualized world B where the Holy Spirit becomes incarnate. 
Second, the contents of God’s beliefs would have been different. Instead of believing 
<the Son is incarnate> God would have the belief <the Holy Spirit is incarnate>. The 
reason this is of little help is that it undermines divine simplicity. A simple God 
cannot have any potential. He is pure act. If God could have done otherwise, these 
possibilities represent potential acts that God could perform but did not. As such, God 
has unactualized potential, so He isn’t pure act and thus not simple. Further, it 
undermines immutability. His act of creation does affect His essence in a meaningful 
way. God is the creator of world A, and not the creator of world B. If it is actually 
possible for God to create a different world, then God is not immutable in the sense 
necessary to preserve divine timelessness. The type of immutability needed is one 
where it is impossible for God to undergo any change or be different in any respect.  
Modal collapse can be avoided by getting rid of divine simplicity and 
immutability, but those doctrines are reasons for holding to atemporality. If those 
doctrines go, we have no reason to think that God is timeless. Further, these doctrines 
play an integral role in the atemporalists’ research program. Abandoning these 
doctrines destroys the integrity of her research program.  
  
Can a Timeless God be Embodied? 
This is an important question for part of the meaning of incarnation is that the 
Son became embodied in human flesh. If a timeless God cannot become embodied, 
the incarnation is impossible. In this section I will argue that a timeless God cannot 
become incarnate.  
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Can a timeless person be embodied on the account discussed above? It seems 
the answer is no for a timeless mind can, at best, only satisfy one of the four 
conditions for embodiment. Le Poidevin points out that the “conclusion must be that 
on the composite model, only Christ’s human mind is embodied, not the divine 
mind.”427 I will take each condition in turn.   
The first condition holds that the disturbances and goings-on of the physical 
body will cause pain or pleasure in the mind. The human mind of the Son can meet 
this condition, but the divine mind cannot. The human mind felt pleasure as the body 
was warmed by the sun. The human mind felt pain as the body was nailed to the 
cross. The divine mind felt none of this for several reasons. First, these are 
temporal—successive—experiences and a timeless mind cannot have such 
experiences. Second, a timeless mind is also impassible. It does not receive joy from 
anything ad extra, nor can its’ joy be interrupted. The classical tradition has long held 
that the divine nature did not suffer on the cross, but that only the human nature did. It 
would appear that, on a two-minds view, the divine mind does not meet this first 
condition. 
The second condition holds that the mind can feel the inside of the body. The 
human mind of Jesus experienced the feeling of an empty stomach during the 
temptation in the desert. I gather that the resurrected body of Jesus also experienced 
hunger. In Luke 24:36-43 Jesus appears to the disciples. Naturally they are startled 
and suspect He may be a ghost. Jesus offers several signs that He is not a ghost. He 
points out that He has a body that can be touched. Then He asks if there is anything to 
eat. I would assume that the broiled fish He was given gave Him the feeling of a full 
stomach. It seems that the human mind of Jesus can experience the body’s full 
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stomach, but that the divine mind cannot. First, these bodily sensations are successive, 
and a timeless mind cannot experience succession. Second, an embodied mind would 
acquire knowledge through the body about this feeling, and a timeless mind cannot 
acquire knowledge. Third, a timeless mind is also impassible, and an impassible mind 
cannot suffer the pangs of an empty stomach.  
The third condition is that a mind can move a body through a basic action. 
This seems to be the only condition that a timeless mind could satisfy, but it satisfies 
this condition in a rather unsatisfactory way. The doctrines of omnipotence, 
omniscience, and omnipresence entail that God can move any material object through 
a basic action. There is nothing that distinguishes God’s ability to perform basic 
actions on the entire universe from His ability to perform basic actions on a particular 
body. (Since I have already argued that there is no account of atemporal action with 
temporal affects, I will not rehash that here. For the sake of argument I will assume 
that there is some working model of this.) There is another problem as well. On the 
two-minds view under consideration the God-man has two wills. The human mind 
wills that the body perform some action a through a basic action. The divine mind 
also (timelessly) wills that the body perform some action a through a basic action. We 
have overdetermination. One of the wills is completely unnecessary and superfluous. 
How can this overdetermination be avoided? One could posit that the human mind 
actively wills a whereas the divine mind passively or permissively wills a. This would 
be a similar move to that which is made in various accounts of divine providence.
428
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This move, however, is open to the charge of Nestorianism. In short, it is not clear 
how one can avoid having to bite the bullet on overdetermination. Regardless of this, 
if a defender of atemporality can solve these problems she has only succeeded in 
satisfying one of the conditions for embodiment.  
Yet not all models of the incarnation can even come this close to satisfying 
this condition. Some explicitly deny that the divine mind interacts directly with the 
body. As such, the divine mind does not move the body by a basic act. Instead, the 
divine mind works through the human mind in order to interact with the body. 
Thinkers like Origen, Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, Gregory of 
Nazianzus, Augustine, and Peter Lombard claim that the human mind acts as a 
mediator between the Son and the body. The idea is that the human soul serves as a 
wall to protect the Son from the “grossness” of human flesh.429 It also somehow 
prevents the Son from suffering any change. This was a widespread model in the 
ancient and medieval Church. If one adopts this model she cannot satisfy the third 
condition for embodiment.  
Condition four holds that a mind’s locus of perception on the world is from the 
perspective of the body. The mind acquires perceptual knowledge from the body. As 
noted above, on a two-minds view the divine mind does not acquire knowledge 
through the body. Only the human mind does.
430
 The divine mind as timeless and 
omniscient cannot acquire any knowledge. Further, a timeless mind cannot look out 
from the perspective of a body for that would require having succession. An 
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embodied mind perceives one thing, then another, then another, and so on. A timeless 
mind cannot have any succession.  
The final condition holds that the thoughts and feelings of the mind are 
affected by the body. The human mind of Jesus can easily satisfy this condition for 
reasons noted above, but the divine mind cannot satisfy this condition. The divine 
mind is timeless, immutable, and impassible. It cannot be affected by anything ad 
extra nor change in any way. If the human body suffers, the divine mind will remain 
in a timeless state of uninterrupted joy. As the human body grows weak and tired, the 
human mind feels it and thinks “I should get some sleep.” The divine mind has no 
knowledge of what it is like to feel tired, nor can the divine mind entertain the belief 
“I should get some sleep” in any meaningful way. This is because a timeless, 
immutable, and impassible mind cannot possibly experience the sensation of growing 
tired and weak.  
As it stands divine timelessness can at best meet one of the conditions for 
embodiment. Since all five conditions must be met for embodiment to take place one 
may reasonably conclude that the divine mind is not embodied. Sure the human mind 
is embodied, but so what? God the Son is a divine mind. If a timeless divine mind 
cannot become embodied, and God the Son is a divine mind, God the Son cannot 
become embodied. It looks like we do not have an incarnation on our hands, and that 
is repugnant to Christian belief. At worst we have a divine mind that is generically 
related to all physical objects in virtue of being omnipresent (and I have already laid 
out the problems this causes for divine timelessness). At best we have a divine mind 
that is loosely related to a human mind and a human body. But the relation is far too 
loose to be considered an adequately orthodox account of the incarnation. If a timeless 
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divine mind cannot be incarnate, Christians must give up belief in timeless divine 
minds.  
 
Two-minds and Knowledge De Se 
God’s knowledge is so peculiarly his own, as to be impossible to be 
communicated to any thing created, not even to the soul of Christ; though we 
gladly confess, that Christ knows all those things which are required for the 
discharge of his office and for his perfect blessedness. 
—James Arminius431 
 
 Some may find my last point about embodiment contentious. Perhaps one 
might object that the relation thus described is not too loose to be considered an 
adequately orthodox account of the incarnation. What makes it ‘too’ loose? The fact 
that the divine mind is not embodied. No embodiment, no incarnation. Further, the 
fact that the divine mind bears the same basic generic relation to the human mind and 
body of Jesus that He does to all other human minds and bodies makes the relation far 
too loose to count as an incarnation.
432
 But the point can be pressed even further when 
we consider de se beliefs. Knowledge de dicto is knowledge about propositions. 
Knowledge de re is knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge de se is personal 
knowledge, or knowledge from a first-person perspective. Allow me to illustrate. 
 Say there is a bachelor named Bill. Bill has heard on more than one occasion 
that <sex is enjoyable>. After receiving an overwhelming amount of testimonial 
evidence to this effect he develops the de dicto belief that <sex is enjoyable>. 
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However, he has not yet experienced it himself first-hand. At this point Bill’s belief is 
merely propositional. Now say that Bill finds a wonderful girl and he marries her. 
After Bill’s wedding night he acquires a new type of knowledge: knowledge de re. He 
can now entertain the de re belief that <sex is enjoyable>. He has a first-hand 
knowledge of sex that he did not previously have. He can also entertain a de se belief, 
or a first-person belief that no one else can entertain: <I enjoy sex>. Other people can 
entertain a similar belief, but it will not be the exact same de se belief as Bill’s since 
this de se belief is about Bill. One cannot entertain this de se belief unless he is in fact 
Bill. Other people can entertain the de se belief <I enjoy sex>, but it will be a unique 
de se belief about them and no one else. The “I” will pick out someone different, and 
thus be a different proposition.  
 What does this have to do with the incarnation? In the incarnation there is 
supposed to be one person with two natures. There is supposed to be one “I” and not 
two, one subject of predication and not two, etc. Given the nature of de se beliefs—
that they pertain to unique individual persons—it seems that a timeless God cannot be 
incarnate since a timeless God cannot entertain the same de se beliefs as Jesus. 
Consider the following. 
22) If God the Son cannot entertain the same de se beliefs as Jesus, God the 
Son is not the same person as Jesus.  
23) If God the Son is timeless, immutable, and impassible, He cannot entertain 
the same de se beliefs as Jesus.  
24) Thus, God the Son is not the same person as Jesus.  
(22) follows from the nature of de se beliefs. They are beliefs that can only be 
entertained by a unique person. Two different persons cannot share the same de se 
belief. They may have a belief that takes the same form like <I enjoy sex> but the 
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propositional content is different for each person. The “I” in the proposition picks out 
a different person.  
(23) is the contentious premise and will need some defense. Say that Jesus has 
the following de se beliefs.  
(25) I am suffering on the cross. 
(26) I began to feel hungry at 11:00am on 3 March, 28. 
(27) I began to feel full at 12:00pm on 3 March, 28.  
(28) I am ignorant of the second coming.  
Can God the Son entertain (25)-(28)? No. As impassible the Son cannot 
entertain the belief <I am suffering>. As timeless and immutable the Son cannot begin 
to feel hungry or full. As omniscient the Son cannot be ignorant. Jesus has these de se 
beliefs, but the Son does not.  
Maybe the proponent of divine timelessness can try to find beliefs that the Son 
has that would make it the case that He counts as the same person as Jesus. What kind 
of beliefs could the Son entertain? Perhaps one will say that the Son has the tenseless 
belief that <my human nature is hungry at 11:00am on 3 March, 28>. Surely this is 
not good enough. This simply is not the same de se belief that the human mind of 
Jesus holds. It should be noted that the atemporalist cannot say that the Son holds the 
tenseless belief <I begin to feel hungry at 11:00am on 3 March, 28> for that would 
entail the Son beginning to have an experience and a belief at a time. Nor can the 
atemporalist say that the Son holds the tenseless belief <I begin to feel hungry at 
11:00am on 3 March, 28 qua humanity> for that would fall subject to the problems 
noted above for reduplication: it would entail (26).  
The de se beliefs of the human mind of Jesus captured in (25)-(28) are 
temporal beliefs that involve change, succession, variation of emotion, ignorance of 
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the future, and an interruption of pure joy. These simply are not de se beliefs that any 
timeless, immutable, or impassible divine mind could entertain. (23) is true, and (24) 
follows. If the Son is not the same person as Jesus, we have a clear cut case of 
Nestorianism.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter I have argued that divine timelessness is not compatible with 
the incarnation. One must pick either divine timelessness or the incarnation. 
Christians cannot give up the incarnation. It is essential to Christian belief and is at 
the heart of the gospel. Atemporality is not at the heart of the gospel, nor is it essential 
to Christian belief. Divine timelessness is not even taught in the Bible, and as such 
Christians should feel no worries about giving up divine timelessness in order to be 
faithful to the explicit teachings of scripture. 
  
  
Conclusion 
 
 
 In this thesis I have argued that the Christian God cannot be timeless. Given 
the existent theories of time, and the models of God’s relation to time, the prospects 
for a Christian research program that includes divine timelessness seem bleak.  
 At this point, however, there may be some remaining questions from the 
reader. Perhaps the reader might like to know why I did not discuss certain issues. For 
instance, one might ask about my commitment to presentism, or my take on the 
biblical material. Clearly, given the limitations of space and the focus of this research, 
certain questions must be left aside for future work. I have done my best to discuss all 
of the essential issues, but there are other remaining issues that I would like to have 
gone into. In this conclusion I wish to note briefly some of these issues, and how they 
might impact the debate concerning God’s relation to time.  
 
Science and Time 
 First, it might seem quite obvious that I did not delve deeply into scientific 
issues as they relate to time. For example, one might ask how I can square my 
presentism with contemporary physics. It should be noted that many others have done 
this better than I can, and as such I am quite happy to leave it in their capable 
hands.
433
 There are fascinating debates in the current literature between presentists 
and eternalists over the implications of relativity theory and quantum mechanics. 
Ultimately, this debate is not relevant for the argument of my work. As I have argued, 
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even if four-dimensional eternalism is the correct theory of time, God cannot be 
regarded as timeless. However, my current and future publications develop an account 
of God’s temporality from a presentist ontology of time, and not from an eternalist 
ontology. Further, my account of divine temporality holds that time never began to 
exist. As such, a few brief comments seem appropriate at this point, but it must be 
stressed that these comments are brief. A thorough discussion would delve into the 
structure of scientific theories, the ways that theories are open to metaphysical 
interpretation, and what one thinks mature scientific theories are accomplishing.
434
 
This task clearly goes beyond the bounds of this current project.  
So what can be said briefly? Two things. First, there is no clear difficulty from 
physics for presentism. Second, science does not clearly teach that time began with 
the universe. I will look at physics and presentism first before discussing the 
beginning of time. 
 First, it should be noted that with the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), there 
is nothing within the theory itself to give us a preferred reference frame. In other 
words, there is nothing within the theory itself that picks out the present moment of 
time.
435
 A four-dimensional eternalist can argue that STR refutes presentism and 
confirms her theory of time. Christopher J. Isham and John Polkinghorne explain this 
understanding of STR as follows.  
In the common parlance, within the theory of relativity there is no unequivocal 
meaning to the simultaneity of events, and thus no unequivocal concept of 
“time.” Consequently, no meaning can be ascribed to the notion of the future 
or past…The most that can be affirmed in special relativity is the existence of 
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an infinite family of possible definitions of time that are related to inertial 
reference frames.
436
 
 
Since there are an infinite number of inertial frames a four-dimensionalist will 
contend that there is no justification for the presentist to pick one inertial frame as 
privileged over any other to be the cosmic present.
437
 
This might seem like an interesting fact of STR that should inform our 
philosophy of time. However, should we give up our deep seated beliefs about the 
present just because nothing within STR can pick out the present? Polkinghorne 
cautions us against doing so. “[A]s for the present moment, so much the worse for 
physics if it finds no representation of such a basic human experience—only the most 
crassly physical reductionist could try to turn this deficiency of science into a source 
of metaphysical insight.”438  
Why think Polkinghorne is right about this? To begin, it should be noted that 
STR, and physics in general, does not give us all there is to know about the world. For 
instance, fundamental physics does not account for causation, and that is not a good 
reason for giving up our belief that causation is a fundamental feature of reality.
439
 
Just because STR fails to account for certain features of reality, does not mean that we 
should give up our belief in those features of reality.  
Ultimately, the presentist should not give up her position in light of STR 
because STR is, strictly speaking, false. This is why physicists continue to work on 
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the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) and Quantum Theory (QT). Bradley Monton 
explains as follows.  
[STR] is a false theory, and prima facie it's not a good idea to derive 
metaphysical lessons for our world on the basis of a theory that doesn't 
correctly describe our world. The reason special relativity is false is that it 
makes predictions at variance with reality. For example, according to special 
relativity, a clock at the base of a building will run at the same rate as a clock 
at the top of the building (assuming that the building is in an inertial frame of 
reference), but in fact the clock at the base runs slower. This fact about clocks 
is one piece of evidence for general relativity—according to general relativity, 
a clock in a stronger gravitational field runs more slowly than a clock in a 
weaker gravitational field.
440
 
 
GTR tries to account for things that STR does not. However, the four-
dimensional eternalist could try to say that GTR is incompatible with presentism since 
GTR does not give us a preferred way to pick out the present either. But this is not 
entirely obvious since there are some models of GTR that do allow us to develop a 
way of picking out the present. What must be understood is that fundamental physics 
does not give us the whole story of reality. As noted earlier, just because one 
scientific discipline fails to account for a particular facet of reality does not entail that 
other disciplines fail to do so as well. When one investigates reality she will want to 
draw upon as many disciplines as possible because each discipline focuses on a 
particular facet of reality. In order to figure out which model of GTR best describes 
the universe that we actually live in, one will need to draw upon knowledge gained 
from other disciplines. As Polkinghorne explains, “when one moves from physics to 
cosmology and considers the Universe as a whole, there is indeed a natural meaning 
of cosmic time (and so a cosmic ‘now’), which is defined by the frame of reference at 
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rest with respect to the cosmic background radiation.”441 These considerations from 
cosmology are how we come up with the calculation that the universe is about 13 
billion years old. When one considers scientific disciplines other than fundamental 
physics the privileged present comes back with vengeance. So GTR does not appear 
to be a problem for the presentist either.  
However, it should be pointed out that GTR, as it is currently stated, is most 
likely false since it conflicts with QT. As noted above, GTR says that clocks run 
faster or slower depending upon the influence of the gravitational field they are in. QT 
says that ideal clocks run the same rate regardless of the gravitational field. Does QT 
conflict with presentism? Again, the answer is that it does not obviously do so. It is 
the case that many physicists maintain that the relativity of simultaneity is a lesson 
learned from STR, and they hope that this will carry over into QT, but it is also the 
case that there are interpretations of QT that do have a privileged present.
442
 What 
must be made clear is that we have no idea what time will ultimately look like in later, 
more refined versions of QT.
443
 It is quite possible for a version of QT that is 
compatible with presentism to turn out to be true, but we simply do not know at this 
time which version, if any, will turn out to be the true description of reality.  
What about the beginning of time? Does contemporary science not teach us 
that time began with the Big Bang? As noted in chapter 2, this is far from obvious. 
Contemporary physicists appear to be working with something like a relational theory 
of time, but it is not quite as fundamental as the relational theory. The physicist 
concerns herself with measurable physical changes, and as such is methodologically 
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unconcerned with the possibility of non-physical changes. Further, she will be 
methodologically unconcerned with whether or not the absolute theory of time is 
true.
444
 For the physicist, if there is no way to develop a clock, then there is no time 
even if events can still be in a chronological order of before and after.
445
 This is why 
one will see physicists say things like “time began at the Big Bang,” but then see 
physicists ask the question, “What came before the Big Bang?” The same physicists 
who say that time began at the Big Bang will also posit a universe or a multiverse 
generator that exists prior to our universe to explain what caused the Big Bang. This is 
an unfortunate way of talking. It would be better for physicists to say that measured 
time as we know it began shortly after the Big Bang (to account for the Planck era), 
instead of saying that time simpliciter began at the Big Bang. Quite clearly they are 
talking about time before the Big Bang when they posit prior universes with their own 
measured time series.  
 
The Bible on Time and Eternity 
One might complain that I did not delve too deeply into the biblical literature. 
I had developed a full chapter that offered a detailed discussion of the biblical 
material on God, time, and eternity, as well as a companion chapter that developed the 
method of perfect being theology and how to use it to interpret scripture and use 
scripture to interpret perfect being theology. But space limitations did not allow me to 
include these chapters. Basically, what I would suggest is that there is no hint of 
divine timelessness in the Christian scriptures. One can easily find the claim that God 
exists without beginning and without end in the Bible, but one cannot find anything 
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that resembles a “without succession” clause anywhere in scripture. More 
importantly, the Bible describes eternity in temporal terms. As G.E. Ladd puts it, 
“Biblically, eternity is unending time.”446 As Ted Peters explains,  
The biblical words that come into English as eternity refer to an age that lasts 
a long time, perhaps forever. Isaiah uses the Hebrew word olam when writing, 
‘I will make you majestic forever, a joy from age to age’ (Isaiah 60:15 
NRSV). In the New Testament the principal term for eternity is aion, which 
comes into English also as aeon, meaning literally an age that lasts for a long 
time. This is the term used in John 3:16: ‘For God so loved the world that he 
gave his only Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but 
may have eternal life (zoen aionion).’447 
 
Whenever the Bible talks about eternity it uses temporal terms. Despite this 
fact, most of classical Christian theology ignores this. Most thinkers throughout 
Church history in the East and the West simply assume divine timelessness and offer 
proof-texts like Exodus 3:14, Numbers 23:19, Malachi 3:6, Psalm 90, Psalm 139, 
Isaiah 46, James 1:17, 2 Peter 3, Hebrews 13:8, and Revelation 1:4. None of these 
passages, however, give us the without succession clause. In fact, many of them 
directly, or indirectly, suggest that God does have succession in His life. Further, the 
passages noted here that say that ‘God does not change’ have a limited scope of the 
ways in which God does not change. They do not teach that God does not change in 
any way, shape, or form. Instead, they speak of God not changing with regard to 
keeping His promises, or never ceasing to be good and loving. Elsewhere I have 
delved into these issues a bit more, but space limitations do not permit me to discuss 
this fully here.
448
  
If one were to hazard a guess as to why so many theologians overlooked the 
fact that the Bible speaks of eternity in temporal terms, one should recall the 
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discussion of chapter 3. There I discussed how classical theologians and philosophers 
were in the practice of providing non-temporal readings of temporal terms when 
speaking about God. Theologians admitted the weakness of using terms like ‘present’ 
to speak of God, but they felt that they had given a sufficiently non-temporal meaning 
to such terms in these particular contexts. One example comes from the Dionysian 
mystical tradition in the East. Theologians in this tradition struggled with the fact that 
the Bible uses temporal terms to describe eternity. They note that sometimes the Bible 
uses terms that are not worthy of God, and that these things can be interpreted to say 
something that is truly worthy of God.
449
 The idea seems to be that even though the 
Bible describes eternity in temporal terms, we should not let this deter us from 
believing that God is timeless and that He existed before, and without, creation. In 
other words, one can give these temporal statements in the Bible a non-temporal 
interpretation. This is better than the kind of proof-texting that has characterized 
classical Christian theology, but it still does not help to ground divine timelessness 
biblically because there is nothing within scripture to suggest that we should give 
these passages a non-temporal reading.
450
  
By way of example, consider the common proof text for divine timelessness, 
Revelation 1:4, which speaks of God as the one “who is and who was and who is to 
come.” This phrase, and variations of it, is repeated throughout the book of 
Revelation. It might strike one as an odd proof-text for divine timelessness since it 
clearly speaks of God having a past and a future. The same God who came to us in the 
past is the same God who is with us now, and is the same God who will come again. 
This phrase does imply God’s eternality, but it also implies succession in the life of 
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God. An atemporalist, like the 17
th
 Century theologian Francis Turretin, will quickly 
point out that this passage speaks anthropopathically, so in actuality it does not imply 
succession in God.
451
 Why think a thing like that? Since the time of Plato, 
philosophers have thought it proper to speak of the timeless God in the present tense 
only. As noted in chapter 3, the present tense ‘is’ is given a non-temporal reading 
when applied to the timeless God. As such, it is not strictly speaking proper to refer to 
God with the past tense ‘was’ and the future tense ‘will be.’  
Should we take Revelation to be speaking anthropopathically here? Surely 
not!
452
 One of the striking features of Revelation is that it continually speaks of God 
as being the one who “was, is, and is to come.” Despite the fact that the timeless ‘is’ 
was widespread by the time Revelation was written, the author does not take up this 
way of speaking about God. The conceptual machinery needed to speak about God as 
timeless was available to the author of Revelation, and yet the author does not use it. 
As David E. Aune points out, the predicate ‘the One who is’ was often used in Greco-
Jewish texts to denote a non-temporal existent God. The author of Revelation, instead, 
modifies the common language and speaks of ‘the One who is to come.’ The formula 
of the One who is, was, and is to come is unique to Revelation, and does not occur 
elsewhere in Jewish and Christian texts before the 3
rd
 Century.
453
  
The author of Revelation seems to have a particular purpose in speaking of 
God as the one who “was, is, and is to come.” It is not an unreasonable interpretation 
to say that the author wishes to emphasize that this God has a past. Even further, this 
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God has made promises about the future. Given what we know about God from what 
He has done in the past, and is currently doing in the present, we can be confident that 
He will keep His promises. In short, the portrayal of God advanced by the author of 
Revelation is deeply temporal. As such, it cannot be a proof-text for divine 
timelessness.  
It should be noted that not all proponents of divine timelessness think that the 
Bible clearly teaches the doctrine. Paul Helm, for one, thinks that the doctrine is 
underdetermined by the biblical evidence.
454
 Others are even less confident than this 
about the biblical teaching. The 17
th
 Century theologian Stephen Charnocke notes that 
the Bible does not teach that God exists without succession. However he does offer a 
reason as to why the Bible does not teach this—because of the weakness of our 
concepts the Holy Spirit describes eternity in the Bible simply as without beginning 
and without end.
455
 The 20
th
 Century theologian Louis Berkhof makes a similar move. 
He notes that Scripture teaches that God’s eternity is duration throughout endless 
ages, but comments that this is merely a popular way of speaking. Scripture, he says, 
does not give us the strict philosophical sense of eternity (i.e. without succession), 
though he suggests that 2 Peter 3:8 might allude to it.
456
 
This is an unfortunate suggestion from Berkhof because 2 Peter 3:8 makes no 
such allusion. 2 Peter 3:8 alludes to Psalm 90, and as discussed in chapter 2, Psalm 90 
teaches that God exists from perpetual duration in the indefinite past to perpetual 
duration in the indefinite future. It is hard to get a more temporal description of God 
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than this. But this is not the only reason that Berkhof’s suggestion is unfortunate. It is 
unfortunate because reading 2 Peter in terms of divine timelessness completely 
obscures the message of the passage. It is at this point that I wish to mention the 
unfortunate pastoral consequences of the divine timeless research program. In 
chapters 3 and 5, and elsewhere, I showed that the divine timeless research program 
explicitly entails that God is not the Creator, Redeemer, and Lord because of divine 
simplicity.
457
 To say that this undermines the basic claims of the Bible would be an 
understatement. But the destructive effects of the timeless research program to the 
gospel do not stop there. Divine timelessness prevents us from affirming the loving 
patience of God since a timeless God cannot be patient.  
Let us take a closer look at 2 Peter 3. The context of the passage involves 
Peter considering an objection to the eschatological claims of the gospel.
458
 Peter 
comments on the fact that some scoff at Christians for proclaiming that Christ will 
come again and judge creation. The scoffers point out that things appear to be the way 
that they have always been with no signs of a coming judgment. Peter rebukes such 
claims as impatient and invokes the simile of “a thousand years as one day” as a way 
to demonstrate God’s patience as compared to ours. The everlasting God does not 
count slowness as the scoffers do. A thousand years is a long time for us, but not for a 
God who exists from “everlasting to everlasting.” The main thrust of Peter’s claims is 
to call the believer to be patient and rest assured that God has His reasons for waiting 
to return. God, according to Peter, has a very good reason for waiting. God is patient 
towards us so that all might reach repentance since He does not wish for anyone to 
perish. That is a very patient God for, it seems to me, God will have to wait a very 
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long time for all to reach repentance.
459
 This passage, like Psalm 90, is profoundly 
temporal in its description of God. God is described as patiently waiting to return at a 
time that He decreed for a specific purpose, and this is something a timeless God 
cannot do. A timeless God cannot patiently wait. As Richard Bauckham makes clear, 
“[t]he intended contrast between man’s perception of time and God’s is not a 
reference to God’s eternity in the sense of atemporality…The point is rather that 
God’s perspective on time is not limited by a human life span.”460 To read 2 Peter 3 in 
terms of divine timelessness is to completely gut the passage of any meaning. 
Ultimately, it robs the hope of the gospel from the believer since it entails a denial of 
what the passage teaches. A timeless God cannot be patient, and the passage teaches 
that God is extremely patient. So much the worse for divine timelessness! 
 
Truthmaker Theory 
Another issue that space did not allow for is truthmaker theory. This issue is 
relevant to debates about the ontology of time as well as about the doctrine of 
omniscience. Is presentism compatible with truthmaker theory? Is truthmaker theory 
coherent? Can God know the future? There are extensive and ongoing discussions of 
these questions, but a full examination is beyond the bounds of this project. In this 
section I shall note some of the relevant issues for the philosophy of time and 
theology. 
The intuition behind truthmaker theory is that every truth claim or proposition 
has a truthmaker—something that makes the proposition true. This is called 
Truthmaker Maximalism. Another intuition is called Truthmaker Necessitarianism 
which is the thesis that the truthmakers must necessitate the truths that they make 
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true.
461
 The big idea, then, is that there is something about the world that makes every 
truth claim true. In other words, truth is grounded in the way the world is, or truth 
supervenes on being. What makes <the grass is green> true? The fact that there is in 
the world grass that instantiates the property green, makes the proposition <the grass 
is green> true. Any patch of grass can serve as the truthmaker for this. There is not a 
one-to-one correspondence between all propositions and truthmakers. The 
relationship between propositions and truthmakers is one-to-many in most instances.  
 The four-dimensional eternalist will say that truthmaker theory entails 
eternalism and is in direct conflict with presentism. Truthmaker theory is said to 
conflict with presentism in the following way. There are truths about the past, but on 
presentism the past no longer exists. What makes it true that <Caesar existed>? The 
times at which Caesar existed no longer exist on presentism.
462
 To put a theological 
spin on the objection, what makes it true that <Christ atoned for our sins>? On 
presentism the significance of Christ’s death seems to be swept away with the flow of 
time. How can the work of Christ have any meaning for our lives if that state of 
affairs no longer exists?
463
  
 Presentists respond to objections like this in many different ways. One option 
advocated by Trenton Merricks is to say that truthmaker theory is false.
464
 Not all 
propositions need a truthmaker. For instance, necessary propositions, like those of 
mathematics and logic, are necessarily true. Nothing makes these propositions true. 
They simply are true. So truthmaker theory is false. Further, truthmaker theory cannot 
seem to handle negative existential propositions like <unicorns do not exist.> Within 
the confines of standard truthmaker theory, there is nothing that can serve as the 
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truthmaker for this proposition, and yet we know it is true. So, again, truthmaker 
theory is false.  
 Other presentists take a different option. Instead of rejecting truthmaker 
theory, many opt for a modified version of truthmaker theory.
465
 In fact, most 
truthmaker theorists in general agree that truthmaker needs to be revised. However, 
there is no consensus on what this revised version looks like.
466
 Some wish to ground 
truths about the past in an ersatz b-theory of time where tenseless propositions about 
the past serve as the truthmakers. Others seek to ground truths about the past in the 
infallible knowledge of God. Another option is to ground truths about the past in 
properties that the world currently possesses. For instance, what makes it true that 
<Christ atoned for our sins>? The fact that God the Son exists now and currently 
exemplifies certain properties serves as the truthmaker. It is true that the Son was 
crucified. Being the one who was crucified is an enduring property of the Son. It is 
something that will forever be true about Him.   
This is a fascinating area of ongoing research, but again, a full discussion 
cannot be had here. What is relevant for the argument of this project is that, even if 
truthmaker theory does entail an eternalist ontology of time, God cannot be regarded 
as timeless. However, it is not clear that truthmaker theory entails an eternalist 
ontology of time since truthmaker theory is currently being revised or outright 
rejected. How one responds to truthmaker theory will have an impact on one’s 
theology.  
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What is relevant for future work in theology with regard to truthmaker theory 
is whether or not God can know the future. Most divine temporalists today are 
presentists, but they disagree about whether or not God knows the future. Divine 
temporalists will claim that the presentist can account for truths about the past, but not 
all agree that the presentist can account for truths about the future. Calvinists and 
Molinists who are divine temporalists will say that there are determinate truths about 
the future, and God has an exhaustive knowledge of these truths.
467
 Open theists, 
however, disagree. There is some debate amongst Open theists about whether or not 
there are truths about the future, but the more sophisticated versions of contemporary 
Open theism hold that most propositions about the future do not have a determinate 
truth-value of true or false.
468
 In particular, the Open theist says that propositions 
about what creatures will freely do in the future do not have a determinate truth-value.  
Here is where truths about the future connect with omniscience. As discussed 
in chapter 4, omniscience is traditionally defined as God knowing all truths and no 
falsehoods. For every true proposition, God knows that it is true, and for every false 
proposition God knows that it is false. Take the proposition <Sam will choose to 
propose to Sally next Friday>. A Calvinist and a Molinist will say that this 
proposition has a determinate truth-value, and God, being omniscient, knows what 
that truth-value is. The Open theist, however, will say that this proposition does not 
have a determinate truth-value. It is neither true nor false. Since an omniscient God 
knows all truths and no falsehoods, and this proposition is neither true nor false, there 
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is nothing for God to know. So, an omniscient God does not have exhaustive 
knowledge of the future.  
This is a topic of much debate in the contemporary literature, but I suggest that 
future work needs to be done in the following areas. First, the actual implications of 
truthmaker theory for the status of propositions about the future need to be 
established. Since it is not clear which version of truthmaker theory, if any, will 
ultimately be deemed to be true, it is not clear what the entailments of truthmaker 
theory are for propositions about the future. So, theologians should be cautious when 
articulating theories of omniscience in light of truthmaker theory.  
Second, the biblical material seems to testify to the fact that God knows a 
great deal more about the future than the average Open theist will allow for. It also 
seems to present a God who is engaged in meticulous divine providence, and not the 
risk taking God of Open theism. It is the case that some Open theists have tried to 
rebut this challenge by abandoning a risky God, and offering accounts of God’s 
providence that appear to be quite meticulous.
469
 It is even claimed that God can, if 
necessary, override our freedom to bring about certain states of affairs that He desires 
to bring about.
470
 If Open theists make these claims, it needs to be made clear what 
the difference is between them and Calvinists.  
Third, when one says that propositions about the future do not have a 
determinate truth-value of true or false, one has to rewrite certain fundamental laws of 
logic, like, say, abandon the principle of bivalence.
471
 That is not a desirable to 
situation to say the least.  Suffice it to say, theologians should be cautious when 
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fleshing out the supposed philosophical and theological implications of truthmaker 
theory.
472
  
 
The Trinity 
Another issue that one might raise is whether there might not have been 
further discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. As noted in chapter 2, within some 
theological circles the doctrine of the Trinity has been used to argue that God must be 
temporal, or must be timeless. It is not clear what the argument is from the Trinity to 
divine temporality, despite the fact that several have suggested there is one. Further, 
some of these so-called Trinitarian divine temporalists end up saying the most bizarre 
things like the Father is timeless, the Son transcends time but is also simultaneous 
with all of time, and the Holy Spirit experiences time according to presentism.
473
 It is 
not clear what this means, nor is there any good reason for projecting these types of 
distinctions into the doctrine of the Trinity.
474
 Further, this clearly destroys the 
homoousious of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit since each has different essential 
properties.  
I do, however, feel some of the force of the argument from the Trinity to 
divine timelessness. Paul Helm, for instance, once argued that divine timelessness is 
needed to avoid Arianism. He has softened this argument in recent years, and I have 
offered a refutation elsewhere.
475
 The problem, however, is not divine timelessness or 
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temporality. The problem is with the traditional doctrine of the Trinity. The way the 
traditional doctrine is articulated simply entails Arianism. In order to avoid Arianism, 
one must get rid of the claim that the Son and Holy Spirit are eternally caused to exist 
by the Father. The Christian theologian should not be concerned about giving up this 
claim since it is not biblically grounded.  
 
The Real Conclusion 
 In this thesis I have sought to argue that the Christian God cannot be timeless. 
I have also argued that there is no such thing as a third way between timelessness and 
temporal. So that leaves us with the claim that God is temporal. My suggestion is that 
theologians and philosophers should abandon the divine timeless research program 
because it is unworkable and devastating to Christian theology. Instead, they should 
devote their attention to developing divine temporality and the implications that has 
for the rest of Christian theology. Divine timelessness has had a long run in Church 
history, but it is time to bury it, and move on.  
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